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ABSTRACT
In the 2016 presidential election in The Gambia, the opposition coalition party had
successfully managed to overthrow an authoritarian government, which has ruled the
country for 22 years. Contrary to the notion of the prevalence of ethnic voting in African
elections, this study found that ethnicity is not the only issue influencing the voting
behavior of Gambian voters. The concerns voters have on human rights abuses by the
Jammeh’s admistration has resulted in a regime change. The election was issue-based,
even though Gambian voters were split on the question of the economy, their
dissatisfaction on Jammeh handling of human rights during the 22 years regime lasted
led to his lost to opposition coalition leader Mr. Barrow, in the 2016 presidential
election.
Using similar approach to investigating issue voting, this dissertation also
examines the local government election of mayors in the Banjul City Council (BCC) and
Kanifing Municipal Council (KMC). In both sets of elections, Gambian voters have
demonstrated that they were more concerned with issues than with the ethnicities of the
candidates in elections. Just as concluded that Jammeh lost the election based on issues
of human rights, more than ethnocentric voting, the study of local government elections

indicates that decisions were primarily based on issues that people care about more so
then the ethnic identities of mayoral candidates.
In their determination of the second and third most important issues, differences
emerged between the voters in Banjul and those in the KMC. While voters in the KMC

ii

have stated that their second and third preferences were waste collection and building
road networks within the city, the voters in the mayoral election in Banjul have
repeatedly noted the importance they attached on fixing the road infrastructure of the city
as their second and third most considered issue when they voted in the local government
election. Although, ethnicity was important for some of the voters, but it wasn’t the main
factor that influenced the regime change than the concerns Gambian voters have on
Jammeh’s handling of human rights in the country.
Keywords— Election, Issue Voting, Ethnicity and Regime Change.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the year 2016, Gambian citizens made their way to the polls to elect a new president.
The incumbent Yahya Jammeh had been in power for 22 years and was seeking re-election.
Jammeh was a tyrant who ruled Gambia with an iron fist by curtailing individual rights and
freedoms and implementing state sanctioned political oppression against innocent Gambians who
were imprisoned, tortured and exiled for being critical of his regime. With Jammeh’s firm grip
on The Gambia’s political system, a regime change was unthinkable. As Darboe and Kora (2017)
have noted, the 2016 election was an assured victory for the incumbent dictator; the opposition
coalition parties had zero chances of winning against Jammeh, but on election day, the people
spoke and the results of the election sent a resounding message of defeat to Jammeh. The sudden
regime changes in the country had witnessed the ousting of a corrupt leader/regime, the first of
its kind in the country’s history, marking the dawning of a new democracy in The Gambia.
The victory of the opposition against an incumbent government is part of a trend sweeping
across the African continent, signaling hope of a changing pattern towards strengthening
electoral democracy. Elections that were organized in countries including Senegal, Ghana,
Nigeria, and others, have all witnessed a peaceful, democratic transfer of power following the
outcome of the ballot boxes. In the Gambian, however, the 2016 presidential election resulted in
an unexpected outcome that left many people stunned. A dictator who had been in power for 22
years organized an election and lost to the opposition, raising several important questions this
dissertation will address. Why did Jammeh lose the election? If the election was issue-based,
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what were the issues the Gambian voters had considered in this election? In order words, were
Gambian voters more concerned with the status of the Gambian economy or human rights abuses
when they voted in the presidential election? Or were the voting decisions of the Gambian
electorates informed by their ethnic identities, influencing their support for a particular
candidate?
While this study will primarily be focused on The Gambia as a case study, it will also
compare similarities as well as differences in voting behavior across many African countries.
The evidence provided in this dissertation will advance our knowledge, by offering a
comprehensive understanding of the voting perspectives of the African voters. While, there are
many factors such as religion, ethnicity and class that continue to shape the outcome of some

elections in Africa, is it also important to note that the influences of these factors vary from one
country to another? This study of The Gambian elections has branched away from the argument
of ethnicity, to show that issues mattered and that Gambians voters wanted their political leaders
to address those issues, namely the economy and human rights. Using similar logic of issue
voting, this dissertation further examines the 2017 mayoral election in the Kanifing Municipal
Council and Banjul City Council. These two are the only cities that are constitutionally allowed
to organize election. This dissertation compared the differences as well as similarities in voting
between local government and national elections and found that Gambian voters care more about
issues that concerns them than the ethnicities of the candidates. In the presidential election,
Jammeh lost the polls mainly because of his poor handling of human rights. In the local
government elections, Gambians have voted in support of candidates based on their policy
positions, such as creating employment opportunities for young people, improving road
2

infrastructure, garbage collection and upgrading the drainage system in Kanifing and Banjul.
Ethnicity, although important for some voters in the presidential election, in the local
government, support for candidates based on ethnic considerations appears to be lower among
Gambian voters. The results and broader implication of this study is discussed in detail.

Overview of Democracy
Democracy, a political concept, means a government derives its source of legitimacy
from the people. Huntington (2016) defines democracy as a form of government that allows the
most powerful and collective decisions to be made by the people through periodic elections.
Democracy allows all individuals, without discrimination, to freely run for public office, and the
electoral franchise is extended to the masses to take part in the voting process. Democracy,

according to Dahl (1971), is a political system that is completely responsive to the needs of its
citizens. Joseph (1997) combines the deliberative and liberal elements of democracy to argue that
a political system is democratic if the ultimate power derives from the people. Democracy
broadens the political space to allow the participation of the masses in formulating public policy
as well as to set up a constitutional mechanism that will protect individual freedom necessary for
open political competition. While democracy as a system consists of different forms of political

participation, holding an election is one way of measuring a government’s legitimacy because
elections provide an avenue for people to express their political preferences peacefully through
the ballot box to support their candidates of choice.
A democratic rule is preferable to authoritarianism because the ultimate decision-making
lies in the hands of the people. The strength of electoral processes in Africa, even though in some
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instances it has produced violent outcomes, signals the changing trend in democratic
consolidation. For the first time, Africa’s monopolies of power, controlled by a few kleptocrats,
are challenged by the masses. The new democratic dispensation has empowered the people to
take part in decision-making, which, in one way, has enabled them to hold public officials
accountable. Thus, in a democracy the will of the people dictates the course of actions of the
government and this is often achieved through public deliberations. Simply put, “a country is
democratic if it grants its people the right to choose their own government through periodic
elections, secret ballot, multi-party elections on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage”
(Fukuyama (2006) p. 43).
Therefore, in order for a country to be classified as a democracy, examining the voting

process is necessary because of the enormous powers vested in the citizens to dictate the political
future of a country through the ballot box. Election is a form of political expression, which when
carried out in a free and fair environment, has the power to determine the political future of a
nation. Political power belongs to the people. The masses decide. Only through them do leaders
derive their true legitimacy to rule. However, even though democracy as an ideal system of
government is implemented differently across the globe, for a nation to be regarded as
democratic, the basic foundations of democracy must be fully functional. Nations democratize
because they want to be democracies.
The principles that uphold a democratic system of a nation are not only interrelated, but
they also are interdependent, and one cannot function in state without the implementation of
others. In essence, democracy cannot be cherry-picked as its components may be different, but
they perform complementary roles in the realization of the democratic ideals of a state. Some of
4

the principles of democracy are as follows: rule of law, accountability, freedom of expression,
observing checks and balances among the agencies of government, and the protection of
fundamental human rights. Separation of powers is critical in diffusing the structures of
governance and preventing the concentration of powers in a single governmental entity to
prevent the potential abuse of power. A commitment to checks and balances enables the three
main organs of government – executive, legislative, and judiciary – to function within the
confines of the law as stipulated in a particular nation’s constitution. Therefore, while organizing
periodic elections in a country may signify a stronger will by political elites to steer a nation's
future towards a democratic path, holding elections alone would not classify a country as a
democracy. As Gros (1998) notes, a country is either a fully-fledged democracy or it is not; and,
better still, it is in the process of democratization in the hope that one day, it would become a
democracy, when all democratic principles are functional in the governing processes.

Democratization Processes on the African Continent
In Africa, elections were organized by many countries in the 1960s after they attained
independence and promoted self-rule, marking the end of colonialism. The winds of
democratization that blew over the continent placed the people at the center of a crucial decision-

making process about the political future of their nations. Afolabi (2017) advances three
significant historical periods that paved the way for the introduction of competitive elections
based on universal adult suffrage in Africa. The first phase of African democratic transition
ranged from the 1950s to 1960s. Afolabi argues that this political process was short-lived as
many of these countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria, later succumbed to military rule. The
second period, which began in the 1970s, witnessed the re-introduction of competitive elections
5

following a brief departure of the military government. In this period, while some states where
able to make giant strides in consolidating democratic rule, others resorted to authoritarianism
because of the presence of the military dictatorship that continued to oppress and curtail
individual freedoms. Afolabi's third phase of democratization in Africa started in the 1990s as
the Cold War ended, ushering in an environment of competitive elections in countries such as
Benin, Zambia, and Mali.
So, despite many challenges the African continent faced in its drive toward democratic
governance, the wind of change continued to blow throughout Africa across five decades. Also
during this time, many African countries periodically organized elections and political leaders, to
a considerable extent, were handed mandates by the people, reducing the prospects of coups

d’état. Collier (2009) describes this political transformation as Africa's breaking from its
experience in the past, especially during the time of the Cold War when most leaders assumed
power through violence. Currently, however, more and more countries in Africa continue to
organize successful elections and to peacefully transfer power from one government to another
through the ballot box. While democracy appears to be gaining solid grounds over
authoritarianism on the continent, it is also important to note the particularities in which
democracy is implemented across various African countries.
Africa’s democratic transformation has been a subject of a much wider academic enquiry
by many scholars, sometimes leading to sweeping claims by political scientists that African
electorates vote based on the candidate’s ethnicity more so than on issues. However, as complex
as human society is, political institutions created to maintain social order are also riddled with
complexities, making it impossible to devise a single approach that will truly capture the voting
6

preferences of the masses of electorates in Africa. Many of the political scientists who examined
elections in Africa have raised the issue of ethnicity as cues that African electorates used in
determining their choices for candidates in elections. This has led to widespread claims by many
academics that elections in Africa are synonymous with an ethnic census, that is, voters are more
likely to support candidates of their own ethnic groups than they are on the issues the contestants
promised to address (Collier, 2009; Porsner, 2005).
While this dissertation does not dismiss earlier studies on ethnic voting, the data
evaluated of the presidential election in The Gambia, contradicts the ethnic votes' perspective.
What follows is an examination of issue voting and exploration of multiple factors in addition to
ethnicity, which influenced the preferences of Gambian electorates in the 2016 presidential

election. Conversely, while many analysts have advanced the notion that ethnicity predicts votes
among the electorates in Africa, this study shows that not all elections on the continent are
influenced by ethnicity. Elections in Africa, like areas in all parts of the globe, have multiple
factors that shape their outcomes, and it is misleading to rely on a single variable of causality for
interpreting the complexity of electorate preferences.
To empirically investigate voting behavior of the people, this research explores a broader

theoretical perspective that will highlight the structures of social categorizations as they exist in
Africa and how they shape political outcomes that reflect social divisions among various groups
in the society. Social cleavages, in particular ethnic cleavage, is the most noticeable form of
social identity in African society, dictate the political orderings of the society where political
activities occur. Thus, the researcher’s evaluations of the ethnic-cleavage structure in African
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society shape the understanding of ethnic politics and how that structure influences the voting
behavior of African electorates during elections.

Theoretical Perspectives on the Origins and Nature of Social Cleavages
Theories, in general, provide a wider spectrum that deepens our understanding of

causality in examining political phenomenon, although no single theory will be enough to supply
all the answers to a complex political concept such as the voting behavior of a group of people.
However, the usefulness of theory relies heavily on the principle of generality, which we can use
to apply to comparable situations, even though the results obtained may differ.
The cleavage theory assumes that a society is divided into various groups who are
competing to obtain political power. What is cleavage ? Cleavage is a social categorization as
well as division among various groups in a society; this division may be in the form of class,
religion, ethnicity, or race. In Gambian political society, other social cleavages, such as religion,
class, and ethnicity, exist. Without downplaying the significance of other social structures,
ethnicity is one of the most visible forms of social identification in The Gambia. It is not,
however, the singular influence on the voting behavior of the masses.
The origin of the cleavage structure dates back to a historical account of how political
parties were formed in Europe. This theory was developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who
have observed that social identities were the basic foundations of partisan formation in Western
Europe. As European society was undergoing social division along regional cleavages between
the center and the periphery, marked by social inequalities between workers and owners of
property, political parties were formed along these existing social cleavages. Also, the church
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played a powerful role in medieval Europe, adding another layer of social division that created a
religion-based ideological split between Catholics and Protestants. This split has continued to
shape the ideological foundation of European politics.
The term “cleavage,” according to Bornschier (2009), denotes a specific type of conflict

existing in democratic politics. The conflict consists of various social groups whose foundation is
based on the structural transformations triggered by large-scale processes of nation building. In
Europe, such processes dated back to the time of various social revolutions that swept through
the continent, uprisings such as the French and English revolutions that led to a split of social
groups based on religion and class structures within the society. The enlightenment period in
European history witnessed the emergence of the Industrial Revolution, which facilitated the

creation of a new social groups, the owners of capital and those who provided labor in the
society. The presence of these cleavage structures did not automatically translate into political
divisions; however, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), these social classification were
eventually politicized and transformed into established political parties by the elites who had
played a key role in mobilizing the masses to effect social change. To understand how current
politics challenge African countries and how existing ethnic divisions continue to shape the
continent's politics’ investigating the cleavage theory is necessary in this context to draw
similarities as well as differences that exist between the formation of political parties in Europe
and those in Africa.
Similarly, constructivist theory also provides a solid foundation for supporting the study
of Africa’s complex voting behavior. Constructivist theory advances the notion that humans have
multiple social identities that are constructed in the course of social, political and economic
9

interactions. “An ethnic group is socially constructed when individuals in a cultural societies
self-consciously identify with one or more objective ethnic markers to distinguish their
membership within the groups from those of the out groups” (Mozaffar et al. 2003, p. 83). We
know that human beings have always ascribed names and consciously given meaning to multiple
objective social markers such as language, religion, race, caste, tribe, territory etc., denoting
social differences. These ascribed social categorizations continue to shape the character and
make-up of our society as well as the political systems we establish.
Studying the cleavage structure and the role it plays using constructivist theory would
mean that ethnicity is salient in African political society because social identities are constructed
around it, which is occasionally used towards political ends. It is important to note that ethnic

differences in society are not in themselves problematic. However, what is concerning is the use
of ethno-linguistics as it relates to a country’s demographic population to foster political division
by pitting some groups against the others and, in some cases, by distributing political benefits by
creating social advancement to some members while depriving others because of their opposition
to the ruling party. Understanding the politics surrounding ethnic cleavage is to argue that each
of these ethnic groups competes to obtain political power by supporting its co-ethnic candidate in
an election to influence public policy in favor of members of one’s own ethnic group.
While the theory of the cleavage structure shows the existence of various groups in both
Europe and African society, how these groups are politicized differs in many ways across these
two continents. In Europe, social cleavages were transformed into established political parties,
primarily driven by ideological foundations motivated by human curiosity to experiment to
explore the best form of government. In Africa, on the other hand, the most common forms of
10

social identity are ethnicities; so partisan formation is less based on strong ideological
foundations and more likely takes on the characteristics and natures of the ethnic social makeup
of the country.
Also, given the hereditary nature of ethnic identity in Africa, compared with class, it is

difficult – if not impossible – for a voter to switch his/her political party affiliations. Even as an
individual has obtained upward mobility in social status, his/her ethnic identities remain the
same. In contrast, since political parties are based on ideological beliefs, Europe’s voters have
greater flexibility and can more easily shift their party support corresponding to any change in
their social status. With the benefit of studying cleavage politics, a more solid understanding of
the factors that influence the formation of political parties is possible and one can go further to

show the different factors that unify various groups in the society as they gravitate towards
political actions. While cleavage politics in Africa are fundamentally different from those in
Europe, comparing them provides a strong foundation for understanding how ethnicity, religion
and class continue to shape the political participation of the masses in these two distinct
continents. Based on this, the reasons Europe and Africa differed in the structural foundations of
partisan formation can be further explored in the next section.

Study of Cleavage Structures in Europe and in Africa
The political parties, which were formed around existing social cleavages in Europe, can
be traced to several historical events. In European society, the French and English revolutions
produced various class structures, which were later transformed into well-established political
parties. In Africa, by contrast, political parties were formed along ethnic cleavages, the origins of
11

which are linked to pre-colonial African and traditional political institutions, where the
hereditary title of king/queen or ruler was based on ethnic and family lineage. The leadership
system also operates a system of hierarchy, which recognizes certain ethnic groups to constitute
a class of nobles in the society, which is able to rule alongside the royal family. In the
kingship/chieftaincy system, leaders derive their political authority through family lineage; being
born into a family of rulers automatically guarantees leadership based on family succession.
Although African societies had a well-established political system since prior to the
arrival of the Europeans on the continent, the existing ethnic cleavage structure became divided
and politicized with the advent of colonialism. European powers were clever technocrats who did
not alter most of the traditional political institutions but strengthened and exploited them to

promote their own political interests. For instance, in British-controlled territory in Africa, the
British governors, understanding the challenges they faced due to the lack of personnel to expand
their political representations in the countries they controlled, implemented indirect rule as a
means to ease the burden of governance. Indirect rule was a form of governance wherein a
colonial power used traditional political institutions, such as kings or chiefs, to rule their subjects
while making them answerable to the British colonial government. The British used force to
coerce local leaders into accepting their authority to rule over them, while allowing chiefs or
kings to serve as intermediaries between the colonial government and the local people.
Traditional rulers who opposed British rule were forcefully dethroned and replaced by puppets
willing to serve and protect the interests of colonial administrators.
Therefore, to understand the voting behavior of the masses of African voters and trace the
origins of partisan formation based on ethnic cleavages, one must investigate the continent's
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historical experience with colonialism. The colonial policy of divide-and-rule may not have been
the only cause of Africa’s current ethnic political predicament but it's certainly one of the main
effects of colonialism, which is widespread and highly noticeable in the ethnic politicization of
the African continent by European colonial powers. As noted by Mozaffar et al. (2003), colonial
institutions created incentives for constructing and politicizing ethnic groups through a policy of
divide-and-rule. Colonialism has not only affected the formation of ethnic groups but has also
restructured their sizes and distributions within their geographic spaces. Thus, “the greatest
responsibly lies on the colonial administrators for not just creating groups, but also dividing
nations according to the landscape of ethnic cleavages, which continues to shape the
characteristic of modern African nations” (Posner, 2003, p. 12).
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Chapter 2
Colonialism and European Administrative Policies in Africa
Ethnic polarization on the African continent has been linked to the legacy of colonialism.
One single event that dramatically shaped the historical foundation of Africa was the Berlin
conference in 1884 that witnessed a scramble for the partition of the African countries by major
European powers namely the French, English, Germans, Portuguese, and Spanish. Following the
industrial revolution, there was a greater demand for raw materials to sustain Europe’s economic
growth. The African continent, with abundant and untapped natural resources, was enticing to
the European powers in their quest to secure new territories to exercise political control and
dominance. The European interests forcefully imposed territorial boundaries, which divided the
African continent into countries, regions, and created political divisions that in some areas
transected similar ethnic and linguistic groups. They also empowered some ethnic groups with
political authority, while suppressing and marginalizing others.
Many of the European powers that came to Africa adopted distinctive colonial policies.
These policies as evidence will later show, have impacted local populations differently in the
countries where they imposed control. In this section, the focus will be on the French policy of
assimilation and the British indirect rule policy, investigating how these policies contributed in
some ways to the ethnic politicization that continue to challenge the governance institutions of
modern African states.
Lange (2004) defined the British indirect rule system as one “based on a tripartite chain
of patron–client relationship where the chiefs serve as an intermediary between the colonial
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administration and the local population”. The British indirect rule consisted of a mixture of
traditional and conventional forms of authority, which while different, in many ways, perform
complementary functions in the administration of the colonized state. These structures of power
were divided between the British colonial administrations and the native chiefs functioning under
the guardianship of the colonial government. The indirect rule system provided room for local
inhabitants to maintain their traditional institutional, governance structures, and helped preserve
the customary laws and traditions of the indigenous people residing in the protectorates. Under
the direct administrative control of the British, English laws were used to govern the population.
In the implementation of the indirect rule system, the British recognized the importance
of maintaining traditional authority in the administrative processes. However, this did not mean

that chiefs had freedom to dictate public policy any way they wanted; rather, they were required
to conform to the demands of the British. The local chiefs were, to some extent, granted quasipolitical autonomy to regulate public policy in their chiefdoms, but only in line with the British
colonial interest. Lord Lugard, the primary architect of this system has noted that “the indirect
[rule system] is designed in such a way that it operates in two sets of rules, the British and the
native rules all working together under the guardianship of a single government in which the
native chiefs have well-defined duties.” The chiefs’ roles are complementary to that of the
government, and “have no right to place and power unless to the services that he renders to the
State” (Lugard, 1926, p. 203).
The chiefs were empowered to serve as custodians of customary laws and their
authorities were constrained and limited to the territories in which they control. The chiefs,
despite the important duties they perform in maintaining laws and order in their jurisdictions,
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must maintain unquestionable loyalty to the colonial government. This means that chiefs have to
balance their responsibilities of serving the interest of their direct subjects and at the same
protect the interest of the British. Where the interest of the colonial administrators conflicts with
that of the natives, the chiefs are expected to safeguard the British interest over that of their own
community, tribe or people or risk the possibility of being deposed. Those who failed in these
efforts were forcefully dethroned by the British and replaced by individuals who were willing to
serve as puppets to the colonial administrators.
Lange (2004) describes two characteristics of administrative practices that were jointly
implemented both in the colony and in the protectorate. In the colony, he observes that there
were well established and organized central administrations that regulated the society based on

rules enforced by the police with a functioning legal system that settled disputes through the
courts, through which law and order was maintained. In the protectorate, on the other hand, the
local chiefs some of whom obtained this position either through traditional patrilineal family
inheritance, or through forceful installments by colonial officials, were allowed to rule based on
existing customary laws. They presided over the settlement of disputes, maintained law and
order, and collected taxes, which were often generated from the control of land and communal
contributions from their subjects for onward delivery to the British.

Reasons Why the British Used Indirect Rule in Africa
There were several reasons why the British used the indirect rule system as a colonial
policy in Africa. First, the colonial administrators had faced significant human resource
shortages to rule large sections of the territories under their control. This was due to hostile
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environmental climatic conditions, especially in West Africa, marked by the prevalence of
diseases, such as malaria, yellow fever, small pox, and many other tropical illnesses that the
British were susceptible to when they first arrived on the continent. Those who managed to
survive tropical diseases and returned to England, were afraid to take a similar dangerous
mission of returning to the continent. Just as Lange noted, “the extensiveness of colonial rule
also depended on the disease environment of the colonies. Since much of Africa was
characterized as ‘‘white man’s grave,’’ neither settlement nor the use of numerous European
officials was feasible even if great economic potential existed” (Lange, 2004, p. 3). Hence, to
effectively govern these vast territories, colonial administrators had no choice but to rely on the
existing traditional institutional system of local chiefs to assist them in the administration of their
colonies, and to help maintain law and order.
The second reason for use of the indirect rule system was that colonialism was not just a
political imposition of a foreign territory by a dominant power, but the decision to colonize a
country was strongly predicated on the potential economic gains for the colonizing state.
Economic considerations powerfully influenced British colonial officials’ willingness to
establish indirect rule in countries where the potential was high for huge economic gains.
Acemoglu et al. (2014) have noted that “indirect rule across Africa was not only viewed by
colonial administrators as a way to maintain law and order, but also to decrease the economic
cost of local government administration by deliberately keeping in place the existing rulers and
ruling through them.” Colonialism is an economic investment that allows unrestricted access and
rights by the colonizing country to trade with the local people. In Africa, the indirect rule system
was also cost effective given that few British officials were on the ground, significantly reducing
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expenditures, and allowing the colonial government to maximize its income generating capacity
from the colonies while minimizing costs to England.
Finally, in some countries the indigenous people were hostile to the presence of
foreigners on their land. In South Africa for instance, in order to prevent any potential conflict

with the locals, the British instituted a system of indirect rule as a preventive measure to avoid
direct contact with the local inhabitants and minimize confrontations with them given to the
history of violent resistance to the presence of the British in their lands. As Lange (2004)
observes, the large presence of British settlers in South, and East Africa created strained relations
with the local inhabitants, some of whom were denied access to their land which was crucial for
their survival as most of them depended on subsistence agriculture to feed their families.

Additionally, many local populations were resentful of the presence of the missionaries
who had introduced Christianity and converted many locals from their traditional religion to
Christianity. For many local people, the Christian religion contradicted and undermined their
customs and traditions and people felt like they were under attack by the presence of the
missionaries. It is also important to note that the British colonial government had no particular
interest in the education of people in their colonized territories, nor were they concerned about

the spirituality of the African population in the countries they colonized. This void was filled by
the Christian missionaries’ activities, who took it upon themselves to build schools, and taught
the indigenous people how to read and write in English language in order to understand their
bible.
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The legacies of the missionary activities in the African continent has added another layer
of renewed political conflict that revolves around religious affiliations, reinforcing the already
existing ethnic politicizations that continue to dominate African politics. The British, even
though presumed to be neutral in their approaches to the Islamic groups who were spreading
Islam, and the role played by Christian missionaries, favored the latter over the former, as
evidenced by their frequent intervention to protect the Christian missionaries from harm any time
they came under attack by locals. The British policy of indirect rule, despite its narrow focus,
was a cost-effective administrative mechanism that has created a long-lasting impact on the
political development of post-colonial African societies. As a result, one the most noticeable
impacts of indirect rule on the African states is the rise of cleavage politics where the
politicization of ethnicities and religion continues to create many of protracted conflicts in
African nations, hindering the advancement of democracy.

The French Policy of Assimilation in the Colonized States of Africa
The French colonial policy of assimilation was very different from the British indirect
rule system. France, unlike Britain, did not only assume direct administrative control over the
newly colonized territories but had also instituted a system that combined political and cultural

elements with the goal of transforming the existing African political institutions to assimilate
them with those in France. The policy to assimilate was a deliberate political effort to incorporate
politics with French culture, which the French promoted in the colonized territories under their
control. Assimilation in this respect meant imposing Francophone and French cultural
expectations on Africans in ways that entailed a much deeper social integration, going beyond
political dominance.
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In essence, African states that were colonized by the French, were regarded as an
extension of the state of France, and unlike the British, the French did not maintain the existing
traditional system of local governance. Their policy called for a total domination of the newly
conquered territories. The French disrupted most of the existing pre-colonial traditional intuitions
of chieftaincy that were in place and replaced them with French bureaucracies. Their strategy
was a civilizational mission embedded with a policy of acculturation that strongly encouraged
Africans to abandon their ways of lives and adopt the French culture.
This colonial policy made the French uniquely different from the rest of the European
powers who colonized Africa. The French policy of assimilation offered strong incentives for
upward political mobility to Africans who demonstrated strong proficiency of the French

language and were able to adopt to the French way of life. The French unlike other European
powers, “are more culturists than racist in any strict sense, because they have accepted black
Africans who speak perfect French into their legislature” (Huntington, 1996, p. 200). Africans
who were able to embrace France as the undisputable colonial power and were able to
successfully embrace the French language and culture were given leadership roles in the French
administration without any discrimination based on the person’s ethnic or religious backgrounds.

The assimilation policy was carefully designed to integrate colonial peoples into a
'Greater France', promoting cultural assimilation through a centralized bureaucratic structure that
coordinated all administrative functions of the colonies and was headed by the governor general
based in Dakar, the Senegalese capital. The colonial state intentionally restructured traditional
systems of governance and replaced them with a centralized French bureaucratic structure. Just
as noted by Blanton et al. (2003), the relations with the central state was no longer mediated by
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traditional local elites, whose powers were eroded by the administrative power of the colonial
state. They argued that French colonial rule reflected a strong motivation for the creation of a
centralized state, which “incorporated individuals from different regions and ethnic groups into a
single social and political system, all under the control of an administrative state” (Blanton et al.
(2003, p. 12).
In Senegal, for instance, which had served as the sub-regional headquarters of the French
colonies of West Africa, individuals who were born inside the territories of Saint Louis,
Refusque, Goree, and Dakar referred to as the French commune, were granted special status of
automatic citizenship of France. Whereas, those born outside of these territories were only
granted French citizenship dependent upon their ability to fluently speak the French language

and demonstrate successful integration into the French culture. In essence, the French established
their language and way of life as the official means of communication and living, and only those
who mastered the language and culture could be granted citizenship to France and be allowed to
serve in higher administrative positions.

Comparing the Effects of the French and British Colonial Policies in NationStates of Africa
The two colonial powers examined here, differed significantly in their policies of
colonialism. While the British indirect rule was a dual system that allowed both traditional rulers
and British administrators to play an active governance role in the colonial state, the French
dismantled traditional political systems and replaced them with French bureaucratic
administration. As a result, one cannot discuss the impact of colonialism in African states
without pointing out the effects the French and British colonial policies have had on
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institutionalizing the existing political divide. It is this divide that made it extremely difficult to
unify various cleavage structures, such as ethnicity and religion, which are currently active in
African politics. As a consequence, there has been continued hindrance of the democratic
processes as well as socio-political advancement of modern African states since their attainment
of independence.
In what ways have the different British and French colonial policies impacted the postcolonial partisan formation in Africa that is now reflected in the current ethnic politicization?
The legacies of the British and French have in some ways shaped the nature and characteristics
of modern African states in many ways. For instance, the British system of indirect rule, which
was heavily reliant on local rulers, had not only attempted to incorporate existing local

institutional structures of ethnic division, but intentionally imposed structural barriers that cut
across similar ethnic demographics , leaving some groups politically empowered, and others
deprived and marginalized. In practice the British policy of indirect rule gave autonomy to the
native administration, “which segregated locals along tribal affiliations and controlled them via
locally powerful men known as chiefs” (McNamee, 2019, p. 23).
Ethnicity was silent in the indirect rule system under the British, and according to Ali et

al. (2018), the British emphasis on native administration led to the division of the local
population into tribes, in which the British made no commitment towards inclusive governance,
and allowed traditional leaders to engage in divisive politics that empowered some groups and
excluded others as along as that the policy serve their colonial interest. In the British’s
administration of the native people, the traditional chiefs were not only empowered to rule over
their respective local populations, they were also allowed to institute a “rigid association between
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one’s ethnic identity and access to basic resources such as land and local government services”
(Ali et al., 2018).
The indirect rule policy has created a widespread ethnic stratification, which not only
heightened the prospect of ethnic conflict among various groups who competed for political

power, but also weakened the powers and authorities of the traditional rulers who were at risk of
being deposed if they countered the British interest. In his observations, McNamee (2019) finds
that in countries where indirect colonial rule was implemented, there is a strong relationship with
people identifying in ethnic identities terms than they would have on their national identities
across sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that “ethnic conflict should be more frequent in former
British colonies because of the effects of the British colonial rule, and maintains that “indirect

rule in particular, has left intact traditional patterns of social organization that facilitated the
mobilization of aggrieved minorities for collective action” (McNamee, 2019, p.12).
In contrast to the British colonial policy of indirect rule, the French policy of assimilation
established a centralized bureaucratic administrative policy, which promoted the political
participation of all ethnic groups in the state. Under the French policy, all people regardless of
their ethnic or religious identities, were seen as equals in the eyes of the state and individuals

were evaluated for public functions not because of their family connections to traditional
leadership, but based on their ability to perform and understand French administrative rules,
language, and culture. As Ali et al. (2018) clearly noted, local administrative boundaries in
French colonies did not necessarily represent specific ethnic groups and, therefore, did not hinder
various ethnic groups from belonging to the same political unit. The use of French as a common
official language was promoted throughout the colonies, encouraging language integration
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within the colonial bureaucracy. The power of local chiefs was also suppressed allowing the
French authorities to have total control of the administrative policies and governance of the
colonized states.
Additionally, the French were able to unify various ethnic groups by neutralizing conflict

and promoting ethnic harmony and cooperation, which allowed different ethnic groups to
participate in the governance process of the colony. Under the French rule, the politicization of
ethnicity was discouraged and a merit-based system was instituted that facilitated upwardspolitical mobility and advancement regardless of an individual’s ethnic background, but based
instead on the person’s proven academic performance and adaptation to French language and
culture.

Furthermore, having explored the two contrasting governance systems of the British and
French and outlining how they both differently impacted the formation of post independent
political parties that emerged in Africa, some critics may argue that colonialism is not entirely
responsible for institutionalizing ethnic and religious politics in the African continent. The
cleavage politics existed in Africa at various social levels before the advent of colonialism. The
British indirect rule policy was merely an exploitation of the existing ethno-linguistics divide, in

which they took advantage of the weak traditional institutional system of local authority and
empowered them to protect their colonial interest.
Given that colonialism ended long time ago, what responsibility do African leaders bear
for failures to unify various ethnic groups in the society? It is important to note that post
independent political parties that were formed in Africa after the attainment of independence,
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have not reflected inclusive ethnic linguistic perspectives representing the diversities of the
cleavages that existed in African states at that time. While some African leaders such as Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania, Leopold Senghore of Senegal, and many other African leaders have
individually taken aggressive steps to address ethnic cleavage politics by promoting strong
nationalism and forming inclusive ethnic and religious political parties that represented the
demographic diversities of their countries, others such Félix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast ,
Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya , and Nnamdi Azikiwe Nigeria’s first president have in many ways
failed to bring various competing ethnic groups together. While the legacy of the nationalist’s
movement in Africa has succeeded in the attainment of political independence, one crucial
challenge faced by post-independent political parties is the unification of various ethnicities.
Ethnic rivalries and tensions have not only hindered social advancement of nation-states in the
continent, but also slowed the democratic progress as some the states descended into ethnic
motivated conflicts that resulted in protracted civil wars, which brought untold suffering to the
masses of the people.
Finally, one of the strongest pillars of the British indirect rule was its emphasis on
tapping traditional chiefs to administer their people based on local customs and tradition. It is

argued that some of the customary practices put in place were, by nature, discriminatory based
on ethnic and religious backgrounds, but it has well served the British interest. In contrast, the
French colonial policy dismantled traditional administration and forcefully centralized their
colonial political system to assimilate the people into French language and culture. Both systems
of colonial policies have in many ways shaped and impacted the structure and formation of
modern African politics.
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Africa’s demographic structure created a potential vulnerability to segmentation politics
by colonial powers that exploited the policy of divide-and-rule to conquer and control Africa. In
their evaluation of modern African political system, Mozaffar et al. (2003) advanced three
features that the African political system has inherited from the colonial government: (1) the
composition of ethnic groups and the differences in group sizes, which are carefully positioned
in a way that no single ethnic group would obtain an outright majority in a country’s election; (2)
due to considerable variety and complexity in ethnic markers, a politically salient inter-group
would have limited cultural differences among the larger group; and (3) some ethnic groups are
territorially concentrated in one region or area of a country, enabling their social constructions as
a large cohesive force that gives them an advantage to present a united front toward a collective
political action.
Similarly, post-colonial regimes that emerged after independence have strengthened
ethnic division because African leaders, even as they were successful in securing independence,
failed to reformulate partisan structures that promote ethnic harmony. Political leaders who
fought to obtain Africa’s independence were overly ambitious in trying to secure political
freedoms, an idea promoted by Kwame Nkrumah who argues that Ghana’s independence would
be meaningless without the total liberation of African countries from colonialism. Hyper-focus
on independence and unification of the African states was a policy at odds with the realities of
ethnic tensions and divisions that were developing within the domestic societies of African
states. The irony is apparent. African leaders who had championed the fight for self-governance
used nationalism as a strong ideological base to rally the masses towards self-rule, but failed as
leaders in successfully establishing political parties that could unify various ethnic groups in
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shaping the political future of the newly formed independent nations. Although some countries,
such as Senegal and Tanzania, are outstanding in attaining ethnic diversity in political
participation of their societies, most African countries still face serious challenges to uniting
various ethnicities in their nations. A historical account of partisan formation on the African
continent, as discussed above, is necessary to understanding how the political events of the past
continue to influence modern-day political structures that shape the voting behavior of the
masses of the electorates on the African continent.

Evaluating Voting Intentions in Africa Based on Ethnic Cleavages
Having examined the historical origins of the cleavage structures and how they affect
political outcomes on the African continent, the foundation is laid to investigate why voters in

Africa use ethnicity as cues to support candidates in an election. Scholars who have examined
ethnic voting in African elections have advanced several factors as reasons African electorates
vote the way they do. In their study, Posner et al. (2010) argue that social identities in Africa
reflect people’s cultural ties to kith and kin, which reinforce strong social/cultural identities that
promote communal values and solidarity among the people. Ethnicity, the foundation of people's
social identities, carries strong links to people's cultural makeup, which is used as a tool toward

political advantage. Posner noted, “Ethnicity serves as tool for mobilizing people, policing
boundaries, and building coalitions that can be used in the struggle for power and access to
scarce resources” (Posner et al., 2010). Similarly, writing on the significance of ethnic identity
and how it influences the nature of African politics. Udogu notes, “Ethnicity is an embodiment
of a tribe, where one man’s fortune is strongly identified with the fortune of the tribe. The idea
that (this is our guy) and if he succeeds, it is the tribe that has progressed, and if he fails, it is the
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tribe that has suffered a setback. Thus, each time a high office goes to someone in the
community, his tribe members will jubilate openly” (Udogu,1999).
According to Posner (2007), Africa's political system consists of various structures of
cleavages. Religion and ethnicity, the most visible forms of social identification, are not singular.

Africans are also divided along regional, class, and linguistic differences, dominating the
political spectrum of the continent. The structure of the political system affects the regime types
formed in an African country; and while it is true that one cleavage may be politically dormant in
one country, in another it may be relevant, depending on the size and influences the cleavage has
on the political system. Why do electorates in Africa vote based on ethnicity? To answer this
question, Posner (2007) advances three main claims that shape the nature of African political

society. First, African voters are interested in maximizing the resources they can obtain from the
state, such as employment, roads, health care, and schools. Voters rely on access to these scarce
resources in exchange for votes.
Second, voters would rely on ethnic cues to support an ethnic candidate whom they
perceive as capable of delivering these resources to them. Reliance on a co-ethnic candidate
creates trust and boosts voters' confidence that the election of a co-ethnic candidate would

deliver them the political goods. Voters premise their support for a co-ethnic candidate on the
person’s ability to deliver targeted benefits to his/her ethnic loyalists. In a political society where
ethnicity is salient, a candidate’s chances of victory increase when his/her own ethnic group is
rewarded and, equally, will risk losing an election when his/her ethnic political base is neglected.
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Third, politics in Africa, unlike in developed, democratic countries, is highly centralized
on the executive branches of government, meaning that the most important decisions are made
unilaterally by the president, which diminishes the powers of the legislative and executive
branches of government. Therefore, in the struggle for political power, politics tends to take the
form of ethnic cleavages, where each group in the society competes for control of the executive
branch that carries abundant functions of power and where public policy is centralized, offering
political rewards of scarce resources to loyalists. In his evaluation of the Zambian political
society, Posner (2007) observes that ethnicity is highly considered in hiring and promoting in the
public sector. From the president down to the lowest public office holder, ethnic favoring is a
common practice and government officials often use their powers to assist members of their own
ethnic group.
In her studies of the voters in Uganda, Carlton (2015) advances that voters do not only
prefer to support their co-ethnic candidate but also tend to strongly correlate ethnic candidacy
with strong performance in government. In a situation where ethnic cues dictate the voter’s
behavior, support for co-ethnic candidates could increase the prospects for an incompetent leader
to gain electoral advantage and be elected into public office. It is a fact that if a candidate’s
performance is evaluated based on particular links to ethnic identity, a strong candidate who does
not hold favorable ethnic connections would stand to lose an election even though such a person
has an exceptional track record of performance in governance. The data obtained through this
study suggest that ethnic support matters less to voters in their choice for candidate despite the
literature's suggestion that ethnicity is a strong influence on voters compared with performance.
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Still investigating the notion of ethnic votes, scholars such as Arriola et al. (2017), argue
that voters engage in ethnic voting because they have limited knowledge about a candidate in
order to make an informed voting decision. Where electorates lack access to vital information
about a potential candidate to make informed decisions, voters may easily resort to ethnic cues to
evaluate which candidate they will support in an election. This logic holds true in a political
society where ethnic support is strongly associated with targeted allocation of government
resources based on political loyalties. Through public endorsements Carlton (2015) argues that
some differences may occur in changing the voting alignment of electorates in support of a
candidate of another ethnicity. This happens when a contestant from a distinct ethnic group drops
out of the race and publicly endorses a candidate, encouraging his or her co-ethnic group to cross
over and vote for a candidate of a different ethnicity.
Furthermore, the evidence of voting among the electorates in rural areas compared with
those found in urban centers, according to Batty (2011), suggests that cues of ethnic identity are
stronger among people living in agrarian societies compared to those living in urban centers. She
observes that people who live in agrarian societies are faced with two major barriers: (1) lower
levels of education and (2) limited access to news media that will better inform them about
candidates in an election. On the African continent, many rural voters have limited access to
basic education. Education, a strong pillar to individual enlightenment, serves as a catalyst to
independent reasoning. An educated mass is also a critical mass that cannot be easily
manipulated by politicians inclined to use divisive tactics of pitting one group against the other
to win.
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Access to education in rural areas is a serious challenge faced by many African countries
as schools tend to be more concentrated in urban centers, a great distance from those residing in
rural areas. Also, rural electorates have limited access to information about candidates and their
policy dispositions, which is critical in deciding for whom to vote. Due to the presence of these
challenges, coupled with the need to address pressing social issues that affect their societies,
African voters often feel compelled to rely on ethnic cues to choose politicians they believe will
deliver the political goods they desire.
As Bates (1983) clearly noted, voters will use the ethnicity of a candidate as a guide to
obtain informational shortcuts for party support, then rely on this information to select the party
that is most likely to deliver social benefits to them. In a study of Kenyan electorates, Romero

(2013) found that ethnicity strongly predicts support for a candidate in the election. His evidence
shows that Kenyan voters' support for a candidate was contingent upon their ability to access
private and public goods distributed by the government. When a political system is structured
around ethnic divisions, a leader's loyalty is channeled to a few sections of the populace,
especially those who helped him or her win an election. The consequence of reducing political
power to a patron-servant relationship is the loss of accountability, setting the political stage for
massive corruption and reducing the wider electorates' confidence in their government's ability to
deliver political goods to all citizens.
However, judging from many studies that have examined the voting behavior of African
electorates, it is evident that Africanists scholars do not agree on the foundational causes of
ethnic voting on the continent. While some analysts have argued that voters are to blame for
engaging in ethnic politics, noting that political elites in Africa are merely responding to voters'
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existing, and underlying ethnic cues to support a candidate, other scholars have pointed out that
political elites engage in ethnic politics because it is the most efficient means of securing the
political support needed to win an election. This political pendulum is a chicken and egg scenario
in respect to determining which came before other. Analysts pondering this issue have led to a
heightened circular debate that is counterproductive, resulting in a diminished understanding of
the voting behavior of the African voters.
In addition, a country’s size and its ethnic composition impact the electoral system.
African countries with a heterogeneous population, such as in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and South
Africa, etc., tend towards their electorates being highly divided along cleavage structures such as
ethnicity, religion and race. In contrast, nations that have a homogeneous population such as this

researcher’s own country, The Gambia, as well as Senegal and Mauritania, may be less impacted
by cleavage structures like ethnicity, religion, and race. Political competition for resources tends
to be higher among nations with a heterogeneous population due to multiple ethnicities involved
in the political process. Heterogeneous societies are complex in nature, so addressing the
political demands from various groups in society who seek government intervention is a difficult
task for leaders. As a result, policies get crowded into ethnocentric terms, enabling political
parties to strategically pick winners to strengthen their electoral base on ethnic grounds while
depriving others who are outside of the winning ethnic group.
In Africa, scholars have also identified religion, in addition to ethnicity, as another form
of identity that influences the way people vote in an election. Islam and Christianity are the two
most common forms of religious identities on the continent. Even though religious beliefs
encompass all sectors of society and transcend ethnic barriers, followers of Christianity and
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Islam are often targeted for political support by politicians who exploit religious institutions,
churches and mosques alike, for political gains. McCauley (2014) argues that religion and
ethnicity influence the political preferences of an individual when examining government policy.
His survey of electorates in Nigeria shows that voters who identify themselves in ethnic terms
are more likely to consider an issue such as land dispute in the country as the primary cause of
conflict, whereas those who identify by religion do not. Similarly, Nigerian voters who identify
religion as important in their lives are more likely than those who identify themselves in ethnic
terms to regard corruption as the central problem in their governance system. Thus, “when
individuals respond in an ethnic context, they place greater priority on material concerns and
local development, whereas those who express strong religious beliefs have shown preference of
a certain way of life or morality as more important over development policies” (McCauley,
2014:2).
Voters often rely on existing stereotypes about a certain ethnic group when voting. In his
studies in Uganda, Krutz (2013) found that voters' perception of an ethnic group influences their
voting behavior toward a candidate from that particular ethnic group. He concluded that
Ugandan voters held negative views on the Karamojong ethnic group, whom they perceived as
uncivilized because of their dress and nomadic lives. This negative view about an ethnic group
always affects the electability of an individual candidate from that group; even if the person is
qualified to hold public office, the voter’s choices are more likely to be influenced by existing
stereotypes.
Posner et al. (2010) observed that ethnic identity in African elections becomes
increasingly salient when political competition is high in a country. To win and consolidate
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power, political elites tend to use the ethnic card to mobilize their political base, pitting one
group against the other. In a study conducted across 10 African countries, Posner et al. (2010)
found that a competitive political environment powerfully predicts that the respondents will selfidentify in ethnic terms. No doubt that a competitive election heightens the political environment
among various groups competing for power in the society; however, if political elites used ethnic
cues to appeal to the masses of the electorates, the election could result in what is referred to as
ethnic block-voting, where ethnic identities are widely favored over the issues of concern to the
general electorates.
In sum, there are many factors that justify the reasons ethnic voting prevails in some
African countries. Scholars who studied African voting behavior have explored a wide-ranging

issue in explaining ethnicity salience in Africa. The effects of ethnic voting have been a serious
concern to all people who are interested in the political development of Africa. Africa’s ethnicity
diversity is a source of strength unless used to divide or marginalize people. Equally, it is
potentially difficult to obtain political stability on a continent when ethnicity is publicized and
weaponized for winning an election. While such efforts may serve a politician's short-term goal,
the long-term challenge is that ethnic politics creates social division and increased ethnic
tensions that lead to conflict as evidenced in Kenya in 2007.
While ethnicity is the most common form of social identity which influences the voting
behavior of the electorate masses on the African continent, it is not the only factor that continues
to influence voting behavior in African nations. Other factors also influence electorates' voting
decisions; one among these is "clientelism." Clientelism denotes a political system heavily
reliant on intermediaries, such as local leaders and influential members of society. These local
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leaders have followers who hail from different ethnic backgrounds and they command wide
respect from the masses of the electorates at grass-root levels. Their public endorsement of a
candidate can turn into a win of opportunity for a party if they have a large following of loyal
supporters. In her study of the election in Senegal, Koter (2013) noted the power that Sufism and
religious leaders had in shaping the electoral outcomes. She advances the idea that, despite
Senegal's multi-ethnic composition, partisan support tended to be structured around clientelism,
more so than on the basis of ethnicity, contrasting from the electoral behavior of many other
African countries where ethnic voting appears to be a stronger consideration.
In a clientelist system, politicians supply benefits directly to local leaders who distribute
these resources to the local populace without discrimination based on ethnic identities. Local

leaders, especially the powerful Islamic sects such as Mourides, Tijan, and Niass in Senegal,
enjoy a huge following and are highly trusted by the people because they deliver important social
services to their communities in areas where government performance lies dormant. As
intermediaries between the government and people, these leaders also play a significant role in
garnering the attention of the government to address the social needs of the people.
Hence, in an environment characterized by deep mistrust of politicians among the

electorates, reliance on traditional leaders serves as a source of credibility and assurance to the
voters that a politician would keep his or her promises. Koter writes, “When electoral politics is
clientelist in nature, reliance on intermediaries presents an appealing mobilization strategy for
politicians in ways that transcend ethnic considerations” (Koter, 2013, p. 93). This political
formation is significant because it unifies people from various ethnic backgrounds around one
single leader who powerfully advocates for the interests of the community on behalf of his or her
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subjects. In Senegal, the efficiency of the government in delivering important development
projects to the citizens is linked to the critical role played by influential Islamic leaders, who,
through their followers, are able to hold government officials accountable.
In this section, the range of circumstances that explain the voting behavior of African

electorates has been explored. In understanding why the electorates in Africa vote the way they
do, some analysts have argued that voters respond to ethnic cues because ethnicity is functional
and provides political benefit, while others think that African electorates have limited
information about candidates in the race to make informed voting decisions. To some, voters’
preferences of a candidate are influenced by their membership in an organized religious group
and, as the case presented above in Senegal, on how the Islamic sect affects political outcomes.

While it is important to note that there are many factors that continue to influence voting
outcomes of African electorates, the two most powerful forms of social identities are ethnicity
and religion, which continue to affect the voting behavior of the masses of electorates across the
continent.

Issue-Based Voting Perspectives on the African Continent
Are all elections in Africa influenced by ethnic voting? Certainly, no one single variable

can completely explain the voting behavior of the masses of electorates. Factors that shaped the
voting behavior of a group of people are complicated because many variables are involved,
which simultaneously influence electoral outcomes. Ethnic-based voting may prevail in some
African countries; in others, the electorates tend to be more focused on issues that affect the
entire society. Thus, focusing on a single unit of analysis, ethnicity, in studying the voting
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behavior of African electorates may not only be misleading but also diminishes the influence of
other factors, which may equally impact the voting preferences of the electorates in Africa.
This section advances the idea that, while ethnicity may have influenced electoral
outcomes in some African countries, in other countries voters are more drawn to issues unrelated

to existing ethnic cleavages. What is issue-based voting? It is defined as a type of voting where
the electorates cast their ballots in support of candidates in an election based on substantive
policy positions. An issue-based voter is a voter concerned with the governmental system, that is,
how government policy affects the general well-being of the entire populace rather than just a
few. Electorates' support for a candidate is not based on any presumed social identity an
individual may hold but rather on the person’s ability to deliver essential services such as

building schools, providing access to water, constructing roads and hospitals, etc.; or, in some
cases, voters may be drawn to a candidate's approach to non-material and value-oriented issues,
such as protecting fundamental human rights, improving the economy, creating employment
opportunities for the masses in the country, maintaining transparency in governance, and fighting
corruption in public enterprises.
Voting is a complex decision-making process that involves many factors and it is often

difficult for political scientists to agree on a single causal variable that extensively captures the
voting behavior of the masses. Just as voters respond to different cues in making their voting
preferences, a nation's political structure has potential to shape the voting behavior of the
electorates in ways that reflect dominant forms of social identities. As Norris and Mattes (2003)
have noted, ethnocentric voting in African countries varies cross-nationally. A country’s
demographic characteristics have the potential to influence the electoral behavior of the citizens
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in ways that reflect the existing social divisions. It is, therefore, evident that votes based on
ethnicity will be stronger in countries with a heterogeneous population that have multiple ethnic
identities. Countries such as Namibia, South Africa, and Nigeria are divided by many languages
and cultures and are particularly vulnerable to politicized cleavage structures. Conversely,
countries that have a homogeneous ethno-social makeup, such as Lesotho, Botswana, Senegal,
and The Gambia, ethnicity may have a minimal effect on the electoral choices of the masses
given that there are strong social ties within the population making it much more difficult for
divisive cleavage politics to flourish. People in small societies are in many ways united by shared
social identities, which are formed either through a common religion, ethnicity, regional location,
or shared cultural backgrounds. The proximity in the ways people live among various groups in
the society is closely linked, enabling intermarriages and intercultural exchanges that facilitate
the emergence of a collective identity, and making it more difficult, if not impossible, for
politicians to divide and rule.
Therefore, it would be a misleading conception for anyone to argue that African
electorates –unlike those in advanced democracies – are not capable of voting based on issues.
Rather, our focus should be tailored to understanding why ethnicity is salient in some African
countries and not in others. An analysis of scholarly contributions to understanding the voting
behavior of African countries has exposed one consistent fact this study relied upon: the presence
of strong social identities in a nation, such as ethnic, religious or class, creates a fertile ground
for divisive politics to rise into the mainstream political culture. The electorates – even though
they are aware of the issues that concern them in a society – tend to rely on existing cues of
social identities because identity serves as an assurance that their needs will be addressed. Since
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election is a game of numbers, identity politics is a unifying force for a group of people to secure
electoral advantage and collectively influence government policy.
But in a political society, voters are concerned with a wide range of issues, which are
classified here in two main categories of goods: the public and the private. Collective goods and

public goods are distributed to all the people in a society. No member is excluded from the use of
or access to these resources. Public goods such as schools, roads, hospitals, community garden or
a well etc. are funded by the government and allocated to the public. Applying Bentham’s
utilitarian philosophy, these are the goods that provide the greatest benefit to a greater number of
the people. No one is excluded from their use.
Private goods, on the other hand, are targeted goods given to specific individuals or

groups, in which other members of the society are excluded from their use. These goods could be
money, food, awards of government contracts or, in some cases, an offer of employment
awarded to an individual or group through an established network of corrupt practices that
prioritizes individuals' needs over those of collective society. The importance of public goods, as
opposed to private goods, is that many of these goods are locally non-excludable to others and
able to benefit all regardless of their ethnic identities. Hence, in the absence of discrimination

based on social identity in a society, voters will shift their focus on evaluating issues that concern
them individually to support a candidate whose policy position will deliver public goods that will
satisfy the needs of the entire community. Issue voters are ones who are aware of their own
needs and who strategically choose a candidate who can deliver to those needs based on their
manifested policy position. When evaluating a candidate, an issue-based voter may note that
social identity cues, such as ethnicity or religion, matter less than the candidate's qualification to
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effectively deliver public goods as voting decisions are more heavily dependent on the
individual’s performance.
Other factors, such as the regional origin of a candidate, also affect voting outcomes.
According to Ichino and Nathan (2013), ethnic voting is a less significant influence in the voting

behavior of people in countries with strong regional settings. They argue that voters may
disregard their ethnic identities to support a regional candidate if they think they will gain more
from the election of a regional candidate. In Nigeria, for instance, the electorates appeared to be
divided along regional lines across north, south and eastern divides. A voter who lived in the
north of Ibo origin may cross the carpet to vote for a Hausa candidate, disregarding his or her coethnic candidate because regionalism will provide more benefit to her or him than ethnic

solidarity. Thus, an electorate that places greater importance on regional preferences is less likely
to support a candidate from another region even if the person shares a similar ethnic group. The
importance of voters forming a regional alliance is premised on the need to distribute resources
to benefit the residents, and if a victory for a regional candidate is expected to attract government
development projects that will benefit the entire region. Building regional alliances reduces the
prospect of ethno-centric voting, helps direct the voting decisions of the electorates towards
issues which are nondiscriminatory, and tends to help the entire region as all members of the
society are given equal access.
The current trend among emerging African democratic states is that they gravitate toward
a promising electoral future when issues tend to matter more than ethnic cleavages. The evidence
of this changing pattern in voting behavior is reflected by Weghorst and Lindberg (2013), who
argue that voters increasingly pay attention to issues that concern them and objectively evaluate
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their voting decisions based on the incumbent's performance in delivering collective goods that
are useful to the entire society and not just for the private gains of a few.
Elections are a process of making decisions, and the choices of the voters are contingent
upon their awareness of issues. Voters, the ultimate decision-makers, have power to shape the

nature of their political society through the ballot box. Their support for an issue not only
dictates political outcomes that will determine the winners and losers in the poll but also
influences public policy. Thus, according to Weghorst and Linberg (2013), the electoral outcome
in a country will nurture development-oriented policies if voters put a premium on collective
goods in their voting choices. However, they cautioned that a nation's political future could
gravitate towards corruption and predation of the resources of the state by political elites when

the pursuit of private interests supersedes public gains in a country, which will hinder
development of a nation and social advancement of the people as witnessed in many African
countries suffering from resource curse, otherwise known as the paradox of plenty.
Consistent with the notion of issue voting, Beyer et al. wrote, “The electorates will
choose a party after a careful consideration of candidates’ positions over the issues that interest
them” (Beyer et al., 2014, p. 10). The fate of every election is decided by the people who defect

from their established partisan disposition to vote for the opposing party in the race. This
defection is premised on voters' pursuits of a party policy position and willingness to cast their
votes to support the party’s agenda. In examining the theory of issue ownership, Herrnson and
Curry (2011) have claimed that the tendency for voters to change parties rises when they agree
with the position held by the opposing party on issues.
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Political scientists may not often agree on a single issue that influences votes in an
election; however, the evidence presented above seems to be convincing that African electorates,
like many others, are capable of paying attention to issues that concern them and will defect to
support another party when the issues that matter to them are raised. Therefore, while it is
difficult to agree on a single, monolithic issue that affects the voting behavior of most African
electorates, it is important to approach African voters as rational groups of individuals with selfinterest in mind. If ethnicity is salient in a political system, voters may be drawn to ethnic cues as
a means to obtaining political goods; hence, the political structure of a country will reflect ethnic
division. Similarly, if voters are concerned with issues, the electoral process will reflect an issueoriented voting preference, so ethnicities of candidates would matter less as long as the people
have access to their basic needs. This is also true when voters have strong regional affinities;
their votes will be regionally based with the goal of obtaining political goods.
In exploring the theory of issue ownership and how it relates to partisan positions on
issues, Petrocik (1996) explains that parties take ownership of an issue by advancing a strong
position and incorporating that issue on their platforms and programs. These ideas are
occasionally tested in a campaign setting to allow the public to react to a party-policy position.
Thus, a party will benefit more with an issue it owns and will manage to raise it to the level
where that issue becomes significant among voters. Voters are not only concerned with issues
but also to determine that the party is able to address a particular issue given its historical
position on that issue. In the United States, for instance, both Democrat and Republican parties
have issues they considered their own. When it comes to issues of social welfare, education, and
immigration, the Democrat party traditionally held stronger positions; the Republican party, on
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the other hand, has concentrated its concerns with policy issues relating to tax cuts, limiting
government regulations, and higher spending for the military defense. African electorates, unlike
those in the United States, are not split ideologically in their support for issues; that is not to say
that voters in Africa do not pay attention to the things that concern them. Issues matter to African
electorates, but the ways in which they arrived at securing these issues is not ideological, but
instead is based on their affinity to existing social cleavages and these cleavages may translate
into support for ethnic, regional, or religious identities and in some instances class depending on
a country’s level of economic development.
According to Harrnson and Curry (2011), partisan defection among voters occurs within
the framework of party positions on issues. A candidate will benefit greatly when voters support

a policy issue that is owned by his/her party and, likewise, may lose votes if the electorates are
dissatisfied with a policy position that is owned by his/her party. Election is a democratic process
that allows voters to evaluate the performances of the government and determine in the ballot
box whether to reward an incumbent by giving him/her another mandate or punishing a
candidate by voting him/her out the government. “Voters are mostly aware of the issues that
concern them in a policy and will use their judgment to determine which issues are important and
decide the party suitable at handling those issues” (Graefe, 2013, p. 48).
Consistent with the theory of issue ownership and how partisan alignment on an issue
affects voting outcomes, Green and Hobolt (2007) argue that parties will strategically focus on
issues they have an advantage to win, while downplaying other issues. This is based on the logic
that the more significant an issue becomes among the voters, the greater the advantage there is
for a party that owns the issue to rally the support of the masses in an election. However, given
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the multiple issues that political parties raise, there may be situations where several parties
advocate for similar issues, causing the challenge of conflicting agendas. As much as the agenda
conflict may create confusion among some voters in determining which party is best suited to
address the issue, dependent on this various alternatives parties offer, a political party that raises
an issue and manages to take ownership of it will benefit electorally if that issue rises as a main
focal point among the voters.
In The Gambia’s presidential elections of 2016, voters have demonstrated that issues
mattered, and they were able to elect the opposition candidates over the incumbent when the
economy and human rights were at the forefront of the opposition campaign agenda. Issue
ownership and partisan defections in pursuit of those issues, were the main reasons why the

regime change took place in The Gambia. Election is a measure of votes for a party in support of
a policy position. If support for a political party in a country is based on policy issues, rather than
on ethnicity, every political party must clearly define its turf and take ownership of it. The
opposition coalition was successful because of the poignant issues they campaigned on, which
centered on how to restore The Gambian economy, uphold fundamental human rights, and
expose bad governance in the Jammeh administration. The opposition coalition intentionally
shied away from divisive ethnic politics which understandably has created political division and
conflict elsewhere in Africa, and instead focused their messages on how they would address
problems on the economy, and protect human rights differently than the Jammeh administration
that had held 22 years of rule in the country.
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Chapter 3
The Gambia's Political Development from Colonialism to Independence
The Gambia is the smallest country in West Africa, surrounded on three sides of its
territory by Senegal. To the west, the River Gambia, which defines the geography of the country,
flows into the Atlantic Ocean. The Gambia was once a colony of Great Britain. The British
founded the capital, Banjul, in 1816 as a strategic base point for the abolition of the transatlantic
slave trade. The country has a total area of 4,363 square miles (11,300 square kilometers) and a
population of 1.9 million people, according to estimates from the national census (GBOS, 2013).
The Gambia obtained its independence from Britain in 1965. Dawda Kairaba Jawara, a Britishtrained veterinary officer, served as The Gambia's first president, presiding for a period of 30
years. His regime was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1994 by a group of young military officers
under the leadership of Yahya Jammeh. Jammeh assumed the presidency and ruled the country
for 22 years. Jammeh’s regime ended abruptly with the 2016 presidential election when the
opposition coalition president, Adama Barrow, defeated Jammeh in the polls. Jammeh went into
exile in Equatorial Guinea, where he currently resides.
Prior to Gambia's obtaining independence from the United Kingdom, many people had

expressed doubts about the country attaining nationhood due to its population size and location.
These doubts, explored by an American anthropologist, Berkeley Rice, in The Birth of an
Improbable Nation (1967), included that The Gambia was the smallest and poorest country in
mainland Africa with no university, railroad, or natural resources to support its economic growth
as an independent nation.
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The British government's policy toward its colonies was primarily based on establishing
trade relations with local people, and the river Gambia, due to its strategic confluence with the
Atlantic Ocean and its navigable waters across the entirety of Gambia, was suitable for the
expansion of British commercial activities into the backcountry. For administrative convenience,
the British had divided the country into two main regions: the colony and protectorates. In the
colony, the British had direct administrative control and presided over the day-to-day functions
of the colony. These areas include Banjul, the capital city, and the immediate surroundings, often
referred to as Kombo St. Mary’s and including James Island, which is located in the interior of
the country. The rest of The Gambia, referred to as the protectorates, was placed under direct
administrative responsibilities of local rulers, known as chiefs The chiefs operated under the
British colonial policy called "indirect rule," a system of governance wherein as local rulers, the
chiefs were used to directly govern their populace while being answerable to the British
government to collect taxes, settle disputes among the people, and maintain law and order within
their territories.
Colonialism ended in The Gambia in 1965 after the country had obtained its
independence and Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara became the nation's first president. Jawara’s
leadership in the country was, for the most part, peaceful. However, in 1981 a group of dissidents
led by Kukoi Sanyang waged a rebellion that succeeded in overthrowing the Jawara regime. At
the time, The Gambia was the only independent country in Africa that did not have a standing
army to protect its national sovereignty. Given the small size of the country, Jawara thought
establishing an army was unnecessary. Perhaps this was a wise move at a time when many
African countries were facing military-led coup d’états. However, the lack of an army opened up
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security challenges unknown to Jawara: A group of disgruntled security forces took advantage of
insecurity problems in the country to catalyze a regime change and succeeded. At the time,
President Jawara was attending the royal wedding of HRH Prince Charles to Lady Diana Spencer
in the United Kingdom. President Jawara had to cut short his visit and returned to enter into an
agreement with the government of Senegal, led by Abdou Joof, who agreed to help Jawara flush
out the dissidents. Both Jawara and Abdou Joof promised to establish a confederation between
the two countries. After successfully removing the rebels and restoring law and order in the
country, Jawara was reinstated to his post, and the Senegambia confederation was formed.
In the preliminary negotiations, several reasons were advanced to justify the
establishment of the confederation. First, The Gambia and Senegal with similar, strong, social,

cultural, and familial ties, were geographically separated by politically imposed colonial
boundaries. Given these ties, both countries would benefit from a deeper political integration by
synchronizing institutions of governance and getting rid of the colonial structures that continued
to divide the two countries. The second reason had to do with Gambia being a very small country
compared to Senegal; it lacked natural resources to support its economic advancement. Many
people had been skeptical about the possibility of The Gambia's even attaining independence,
given the country's total land area and population size. The proponents of the confederation have
always maintained that, by integrating the country into Senegal, The Gambia would have
benefited more from economic development.
However, the fear on the Gambian side was that closer political integration could lead to
domination by Senegal. As Wiseman (1996) clearly notes, while the Senegalese side sought to
establish greater unity, the Gambian side was concerned with the protection of national
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sovereignty vis-á-vis a powerful neighbor. The confederation was a marriage of convenience that
ended shortly after it was formed as neither country could reconcile its differences. The issues
that ended the confederation were the desire to protect national sovereignty and the difficulties in
reconciling two official languages (Senegal's official language is French whereas The Gambia's
is English). In addition, the two countries had different national languages: Wolof was and still is
the national language in Senegal whereas in The Gambia, both Wolof and Mandinka are spoken.
Gambian politicians made no effort to specifically designate either of the two as a national
language.
Jawara’s legacy in The Gambia had produced mixed reactions among many Gambians.
While some argued that his government promoted democracy and championed the fight for

human rights' protection in Africa, others accused Jawara‘s government of turning a blind eye to
corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement of public resources. Critics have argued that the
Jawara administration operated an elitist government that was out of touch with the realities of
mass poverty and destitution that the Gambian people faced during his 30 years of leadership.
Gambians juggled uneven access to social and economic opportunities. While those who had
political connections were given access to government resources, others languished in poverty
with no access to education. There were huge divides and limited access to social services
between citizens in urban areas and those living in rural areas of the country. While some people
had access to education based on their family connection to power, the masses in the country
remained poor and uneducated as the government had established only three high schools and
only one major hospital for the entire country and there was no road infrastructure connecting the
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country's main towns. This persisted throughout the entire three decades of Jawara's regime in
The Gambia.
Corruption remained at an all-time high. Government officials under Jawara were
frequently accused of diverting public funds for their personal use. The most disturbing scandal

during the Jawara’s Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) government was the allegation of
corruption involving Vice President Saikou Sabally. Similar allegations were also made against
senior management of The Gambia Cooperative Union, and even after external auditors found
serious financial mismanagement in the organization, the Jawara government did not take any
further steps to punish perpetrators of financial crime (Loum, 2002). The government's inability
to proactively combat corruption dampened public trust and damaged its reputation among the

populace who had supported the coup. Under Jawara, the country was politically independent but
economically dependent on foreign aid. Great Britain, the former colonial masters, provided 70%
of the budgetary support to the government as payment for wages and salaries to civil servants.
With the lack of natural resources to support its economic development and the main source of
the economy heavily dependent on agriculture, the Jawara government failed to boost the
agricultural sector and diversify the national economy.

Despite the allegations of corruption and mismanagement of public resources, Jawara
was credited for strongly advocating for democratic rule. He periodically organized elections and
allowed many opposition parties to compete in the elections. Jawara was credited internationally
as not only the nation's founder who fought for Gambian independence from Britain but also,
unlike his future successor, Jammeh, was a strong proponent of human rights and individual
freedoms in the country. One of Jawara's notable legacies in advancing human rights was the
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establishment and hosting of the African Center on Human and People's Rights. The office of
this important African Union agency, currently located in The Gambia, is referred to as the
Banjul Charter, and honors Jawara's contribution to advancing human rights on the African
continent.

Also, during his 30 years in power, Jawara allowed multi-party-political participation in
the electoral process. Several political parties were formed and competed in the presidential
elections: People’s Progressive Party (PPP) led by Jawara; Democratic Alliance Party (DAP)
formed by the Rev. J.C Faye; The Gambia Muslim Congress (GMC) founded by I.M. Garba
Jahumpa; and the United Party (UP) formed by Pierre Njie. As Sallah (1990) observes, the
Jawara party's ability to appeal to the masses of the electorates in the protectorates (regions of

The Gambia that were not directly controlled by the British, but by the local chiefs) by
expanding their reach beyond urban areas provided the clear advantage that the party has had
over the others, which were mainly concentrated in urban centers of the country.
Thus, the PPP's dominance of the electoral system was primarily based on a consolidated
grassroots support that the party had received from the rural voters. Jawara organized regular
elections recognized internationally as free and fair, and his party succeeded in winning the polls

until July 1994, when a group of soldiers stormed the state house in Banjul and overthrew his
government, sending Jawara into exile in the United Kingdom.

The Reasons for the Coup D’états in The Gambia and Beyond
Two main theoretical frameworks can help explain why there are so many of coup d’états
in Africa: internal and external. Based on these, further exploration of the reasons military
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intervention is common in African politics is possible. Internal factors suggest that the army is
responding in defense of a perceived threat to corporate interest of the army in the allocation of
wages and associated benefits by political elites. Low wages and loss of income for the army
have been consistent reasons given by many successful coup leaders for why a civilian
government is overthrown.
The army in most African countries has often viewed itself as responsible for protecting
both the national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of a nation, as well as serving a much
bigger role in governance: the forceful removal of an incompetent government. It has been
reported that prior to the events that led to the 1994 coup d’état in The Gambia, an army mutiny
had taken place over the soldiers' dissatisfaction with the government's refusal to pay allowances

to those who participated in the peace-keeping mission in Liberia. This incident could have
served as a warning to the government to pay attention to the needs of the army. However, the
Jawara government failed to address the concerns of the military, so when the coup erupted,
many rank and file soldiers defected to support the coup.
Also, some coup leaders had noted ethnic favoritism and division in the society, one
justification for a regime change. In some countries in Africa, individuals from certain ethnic

groups are given an unfair advantage in rising to higher positions in government than others,
especially concerning promotions and benefits. In the army, official promotions occurred more
often as a means of rewarding regime loyalists or in favor of ethnic connections, as opposed to
on merit. Politicizing the army created an unwanted distraction from the core principle of
protecting national sovereignty and moved it towards developing an interest in politics. It is often
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said that the army should stay away from politics, but the same is also true that politics should
stay out of the army.
Hence, politicizing the army is a dangerous way to achieve short-term political gains
because in the long term it could backfire and create political instability in a nation. Politicizing

the army has been one of the main reasons for the proliferation of coups on the African
continent. Loum (2002) argues that certain characteristics are essential for the effective function
of an army, e.g. nationalism, professionalism, and cohesion are all key elements that guide the
work of the soldiers. The army will, therefore, take a stand to preserve these core principles if
threatened by the political class. In The Gambia, prior to the coup that ended the Jawara
government, analysts indicated that not only was the army neglected by political elites, but was

also heavily politicized and divided along ethnic lines. While some officials, due to their political
connections, were promoted to senior ranks, others with similar qualifications were denied career
advancement and benefits.
One factor that causes military intervention is linked to corruption in government. “A
government that is corrupt creates a wide economic disparity between the rulers and the ruled,
which potentially provokes a reaction from the military that capitalizes on public dissatisfaction

as an advantage to stage a coup and forcefully remove a corrupt government” (Loum, 2002, p.
149). A strong economy is a good sign of regime stability as opposed to a weak national
economy that renders its citizens jobless. This could also create relatable consequences of
lawlessness, endangering the security and stability of a country, thus, inviting the army to
intervene to forcefully remove the government and to restore law and order.
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Why did the coup take place in Gambia? In his autobiography, Jawara accounted a vivid
memory of July 1994, when a soldier rushed into his office and broke the news of the coup
d’état. “There is group of soldiers advancing towards the capital, Banjul and I was instructed to
immediately evacuate to avoid any loss of lives. An arrangement was made to safely transport
me and my family to a nearby US Navy Ship that is duck at the port”(Jawara, 2009, P.385). As
the event continue to unfold, it later became clear that soldiers under the leadership of Lt. Yahya
Jammeh led a coup d’état that successfully overthrew Jawara's government. Members of the
junta advanced several reasons to justify the coup. The soldiers believed that military action was
necessary to restore sanity in the government and to root out corruption, which was prevalent and
out of control under the Jawara government. A case in point where an act of corruption directly
affected the military: The government refused to pay allowances to a group of soldiers who
participated in a peacekeeping mission in Liberia during the civil war (Wiseman, 1996, .p 20).
While this incident may not be the leading cause of the coup, it clearly signaled the general
frustration faced by members of the Gambian army against Jawara’s government, which
neglected the poor living conditions of the soldiers in their barracks, despite their complaints of
the dilapidated housing facilities, low salaries, and substandard food supply.
The second reason advanced for the coup was the dissatisfaction of the Gambian soldiers
with the presence of Nigerian officers: The Nigerians were brought into the country on a
technical mission to train Gambian soldiers on how to run a national army when it was newly
formed. Some of the soldiers, including senior officials, had complained about the
insubordination and mistreatment by Nigerian soldiers. “The appointment by Jawara of the
Nigerian officers to senior command and position within The Gambian National Army had
53

caused considerable resentment among Gambian soldiers, which provided a motivation for the
coup”(Wiseman, 1996, p. 20).
Third, many critics have argued that Jawara’s government was completely out touch with
the realities of poverty, destitution and misery faced by many Gambians whom for far too long

have been neglected by their government. Jawara focus has been more broadly on fixing
international issues and delegating domestic issues to his corrupt officials who have failed to
deliver in addressing the needs of Gambians. He was too busy trying to solve the world’s
problems instead of addressing the needs of Gambians. Jawara’ numerous international travels
have placed him out of touch with domestic realities faced by citizens on daily basis. Jawara was
not only aware of the presence of the US Naval Forces in the country but has stated that his vice

president and defense minister have not informed him of the joint military exercise between
Gambian army and US Navy. From this account, it was obvious that there was a power vacuum
in the country, and Jawara was neither paying attention in the domestic affairs of the country nor
was his security forces. The soldiers were cleaver enough to recognize the power vacuum and
took up arms to fill the void and rallied the people to support of their cause with the promise of
instituting a government that will be transparent and responsive to the needs of the people. While
on board the US Naval ship his family, “I have tried to negotiate with the Junta leaders to
convince them to return to the Military Barracks. I have promised to address their concerns if
they allow me to return but they rejected every demand I made” (Jawara, 2009 p.386). That offer
was perhaps too late given the frustration many people have faced in the country, and when that
negotiations failed Jawara, his family and some of his government officials went into exile in the
United Kingdom marking the end of the 32 years of the PPP leadership in The Gambia.
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The coup in The Gambia is not relatable in many aspects to the coup d’états that have
taken place in the African continent, which usually have ethnic components as motivating factors
in justifying regime change. In The Gambia, according to Wiseman (1996), ethnicity has never
played a significant role in Gambian politics as the coup leaders hailed from various ethnic
backgrounds. Jammeh was from the Jola ethnic group; Sabally, Fula; Hydara, a Moor of
Mauritanian descent; Touray, Mandinka; and Singhateh, Christian and a Mandinka with an
English mother. The coup had also no particular links to the controversial World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment program, an imposed economic policy
that resulted in creating political instability and coup d’états in many African countries.

The Waves of Elections During the Twenty-two Years of Jammeh Leadership in
The Gambia
Following the successful coup d’état, the military junta formed the Armed Forces'
Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) with Jammeh as chair. It also promised a temporary stay in
power until an election was organized, at which time it would hand over power to a civilian ruler
and returned the military to the barracks. During this transitional period, the constitution was
suspended, and the junta instituted series decrees aimed at strengthening its political power,
restricting individual freedoms, and banning opposition political parties from operating in the
country. Decree 57, for instance, gave the interior minister unlimited powers to arrest and detain
without charge any person perceived as threatening national security and disrupting the peace
and stability of the country (Wiseman, 1996).
The junta did not keep its promise, despite mounting international pressure, and imposed
economic sanctions from the European Union (EU) and United Nations to organize elections and
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hand over power peacefully to a civilian government. It was reluctant to do so. Jammeh resigned
from the military and became the flag bearer for the newly formed Alliance for Patriotic
Reorientation and Construction (APRC) to contest in the 1996 presidential election. Although
this was the first election to be organized serving as a test to the popularity of Jammeh, serious
concerns were raised relating to the credibility of the polls as the ban on existing opposition
parties was still in place. While a handful of selected opposition parties was allowed to
participate in the polls, major pre-coup political parties, such as PPP, National Convention
Party(NCP), and Gambian Peoples Party (GPP), were prevented from contesting, a clever tactic
that gave Jammeh a clear electoral advantage. Jammeh won the presidential election with 56% of
the votes, while Ousainou Darboe, his main rival, managed to secure 36% of the votes. Jatta and
Bah secured but 10% of the votes (Perfect, 2010, p. 12).
Following Jammeh's victory in the polls, a referendum was organized in 1997 that
presented Gambian voters with an opportunity to vote for a new constitution. Results were also a
victory for Jammeh as 70% of Gambian electorates voted in favor of the constitution (Perfect,
2010). Having secured a five-year leadership mandate in addition to obtaining a stamp of
approval by Gambians on a new constitution, Jammeh would wield enough political influence to
sway future elections in his favor as he strengthened his grass roots base with promises to change
the living conditions of Gambians and to distance himself from nepotism and corrupt practices of
the former government.
In 2001, an election was organized. This time, international organizations were able to
exert pressure on Jammeh to open the political space to allow previously banned opposition
political parties to contest in the polls. Although the political franchise was extended to all
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existing parties in the country, the opposition parties, for the first time, tried to unite under a
single flag-bearer to compete in the elections against Jammeh. With deposed former-president
Jawara still in exile in London, the leadership of his party, the PPP, was headed by Omar Jallow.
Sherif Mustapha Dibba and Hassan Musa Camara represented their parties, the NCP and GPP,
respectively. The opposition leaders rallied behind a single candidate, and Oussainou Darboe of
the United Democratic Party (UDP) was chosen to increase their collective chances of winning
the election against Jammeh. However, this effort did not materialize due to disagreement on the
chosen leader, and instead, the opposition parties entered single-handedly into the polls.
Table 1 The results of the 2001 presidential election in The Gambia. Source: Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC ) www.iec.gm

Candidates

Party

Votes

Percent

Yahya Jammeh

APRC

242,302

52.96%

Ousainou Darboe

UDP/PPP/GPP

149,448

32.67%

Hamat Bah

NRP

35,678

7.8%

Sherif Dibba

NCP

17,271

3.8%

Sidia Jatta

PDOIS

13,841

3.0%

Five candidates contested in the election. Jammeh again appeared with 53% of the votes,
while Darboe secured 33% of the votes. Hamat Bah and Sherif Dibba were able to obtain 7.8 and

3.8 percent of the total votes, while Sidia Jatta obtained 3 percent of the votes in the presidential
elections. Although there were reports of irregularities in results due to electoral malpractices, as
well as reports of the regime using intimidation tactics to suppress opposition parties, (Saine,
2003), Jammeh won the polls, strengthening his grip on power and continuing his domination of
The Gambia’s political system.
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Having learned a bitter lesson from repeated, humiliating defeats in the polls by Jammeh
in both the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections, the opposition parties thought it wise to come
together to form a coalition to compete in future elections. This effort was spearheaded by many
Gambians living in the diaspora, particularly those in the United States, who in their observation
of Gambian politics concluded that no single party could win elections given Jammeh's
dominance over the political structure of the country. Therefore, to affect a regime change and
remove the dictatorship in Gambia, forming a coalition of opposition party that was externally
funded was essential to countering Jammeh's electoral dominance.

Chapter 4
The 2006 Presidential Elections in The Gambia
In 2005, a summit was organized by Gambians in Atlanta, Georgia, United States. There,
an agreement was reached that led to the subsequent formation of the National Alliance for
Democracy and Development (NADD). In May 2005, NADD presented an opposition united
front to compete in the 2006 presidential election (Saine, 2008). In a runoff to the 2006
presidential election, the coalition was not successful and, at once, began to disintegrate due to
disagreement among party leaders on the who will be nominated to become position of the flagbearer. The decision to select Halifa Sallah as the flag bearer was rejected by UDP and NRP
executives, who later formed their own coalition, headed by Oussainou Darboe, to compete in
the election
Three candidates contested the election: Jammeh for the APRC; Darboe, for the
UDP/NRP ticket; and Sallah, for NADD. Amid a divided opposition, Jammeh’s political base
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solidified and enjoyed increasing political advantage over the opposition parties. He painted into
his campaign a picture of failure and disgrace by the opposition leader’s inability to agree on a
single candidate. Jammeh convinced Gambian voters that the opposition leaders could not be
trusted to govern the country because, he averred, they could not even put their own houses in
order.
Table 2 The Results of The Gambia's 2006 Presidential Election. Source: Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC), www.iec.gm

Candidates

Party

Votes

Percent

Yahya Jammeh

APRC

264, 404

67.33%

Ousainou Darboe

UDP/NRP/GPDP

104,808

27%

Halifa Sallah

NADD

23,473

6%

Total Votes Cast

392,685

59%

Registered Voters

670,000

100%

As the results show, Jammeh secured 67.33% of the votes, while Darboe received 27%
and Sallah emerged with 6% of the votes. In this historic vote, the opposition parties learned
several important lessons. Given Jammeh’s popularity in the country, a stronger coalition would
be needed to compete against Jammeh in future polls. No single party standing alone would be
able to defeat Jammeh. There was an urgent need for opposition parties to put their differences
aside to support a single candidate.
Darboe, leader of the United Democratic Party, despite forming a coalition with NRP and
GPDP, suffered a humiliating defeat in areas of the country considered as opposition
strongholds. Also, contrary to the notion of ethnic voting, Africanist scholars noted that
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Jammeh's victory against the opposition in the 2006 Gambia presidential election was not
influenced by ethnocentric voting. According to Saine (2008), Jammeh was able to secure a huge
margin of votes to defeat the opposition parties in places such as Jarra East, Lower and Central
Badibu, as well as Basse and Falladu, places predominantly inhabited by the Mandinka and Fula
ethnic groups, the co-ethnicities of Darboe and Bah, who coalesced and competed in the election
against Jammeh. Sallah, who took a third position in the race, had also underperformed among
members of his co-ethnic Fula group, paving the way for Jammeh to secure another five-year
electoral mandate.
In sum, the evidence here shows that the disintegration of the opposition alliance,
namely, the NADD, combined with the failure of the party leaders to strike a compromise to

rally behind a single candidate were the primary reasons the opposition did not succeed in
defeating Jammeh in the polls and that co-ethnicity was not a factor. Jammeh, despite the fact
that he hails from the Jola tribe, an ethnic minority, garnered a remarkably diverse support base
in the country, cutting across ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages in the broader spectrum of
Gambian society. In fact, “Support for Jammeh appears to be stronger among youth and women,
who are a substantial percentage of The Gambian population, and his popularity may have been
even stronger among the Mandinka, Fula, Wolof and other ethnic groups than in his co-ethnic
Jola” (Saine, 2008, p. 72).
Essentially, Jammeh, unlike other dictators on the continent, continued to respect
electoral democratic principles by agreeing to organize periodic elections, which he easily won
over disunited opposition parties who could not agree to the formation of a coalition to contest in
the elections. Jammeh’s victories instilled public confidence that he was the ultimate choice of
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the Gambian people. In an interview on BBC, Jammeh bragged that he would rule the country
for a billion years, (BBC, 2011), but neither Jammeh nor anyone could predict that he would
later organize an election that he would lose to the opposition. Thus, the 2006 presidential
election was a disappointing performance for the opposition parties. However, the significance of
the 2006 poll served as a lesson that would instruct the near future for shaping Gambian politics
in ways that no one could have ever imagined.

The 2011 Presidential Elections in The Gambia
The 2011 presidential election in The Gambia produced no different outcome, aside
from the fact that it was the last election to be organized before unexpected regime change
took place in the country.
Table 3 The Results of The Gambia's 2006 Presidential Election. Source: Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC), www.iec.gm

Candidates

Party

Votes

Percent

Yahya Jammeh

APRC

470,550

72%

Ousainou Darboe

UDP

114177

17%

Hamat Bah

NRP

73060

11%

Jammeh, the incumbent, won by 72% of the votes, while Darboe and Bah took home 17% and
11% of the votes respectively. Other opposition party, Peoples Democratic Organization for
Independent and Socialism (PDOIS), boycotted the polls, citing irregularities, and arguing that
the environment was not conducive to a free and fair election.
These concerns were echoed by the regional block, Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), which, after concluding a fact-finding mission to The Gambia, decided not to
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send election observers. The ECOWAS said that the mission had found "an unacceptable level of
control of the electronic media by the party in power and an opposition and electorate cowed by
repression and intimidation" (Reuters, 2011). The African Union, the Commonwealth, and the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) observed the polls and concluded that they were free
and fair.
The endorsement by these organizations, excepting ECOWAS, gave Jammeh an
internationally accredited stamp of approval to his victory that constitutionally slowed him
another mandate to remain the leader for five years. If democracy were measured only on
account of organizing elections, it can be argued that Jammeh honored this principle by
periodically seeking the electoral mandates of the people, which he handedly won due to the lack
of opposition unity.
However, the 2016 election that Jammeh organized, against all odds, pitted him against a
coalition of opposition that turned the tides. To this point, Jammeh had made unsubstantiated
claims that he would never lose an election because he held strong spiritual connections to divine
powers capable of swaying public opinion in his favor. However, the result of the December
2016 election not only showed “the weakness of Jammeh’s perceived mysticism of his position
of authority, but also powerfully demonstrated that politics in its basic form is a social contract.
Only through the people can a regime change be affected… The mystification of the presidency
has played out in Jammeh’s favor because it made Gambians believe that elections will never
succeed in affecting a regime change. The paradox, however, is that his agreement to conduct a
free and fair election in The Gambia backfired, and ultimately led to his downfall” (Sanneh,
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2017, p. 30). Forced out by the ECOWAS military intervention following the election, he
currently lives in exile in Equatorial Guinea.
Although the sudden regime change ended the 22 years of tyranny and dictatorship in the
country, the most interesting question that surprised many political scientists is that, given
Jammeh's firm grip on the political system, his control of the military and economic system in
the country that placed him at an advantage over fractured opposition parties, why would
Jammeh organize an election that he could lose? Who are the people who voted in this
presidential election, and what were the issues they considered in casting their votes for the
opposition coalition parties over Jammeh? Were voters concerned about issues like the economy
and human rights abuses, or the ethnicities of the candidates? These questions will be explored in
the later section of this dissertation, but, first, there must be an examination of the broader scope
of The Gambian economy and its challenges under the Jammeh administration that led to this
historic election.

An Overview of Gambian Economy Under the Jammeh Administration from 1994
to 2016
The Gambia has a small economy with very limited natural resources. The country’s
economy relies heavily on agriculture, tourism, taxes, and remittances from Gambians abroad.
Not only is the country among the smallest on the globe, it is also among the poorest in subSaharan Africa. According to the human development index, Gambia ranks 174th out of 189
countries globally as the least developed (HDI, 2019). The World Food Program (2018) shows
several economic hardships, ranging from rising food insecurity to poverty and malnutrition
among the populace. The unemployment rate in the country for youths, according to Gambia
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Bureau of Statistics, was at 13.28% in 2015 and slowly dropped to 12.33% in 2018 (GBOS,
2020).
The economy under the Jammeh leadership faced many challenges, although the Jammeh
government does not single-handedly bear responsibility for the lack of economic diversity in the

country. The 30-year PPP government under Jawara that preceded Jammeh did not perform well
either in setting up a solid foundation for a robust national economy. Following the coup d’état
in 1994, The Gambian economy, which was based on foreign aid, suffered a significant
reduction due to imposed sanctions by Western donors who put pressure on the military junta to
organize elections and hand over power to civilian rule.
The British government led this effort, having realized that a huge portion of the

country’s economy was based on tourism. Given that most tourists were holiday visitors from the
UK, Great Britain issued a travel advisory for its citizens against visiting the Gambia following
the coup. During this difficult transition period, Jammeh had no choice but to seek financial
support from non-Western governments such as Libya, Taiwan, and Cuba, as well as Nigeria
under the Abacha regime, to cater to the immediate financial administrative needs of the country,
while continuing to negotiate the conditions put in place by Western donors before aid would be

restored.
Jammeh’s APRC government, having realized the economic challenges facing the
country, structured an ambitious economic policy called the Vision 2020 Blueprint. The primary
goal of this policy was to transform the Gambian economy by diversifying its ability to generate
revenue, encourage competition, and successfully integrate The Gambia into a global economy.
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This policy document, among other things, also aimed to boost the agricultural sector to attain
national food self-sufficiency (Saine, 2009). However, while Vision 2020 impressed on paper, in
reality, it was a far-fetched dream that did not materialize.
The agricultural sector is the largest economic activity in the country, and according to

Action Aid (2018), more than 70% of Gambians earn their living through farming. Groundnuts
are the main crop grown for commercial purposes; however the value of groundnuts as a cash
crop over the years has declined drastically due to a combination of factors, ranging from low
prices in the world market, erratic rainfall in the country, and migration of youth from rural to
urban areas and Europe in search of non-agrarian and white collar jobs. Gambia has a huge
farming potential. Over half of the country is supplied by freshwater from the Gambian River

and there is adequate arable land which, in some areas is underutilized and suitable for
commercial agricultural activities that could feed the population and stop the importation of
foreign rice. The Jammeh government, having tried to lure investment in agriculture, was not
able to attract domestic and foreign investors willing to engage in large-scale. private sector-led,
commercial agricultural activities. The reasons for this failure will be explored and discussed
later.

Another challenge faced by the agricultural sector in The Gambia is that it depends
heavily on seasonal rainfall. Rain often lasts for three months but guarantees no adequate water
supply to farmers. Farmers have neither the necessary tools nor technical training required for
them to explore various methods of irrigation that will ensure continuous availability of adequate
water for their farms during the dry season. Most of the agricultural activities center on
subsistence farming, a type of farming where families grow food merely for consumption.
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The Jammeh government tried several methods of addressing the country's food
sufficiency without success. Jammeh's infamous “operation feed yourself” policy goal aimed at
mechanizing the agricultural sector. The government imported tractors and fertilizer and
distributed them to farmers across the country as a measure to boost the national economy by
encouraging grassroots participation in agriculture. In 2011, the national economy was also hurt
by an invasion of locusts that destroyed crops throughout the country. The loss reminded the
government that agriculture, with all its economic benefits, was a generally unsustainable
venture, because of the unpredictable circumstances in rainfall patterns and natural disasters.
Jammeh's Feed Yourself government initiatives failed, despite there being a huge population
engaged in agriculture and the availability of land and water. Gambia could not produce enough
food to feed its population, and remained dependent for its main staple, rice, on importation from
other areas of the world.
Over the years, Gambia has shifted drastically from being an agriculturally based
economy to a service one, with tourism rising as a main foreign-exchange earner for the country.
Tourism generates as much as all other sectors combined and is a major contributor to
employment; however, tourism is also a seasonal activity, as the sector faces short-term
economic challenges when European is not wintering. Seventy-five percent of the tourist arrivals
in the country are between November and April: it is estimated that “a record number of tourists
rose from 57,231 in 2003 to 142,626 in 2007” (Perfect, 2010, p. 56), bolstering Gambia’s place
as a major tourist destination in West Africa.
The country’s reliance on tourism has exposed its vulnerability to unpredictable global
circumstances. For example, the 2014 Ebola outbreak seriously affected the Gambian economy,
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exposing it to the danger associated with basing a nation’s economic future on seasonal tourist
operations. Many European countries issued citizen advisories against traveling to West Africa at
the epicenter of the outbreak. As a result, Gambia experienced a significant drop in the number
of tourists due to Ebola outbreak.

Aside from the fact that the Gambian economy was highly vulnerable to external
circumstances, like the Ebola outbreak, one of the problems faced by The Gambian economy
under Jammeh was the high number of debts owed to both domestic and international creditors.
According to the IMF, the “domestic debt relative to GDP increased slightly to 34 percent of
GDP as of the end of 2012, and this was primarily caused by higher government expenditure that
surpassed national revenue. The fiscal indiscipline was result of high domestic borrowing, and

interest on debt continued to consume a large share of government revenues with a 22½ percent
increase in 2012, of which 18½ percent was used to finance domestic debt” (IMF, 2013, p.13).
To address the government deficit and high indebtedness, the IMF and World Bank
agreed to include The Gambia with other countries receiving help from the High Indebted, Poor
Countries (HIPC) initiatives. Through the HIPC aid, Gambia obtained US$66.6 million in 1999.
This money was agreed to be paid partially dependent on the government’s willingness to fulfill

the monetary conditions laid out by IMF. “Out of the total commitments, US$8.0 million and
US$6.0 million was delivered as interim assistance to the Gambia government” (IMF, 2008, p.8).
As a tax-based economy, a huge amount of The Gambia’s GDP is generated from taxes.
Although, many efforts have been made to synchronize the country’s tax base system, the
government has not yet been able to figure out an efficient mechanism to collect taxes nor how
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to increase the revenue generation capacity of the state. In a move to solve this problem, the
Gambian government introduced a value-added tax (VAT) on imported goods. This taxation
policy is laudable considering the loss of revenue in the country due to the unstructured taxes and
regulation system. However, the lack of transparency and presence of corruption in public
enterprises made it much more difficult for the country to collect taxes effectively.
Other factors existed in the country that made it harder to conduct business and improve
The Gambia’s sluggish economy. The presence of a dictatorship made it difficult to attract
foreign investors. Jammeh ruled The Gambia with an iron fist. Even though his government
claimed to have a free-market policy, government invention to forcefully regulate the market was
a common practice. Jammeh occasionally issued statements threatening to shut down businesses

that he accused of engaging in objectionable business activities, such as hiking the prices of
consumer goods. The rule of tyranny destroyed business confidence and despite the fact that the
Gambian environment was lucrative for business ventures, many businessmen/women did not
feel confident to invest for fear of reprisal by the government and the potential for loss of their
investment.
Similarly, the judicial system under the Jammeh administration was heavily politicized

and many investors were aware of the danger of doing business in a country where the judicial
system was controlled by the government. On the Forbes (2018) list of the countries for the best
business, The Gambia ranked 155 out of 160 countries considered suitable for running a
business. Consequently, it was more difficult for the country to attract investors, as the report
cited problems such as bureaucratic red tape, corruption and judicial partiality further
diminishing investor confidence. A case in point was the government’s abrupt termination of a
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sand-mining license granted to an Australian company, Carnegie Minerals, saying that “the
company failed to correctly report the quantity and value of its mineral exports from Gambia”
(Reuters, 2008).
Finally, the most recent troubling economic challenge faced by the Gambia was the mass

exodus of its youth going to Europe searching for greener pastures. The “back way,” as the
journey is locally called, is a risky venture, estimated in 2014 to have resulted in more than 5,267
deaths of people trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe according to the International
Organization for Migration (IOM, 2016). The Gambia, despite being a small country, has been
one of the major sources to irregular migration to Europe. In 2016 alone, the IOM reported that
11,929 Gambians arrived in Italy by boat, a 41% increase from arrivals in 2015 (IOM 2018).

There were many reasons responsible for the large-scale emigration of youths: “the lack
of jobs and opportunities in rural and urban areas, the lack of adequate support to farming, which
is being badly affected by climate change and because they see a better life in Europe” (Action
Aid, 2018). Another factor, political in nature, involved Gambians' fleeing from tyrannical rule
and oppression of political opponents by Jammeh. Jammeh’s intolerance of dissent led to many
people fleeing the country for fear of their lives and seeking political asylum in Western

countries. Evidently, this mix of economic and political factors has restructured the Gambian
national economy to a more remittance-based economy, as Gambians abroad constitute a major
source of revenue for the country. “These remittances averaged US$181 million a year during
2013-15, equivalent to around 20% of GDP, one of the highest proportions in the world” (Action
Aid, 2018). Most expatriate Gambians send money home to their relatives, which, in many
significant ways, helped sustain the country’s economy under Jammeh.
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In the 2016 presidential election, however, Gambians succeeded in voting out the
government of Yahya Jammeh, raising the question as to whether the economy was a
contributing factor that led to a regime change. Given Jammeh's poor handling of the country’s
economy for 22 years, how much of a factor did the economy play in affecting voting outcomes
that favored the opposition coalition parties? To answer this question, independent research was
conducted to collect and examine the opinions of Gambian electorates who took part in the 2016
presidential election. An important aspect of the research was to determine the extent to which
consideration of the economy was a factor in how voters chose to cast their ballots in the
election.
Before proceeding further into an analysis of Gambian voters, it is important to first

explore various perspectives on the theory of economic voting and how it affects electoral
outcomes in a democratic nation. A dominant view among many scholars in political science is
that the economy plays an instrumental role in influencing electoral outcomes in a democratic
nation where the polls are generally perceived as free and fair. Voters will reward an incumbent
candidate with re-election based on economic performance, while punishing him/her when the
economic condition in the country is bad by denying the candidate the vote. Furthering this
argument, presented here are three major theoretical frameworks for electoral practice, egotropic, socio-tropic, and communo-tropic, and the investigation of how these various theories
inform the importance of economy in an election.

The Electorates' Assessment of an Incumbent Based on Economic Performance
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Ego-tropic electoral practice is a kind of voting where an individual allows his/her
personal economic circumstances to dictate the votes. It is a situation where a voter's decision to
support an incumbent candidate in an election is contingent upon his/her status of income. A
voter may support an incumbent's bid for reelection if his/her economic situation is strong and,
likewise, will vote against an incumbent candidate when his/her economic circumstances are
weak. An ego-tropic voter is a self-assessed electorate whose decision to reward or punish a
candidate is primarily based on the evaluation of his/her economic standing as opposed to having
a general assessment on how robust or weak the economy is doing for everyone in the society
under the current president.
Ego-tropic voting is a myopic electoral assessment where a consideration of the

individual's self-economic gains is greater than that of the larger society. Since election is a
democratic means that empowers the citizens with a voice to freely choose their leaders, it is also
true that the policies that public officials institute differently affect individuals and various
groups of the society. Therefore, in deciding how to vote, a person may not be concerned by how
well or bad the economy is doing for everyone but rather vote for or against an incumbent based
on his/her personal assessment of government policies and how they have aided or abated his/her
economic condition.
Socio-tropic voting on the other hand, is a type of voting assessment where electorates
primarily examined the general socio-economic situation in the country to determine how
government economic policy affects the broader structures of the society, rather than just few
individuals. An election serves as a tool to inform the electorates as well as help them assess the
economic policies of an incumbent candidate to determine how their administration’s policies
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advanced or harmed the economic wellbeing of the citizens. Therefore, if the incumbent has
done well nationally on the economy, voters will reward him/her with re-election, while when
the national economy is in a bad shape, the incumbent is punished and removed from office.
Socio-tropic voting behavior is primarily based on voters' collective assessment of government
economic performance, with a view that the economy has a potential to shape the electorates'
voting behavior in a country.
Finally, communo-tropic voting is an assessment where an incumbent candidate is
punished electorally, not because of his/her handling of the general economic condition in the
country, but rather due to a proven electorate's disapproval on the government's handling of an
economic policy that affected a specific region in a country. A country’s economy may be strong

nationally, but voters who experience a weakening economic situation in a particular area may
decide to punish an incumbent on the ballot and hold him/her responsible in solidarity with
individuals of the affected region. For instance, “If conditions within a city affects the
presidential approval among residents, this would demonstrate a communo-tropic preference”
(Rogers, 2014, p. 8).
In sum, the importance of the economy in influencing voting behavior of electorates is a

widely accepted concept by many scholars in political science. Equally, various forms of
economic voting, such as ego-tropic, socio-tropic and communo-tropic, were explored in this
section to deepen understanding of the types of economic assessments Gambian voters
considered when they voted in the election. In examining the voting behavior of Gambian
electorates who participated in the 2016 presidential election, and given the economic
circumstances under Jammeh's administration, how much of an effect does the economy have, if
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any, influenced the votes toward the opposition coalition candidate? Which theoretical
framework better explains the voting behavior of Gambians who took part in this historic
election? These questions will be discussed later in detail, but first, a layout of the background
leading to the presidential election is provided.

The opposition coalition in The Gambia included seven political parties that came
together to compete for the elections against Jammeh. These parties, despite their divergent
ideological dispositions, agreed on a coalition to pursue two goals: to win the election and
remove Jammeh from office. Common concerns, raised by the leaders of the opposition,
justifying the need for a single coalition against Jammeh, were that human rights abuses in the
country were rampant, the state of the economy was deplorable, and election reform was

urgently needed to guarantee a free and fair election. Aside from the fact that Jammeh was a
dictator who had ruled the country with an iron fist, using fear and intimidation to silence his
political opponents, many opposition leaders accused Jammeh of having received help from his
Jola ethnic groups.
The opposition leaders alleged that Jammeh’s government turned a blind eye on ethnic
crossovers that allowed foreigners, most of whom came from his co-ethnic Jolas residing in the

Casamance region of southern Senegal, to vote in Gambian elections. This raised concerns of
ethnocentric voting that had favored Jammeh electorally during the 22 years his regime lasted.
Hence, three main issues were raised by the coalition for the 2016 presidential election: the
concerns over human rights' abuses; the status of the Gambian economy under Jammeh; and
allegations of ethnic voting. Were these issues the most significant factors for Gambian
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electorates who took part in the presidential election? First, it is important to explore the issue of
human rights in the Gambia during the 22 years of Jammeh's leadership.

The Scope and Systematic Human Rights Abuses Under the Jammeh
Administration in the Gambia
The concept of human rights is a politically charged issue for governments. The primary
debate on human rights focuses on two essential but contentious principles: universalism and
cultural relativism. While some countries, primarily western cultures, advance the idea that
human rights are universal and transcend national boundaries and cultures, others, mainly nonwestern nations, support a culturally relative approach to human rights consistent with local
customs and traditions.
Ever since the proclamation of universal human rights in 1948, members of the United
Nations have unanimously agreed to advance the course of human rights and to prevent any form
of human suffering wherever it may occur. The UN Declaration of Human Rights notes, “we the
peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed our faith in fundamental human
rights, the dignity and worth of the human person and the equal rights of men and women and
have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”
(United Nations, 1948).
The Gambia not only signed the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights but also
ratified the regional protocol enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
These human rights institutions rely on the tenet that, regardless of differences in cultures and
ways of lives, there are shared core principles of human rights that are inherent to all humans.
According to Hughes (2011), human rights uphold the principles of human liberty, guarantee
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freedom that is irreplaceable, and protect human vulnerability to suffering from oppressive
governmental systems. Human rights, which protect individual freedoms, grant equal
opportunities for all people to live their lives in full dignity so that they can realize their
potentials.

The concept of human rights has two main theoretical perspectives, which also explain
various frameworks under which these rights are advanced around the globe: universalists and
realists’ approaches to human rights. The universalists describe the individual as consisting of a
network of global citizens who are represented by various political systems that transcend
national boundaries. Universalists, according to Donnelly and Whelan (2018), comprise multiple
actors such as individuals and non-state actors working together to promote and protect human

rights. This view of human rights looks to advance broader human rights freedoms irrespective
of cultures and to enjoin states with the responsibility to protect fundamental individual freedoms
without limitation to cultural differences.
The realists' perspective, on the other hand, examines the issue of human rights as an
exercise of power and security, which is the primary factor that dictates the nature of
international politics. The realists hold the tenet that, due to the egoistic tendencies of humans

coupled with the anarchic nature of the global system, states have no choice but to rely on
themselves for protection. Based on this concept, the realist has portrayed human rights as a tool
used by powerful nations to exercise their power and dominance over weaker states, essentially,
an ideological weapon. As result, many states often reject the universalists approach to human
rights in support of cultural relativism that advocates for observing human rights based on
existing cultural norms and values of the state.
75

However, the weakness of the cultural relativists approach to human rights is premised on
the fact that oppressive regimes around the world often use culture and national security to
justify suppression, abusing the rights of citizens and their political opponents. This was the case
in The Gambia under the Jammeh regime.

In The Gambia, human rights under Jammeh's 22 years of leadership were marred by
allegations of systematic terrorizing and wide-ranging, state-sponsored human rights abuses of
Gambian citizens. These abuses are too many to be documented here, but Jammeh’s leadership
depicted a realist’s approach by justifying power to enforce and compel compliance for
preserving the survival of the regime against any opposing political force. However, to provide
examples, several instances of human rights' abuses are explored here to allow a better

examination of how these abuses influenced the electoral outcomes in the 2016 presidential polls
that resulted in a regime change in The Gambia.
On November 11, 1994, a few months after the successful overthrow of the PPP
government, a counter coup d’état was launched involving senior members of the Gambian
armed forces under the leadership of Basirou Barrow. In connection to the coup, 40 soldiers were
arrested, detained and summarily executed by the military junta without any trial. This act of

"jungle justice" contrasted sharply to the junta slogan of "soldiers with a difference," but it
served as a reminder to any soldier who tried to remove the existing government, that they would
be executed in cold blood. The murder of the alleged coup plotters began a dangerous trend
towards human rights abuses in the country, a time also characterized by fear and intimidation of
political opponents. A power struggle between members of the military junta led to the arrest of
Sanna Sabally and Sadibou Hydara on allegations of trying to assassinate Jammeh, the
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chairperson of the junta at the time. These individuals were arrested, subjected to all kinds of
torture and as a result, Sadibou Hydara lost his life under government custody.
The human rights abuses of members of the military did not stop there. In 2006, several
soldiers under the leadership of former army chief colonel Ndour Cham were accused of plotting

a coup d’état against Jammeh. Bunja Darboe, Wassa Camara, and Tamsir Jasseh, together with
civilian associates, were arrested and charged with carrying out a plot to overthrow the Jammeh
government. The group was found guilty by the courts and their sentences ranged from 10 years
for those accused of concealing treason to life imprisonment for the ringleaders of the coup.
Although the above-named individuals were alleged to have undergone torture and mock
executions to extract forced confessions while in detention, they were at least accorded a court

trial. Their associates, such as Daba Marena, the former National Intelligent Agency (NIA)
director, and some of the soldiers arrested in connection to this coup, were never brought before
a court of law, and were widely believed to have been executed by the government. At the time,
the state media reported that Marena and the others had escaped while being transported to
another prison, but many human rights advocates challenged this narrative, describing it as a
cover-up to prevent the public from knowing what actually happened to these individuals.
In 2011, another group of senior military officials and some businesspeople were arrested
and charged for trying to overthrow the Jammeh government. Contrary to other alleged coups
d’état in the country, this one was widely rumored to be a false pretense for the regime to purge
powerful military elites whom Jammeh considered a threat to his government. This group of
soldiers included a former Gambian army chief, Lang Tombong Tamba, Kawsu Camara, and two
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other business associates, Abdoulie Joof, and Yusuf Essiden, a Lebanese national. They were all
sentenced to death by the high court in Banjul.
Jammeh's human rights abuses against Gambians was not limited to soldiers as ordinary
civilians had their freedoms curtailed by his repressive regime as well. A case in point occurred

on April 14, 2001, when a group of students staged a peaceful protest to demand justice for one
of their colleagues who was believed to have been tortured to death by the police. The security
forces responded with force and fired live bullets into the crowds, killing 14 students and
injuring several others. Due to external pressures, the government launched an investigation to
determine the circumstances surrounding the killing of the students. At the end of this inquiry,
the Jammeh government decided to offer amnesty to both the victims and perpetrators of the

crime. To the surprise of many victims and their families, no single police officer was brought to
justice in connection with the death of the students. This incident clearly indicated that the
Gambian government was not only complicit in widespread human rights violations of innocent
civilians, but also reminded people that the government was willing to brutally suppress the
people’s rights to freedom of protest. The demand for justice on behalf of the students from
human rights organizations within and outside the country fell on deaf ears. The prevailing
atmosphere in the country served as warning to its citizens of a continued, dangerous trend
towards selective justice and state-sponsored terror.
In 2009, the Gambian government ran witch-hunting (not a metaphor, here) exercises
wherein villages were raided by the government security and arrested many civilians who were
accused of having committed acts of witchcraft. It is important to note that animist beliefs are a
part of some traditions in the country. Amnesty International estimated that that up to 1,000
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Gambians were kidnapped by government-sanctioned "witch hunters" and detained in secret
government detention sites (Amnesty International, 2009). These people were forced to drink an
herbal concoction that caused them to hallucinate and some died. In a similar bizarre encounter,
Jammeh set up a traditional treatment program when he outrageously claimed that he had a cure
for HIV/AIDS. In this program, many of the patients who were undergoing scientifically based
HIV/AIDS treatment were forced to abandon taking diagnostic medicine for that prescribed by
Jammeh. This was a fatal mistake. Most of them died.
In 2005, a group of Ghanaian migrants who were planning to travel to Europe via
Gambian waters was intercepted by a rogue element of the Gambian security forces who accused
them of being mercenaries planning to overthrow the government of Yahya Jammeh. These

people were rounded up and summarily executed by the Jammeh regime. No proper investigation
determined the credibility of these allegations (Saine, 2009, p. 22).
To further oppress and intimidate the citizens, the government set up an elite paramilitary
group known as “the Junglers” who ran a wide-ranging network of terror and conducted arbitrary
arrest and detention of innocent civilians perceived to be critical to Jammeh’s leadership in the
country. This group, linked to many high-profile killings of political opponents, was widely

believed to be directly carrying out orders from the President’s office. Also, a similar security
agency of the state that oppressed and tortured the regime's political opponents was the infamous
National Intelligent Agency (NIA), a state body directly controlled by the office of the President.
The NIA also ran detention facilities on its premises where detainees were allegedly tortured to
force confession before they were dragged to court.
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Jammeh’s war on the free press started just a few months after the military takeover in
1994 when he ordered the closure of the Daily Observer for publishing an article considered
critical of his government. The owner, a Liberian national, was deported to his country while
several other Gambian journalists connected to the story were arrested and detained. The
Jammeh government had a sustained effort to repress media freedom. As a result, many
journalists in the country were under constant intimidation, arrest, and detention. Saine (2009)
describes the scale of the junta war on press freedom as systematic, state-sponsored violence
never seen before in the history of the country. The goal was for the state to censure the press,
control the narrative, and prevent journalists from informing the population of government
policy.

In 2003, several journalists from the Independent News Paper were arrested and detained
at the NIA for publishing an article critical of the government, while others received death
threats. In the same year, three unidentified men forced their way into the premises of the Points
Newspaper, overpowered the security guard on duty, tied him up, and set the place on fire. The
government's tactics of harassment and intimidation of journalists failed to censure the private
media houses. In 2004, the chief editor and co-founder of the Points Newspaper, Dayda Hydara,
was assassinated in what was widely believed to have been an ambush by members of Jammeh's
military hit squad while he was on his way home. Although the government denied any
involvement in the killing of Dayda, no independent investigation was launched to determine the
cause of death (Amnesty International, 2014).
This incident created a public outcry that prompted international pressure led by the
European Union, the United Nations, and the United States on The Gambian government to
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investigate the murder and to bring perpetrators to justice. Several human rights organizations,
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, also amplified their voices, calling on
the government to uphold its commitment to the universal declaration of human rights and to
protect freedom of the press in the country. Despite all the pressure ramping up against the
regime in Gambia to protect the human rights of members of the media, no commitment was
made by the government to protect the freedom of the press in the country. Many of the
journalists, in fear for their lives, had no choice but to flee the country to seek asylum either in
Europe or America.
Thus, the media was one sector that suffered widespread abuse during the 22 years of
Jammeh's administration, characterized by state-sponsored arrest of media practitioners and

indefinite detentions without trial, crippling the nation’s access to impartial information. There
were also reports of arbitrary arrests of journalists, instances of torture, and frequent
disappearances of media practitioners under the state custody, which cast a dangerous and
deplorable condition for a free press in the country. Jammeh's intolerance to freedom of the press
is evident in a statement he made threatening journalists: “If you think you can collaborate with
the so-called human rights defenders and get away with it, you must be living in a dream. I will
kill you and nothing will come out of it” (Human Rights Defenders, 2009). Jammeh was
intolerant of dissent. His regime sustained an effort to clamp down on freedom of expression by
closing down private media houses, dragging journalists to court on charges of libel and sedition,
and jailing them for publishing stories critical of the government.
In 2007, the Ghana-based Media Foundation of West Africa filed a lawsuit at the
ECOWAS court on behalf of Musa Saidykhan, a Gambian journalist who had accused the
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government of torture while in detention by the notorious NIA. The court ruled in favor of the
plaintiff and ordered the Gambian government to pay a total sum of US$200,000 to Saidykhan in
damages for violating his fundamental human rights. The court also reached similar conclusions
relating to human rights abuses carried out against other journalists by the Gambian government,
ordering payments to the families of the late Ebrima chief Manneh and Dayda Hydara, who died
defending press freedom in The Gambia (CPJ, 2010).
The human rights abuses carried out by the Jammeh administration were not limited only
to the members of the media fraternity. The opposition parties also suffered significant arrest,
harassment, and intimidation at the hands of the security forces by Jammeh's orders. Jammeh
often branded the opposition political parties in the country as enemies of progress who would

never be able to defeat him in the election. This may have been true, given his regime's firm grip
on every sector of the political system, placing the opposition parties at great disadvantage.
However, in the count down to the 2016 presidential election there were several occurrences that
would significantly shape the political future of the country.
In 2016, a group of opposition activists from the United Democratic Party (UDP) under
the leadership of Solo Sandeng took to the street in a peaceful protest and a show of defiance to

promote public awareness of the need for electoral reform in the country. Solo Sandeng and his
group argued that the current electoral law placed the opposition at a disadvantage and should be
changed to ensure a level playing field for all political parties in the country. They opposed the
newly enacted law of first pass the post and advocated for a return of absolute majority of 50
plus one and a runoff if any of the competing parties did not secure more than 50% of the votes.
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The protesters had carefully chosen Westfield as a center to launch their demonstration
because of its strategic location in the middle of a vibrant urban center in hopes of attracting
large crowds and to send a powerful message to the government in support of their proposal on
electoral reform. The security forces rounded up the protesters and whisked them away for
detention at the infamous NIA office. These individuals in the course of their detention were
subjected to all kinds of torture, and Solo Sandeng, the leader of the protest, died in state
custody. This incident triggered a response by the international community and human rights
organizations demanding that the Gambian government investigate the circumstances
surrounding Solo Sandeng’s death and bring the culprits to justice.
As pressure both domestically and internationally continued to mount on the government,

a group of opposition supporters primarily from the United Democratic Party (UDP) and under
the leadership of the founder Oussainou Darboe led a solidarity protest demanding the
unconditional release of Solo Sandeng from custody, dead or alive. Jammeh’s rogue forces again
descended on these peaceful protesters, arrested them, and detained them in the state's central
prison. They were later charged for holding a protest without a permit, which, if found guilty,
would result in a minimum sentence of three years in prison. During this heightened environment
of political tension that occurred in the six months leading up to the 2016 presidential election,
the opposition parties were more united than ever to affect a regime change in the country.
However, given the electoral reality on the ground, the opposition recognized that it
would be impossible for a single opposition party to win the election over the incumbent without
forming a coalition to present a single flag bearer to collectively compete against Jammeh in the
polls. Uniting opposition parties in The Gambia to compete against Jammeh had been a
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frustrating process in prior elections given their failures to reach agreement on a single individual
who could represent the coalition of broad oppositions. This moment presented an opportunity
they could not afford to lose particularly given the many Gambians in the diaspora who had
promised to fund the campaign of the opposition parties if they agreed to form a coalition. In this
deal, six political parties – UDP, NRP PDOIS, GMC, PPP, GDP – and one independent
candidate agreed to form the coalition. Through a congress, all parties reached a deal to choose
Adama Barrow from the United Democratic Party as the flag-bearer. Barrow was chosen to lead
the coalition for a number of reasons. For one, following the arrest and incarceration of
Oussainou Darboe, the UDP leader and his party executives by the security forces, Barrow was
nominated to head the party on Darboe’s behalf. Secondly, the UDP, being the largest opposition
party in The Gambia at the time, was viewed as having a stronger influence among coalition
delegates, securing the selection of Barrow to lead the opposition parties to the polls.
Human rights abuses under the Jammeh government were a systematic and widespread
practice that aimed at instilling fear and intimidation in the nation’s people. The 22 years of
Jammeh's leadership was a reign of terror for The Gambia, marked by arbitrary arrest, detention
without trial, and disappearance without a trace against regime opponents. These events were
indiscriminately carried out by the state, affecting all sectors of the Gambian population. Some
were able to escape, leaving their country to seek asylum in Europe or the United States. Too
many paid the ultimate price through the loss of their lives at the hands of the regime.
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Chapter 5
Ethnic Voting On the African Continent
Ethnicity plays a very important role in African elections. Many scholars who have
studied the voting behavior of African electorates have indicated that ethnic cleavages critically
influence political mobilization of the masses and their voting preferences during elections. Why
do African electorates vote base on ethnicity? As complex as the answer to this question appears
to be, this section focuses on advancing several underlying factors that shape the voting behavior
of African electorates to reflect the cleavage structure. The first premise is that every nation has
an underlying political cleavage structure. Given that fact, one must understand the socio-cultural
formation of a society where identities are formed and how these identities manifest in the wider
political spectrum of the society to create various forms of group solidarity based on either racial,
ethnic, or class identities. As a matter of fact, every nation has a unique political culture and
distinct historical experience that influence the ordering of a political society.
In Africa, the legacy of colonialism, a historical factor, has significantly shaped the
current ethnic division dating back from foreign rule to modern-day, post-independence political
structures. The internalization of the externally induced ethnic division, primarily by Britain

under the policy of indirect rule, which politically empowers some groups against the others, has
led to the establishment of a political culture that influences the electoral behavior of the masses
in a way that reinforces the existing political system. Thus, in African countries where ethnic
division is prevalent in the society, ethnic cleavages will be used for political gains because they
have proven not only to beneficial but also an effective means for voters to secure political goods
from the election of a co-ethnic member.
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Secondly, a nation's demographic structures may influence voting behavior of the voters
in ways that reflect ethnic solidarity in support of a candidate. In studying African countries with
a heterogeneous population, such as Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast etc., analysts have shown that
the voting behavior of the electorates tends to be formed along ethnic and regional alliances. In
their study, Horowitz and Long (2016) have argued that geographical clustering of voters leads
to the creation of “ethno-political enclaves,” which enables the electorates to vote within the
proposed enclave. Voters in a heterogeneous population are divided along geographical distances
based on their locations in the country. A wide regional difference in the country presents serious
challenges to voters in accessing information about other political candidates and allowing them
to rely on those available in their regions to make informed voting decisions. Due to a lack of
information, these voters tend to focus on regional/ethnic cues in support of a candidate and may
overestimate their candidates’ chances of a victory, even if such a person has a zero chance of
winning nationally in an election.
Finally, another reason ethnicity plays an important role in African politics is that
political structures in Africa are riddled with patronage practices that offer rewards for electoral
loyalty to some groups in the society while punishing others for lack of support in terms of the
benefits they could rightly have. In many African countries, the reality is that access to political
goods is linked to political support. The politics of ethnic segregation continue to affect the
political structures of the societies by increasing the prospect of inter-ethnic rivalry and conflict
among various groups as they compete for limited state resources.
Similarly, many African countries have yet to set up a meritocratic system where
individuals are awarded political positions based on their proven qualifications. Given the
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absence of such a system, people will naturally be inclined to evaluate their voting preferences
based on the existing ethnic cleavage structures of a country because ethnic loyalty is proven to
be politically rewarding for those who engage in it. The danger of voting based on cues of
ethnicity is that it leads to the formation of political alliances in society based on ethnic identities
politicians exploit these social divisions by offering favors to some groups while depriving
others access to governmental resources and social advancement.
Thus, the current structures of African political systems reflect intentional ethnic
politicization and favoritism, which offers political rewards to some members in the society
while denying others access to government services and programs. In their study of ethnic
favoritism, Frank and Rainer, (2012) advanced three perspectives to explain why African leaders

engaged in ethnic-cleavage politics. First, the concept of altruism denotes a leader's willingness
to extend favors by distributing political benefits, such as constructing roads, building hospitals,
and schools, as well as awarding government contracts to certain groups of individuals as a
bargaining tactic for their political support and loyalty and as they may constitute an essential
political force to help the leader wining an election.
Such a leader may carefully target one ethnic group in a country that forms the majority,

different from his/her own ethnic group to use them in building a political base. This candidate
may be reluctant to reach out to other groups and strategically focus his or her energy and
political capital on winning the support of the majority groups in the country. Thus, altruism, in
this sense, is strategic in the sense that it is not meant for the person to feel good about the act of
giving; rather this generosity is political in nature, the purpose for which is to rally support from
an influential group to win an election.
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Voting is a game of numbers: the more a candidate obtains, the greater the chances of
electability. Thus, in a political environment that is marked by ethnic division, where tribal
affiliations are strong among the voters, a politician may rely on a majority ethnic group as a
viable political base that would offer greater chances of winning, assuming the person is able to
transform such ethnic loyalties into votes. It is important to note that altruistic political patronage
may boost the ego of a politician, especially when using successfully completed developmental
programs as evidence of effective leadership in a campaign. However, altruism may be a selfdestructive political venture when such gestures do not translate into votes in an election.
Another perspective is that a politician may change from politicking along ethnic lines
when a person understands that it is not only dangerous but also morally wrong to single out one

ethnic group to distribute government resources yet deprive others. In examining the
demographic characteristics existing in many African countries, it is fair to say that no candidate
can comfortably win an election by receiving votes from a single ethnic group without support of
the other ethnicities. Hence, to maximize a contestant's chances of victory, a leader may not have
a choice but to appeal to masses of the electorates in a way that transcends the boundaries of one
single ethnic group. Moreover, in places such as South Africa, establishing universal adult
suffrage has expanded voting rights to various groups. Blacks, disenfranchised during apartheid,
have recently been allowed to vote as a means of promoting broader political participation by all
citizens in choosing leadership in the country. Therefore, ethnic politicization and division are
less likely to succeed in a democratic state with a pluralistic demographic population. The
politics of ethnic division in a country creates chaos and political instability, which, in turn,
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creates a fertile ground for the emergence of dictatorship -- as we have seen in Nigeria, Sudan,
Cameroon, etc.
Finally, the quid pro quo model -- “I do you a favor, and, in return, I expect you to do me
a favor” means a leader may strategically implement projects in some areas of the country by

specifically targeting members of her/his ethnic group for developmental aid. These are visible
political goods, such as constructing roads, building hospitals, accessing electricity etc., with the
expectation that these favors will, in turn, transform into votes in an election. The quid pro quo
model differs from the concept of altruism wherein leaders tend to distribute political goods to
the people with whom they have no common ethnic or cultural relationship. Political leaders in
this model understand their audiences as a group of people with whom they share similar ethnic

background and strong cultural ties and relationships, with the expectation that their political
favors will be returned in kind through votes.
How do the demographic characteristics of a nation influence the electoral process, that
is, ethnocentric voting more likely to take place in a country with a heterogeneous population
than in a homogeneously political society? African countries with a homogeneous population
face different challenges, which are often not related to ethnic politicization and division. This is

mainly because a homogeneous society has a strong cultural tie that unites the population
irrespective of ethnic, religious, and cultural differences. African countries with a homogeneous
population are often small countries, and it is occasionally difficult, if not impossible, for
politicians to divide and distribute political goods to a section of the population while isolating
others. These countries, due to their small sizes, have close, harmonious relationships among
various groups in ways that promote solidarity and collective dependence for all.
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As a homogeneous political society, The Gambia fits this case study. I am investigating
the voting behavior of Gambians to show how the electorates manifested their preferences for a
candidate in the 2016 presidential election. Have ethnic cues influenced the electorates' voting
preferences in this historic presidential poll? Before I answer this question, let me first outline
the ethnic compositions of the Gambian population to examine how Gambians have voted in the
past presidential elections.

Evaluating Ethnic Demographics and Regional Votes in 2001, 2006, and 2011,
Presidential Elections in The Gambia
The Gambia has eight major ethnic groups: Mandinka, Fula, Wolof, Jola, Serer, Sarahule,
Manjago, and Aku. The estimates from the 2013 Population and Housing Census have shown
that the Mandinka form the dominant ethnic group (36%), followed by the Fula (22%), the
Wolof (14%), the Jola (11%) and the Sarahule (8%), whereas 9% represents the Serere, Aku,
Manjago, as well as other groups of foreigners residing in the country (GBOS,2014). Since The
Gambia attained independence from Britain, the country has always been known to abide by a
multiparty, democratic system. Although periodic elections were organized that allowed all
ethnic groups to take part in the electoral processes, the voting behavior of Gambian electorates
has never been studied until recently. Before I examine regional voting outcomes in the country,
let me first illustrate the locations of Gambian ethnic groups according to regions of the country.
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Figure X Distribution of ethnic groups by region of The Gambia

The above figure shows the distribution of ethnic groups by proportion according to
regions of The Gambia. While there is no region exclusively inhabited by one ethnic group, a
distinct pattern of distribution around the country shows a high concentration of one ethnic group
over the others. The Wolof, for instance, are located along the North Bank Region, the Sarahule
ethnic group dominates the residents of the upper region, the Jolas are heavily concentrated in
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the West Coast Region, and the Fula in the Central River Region; the Mandinkas, the majority
ethnic group, are widely distributed around the country.
One major challenge to electoral democracy in Africa has been the fragmented regional/
ethnic concentration, which is usually a catalyst used by politicians to engage in pitting one

group against the other during elections. The Gambia's demographic characteristics, despite
showing a much greater disparity in ethnic concentration across regions of the country than
elsewhere in Africa, have presented a special vulnerability to ethno-centric voting behavior
among electorates. Evidence from The Gambia's past presidential elections appears to contradict
any evidence of ethno-centric voting. To justify this claim, I deem it necessary to explore three
major presidential elections that were organized by the Jammeh administration.
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Figure 1 The results of the 2001 presidential election in The Gambia

Figure 1 shows a distribution in the 2001 presidential election over eight administrative
regions of the country. Five major candidates had competed in this election: each of them hailed
from different ethnic groups in The Gambia. Jammeh, the incumbent, was from the Jola ethnic
minority, Bah was Fula, which is the second ethnic majority, while Dibba, Darboe, and Jatta
were from the Mandinka, the majority ethnic group. Although ethnicity has been presumed to
have influenced voting preferences in Africa, the results of this election indicate clearly that
ethnicity was not a major factor in Gambian voters’ support for a candidate.
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Even though Jammeh was from the Jola ethnic minority, which is heavily concentrated in
the West Coast region of the country, he was able to defeat his rivals in all other regions, which
were heavily populated by the Fula, Mandinka, and Wolof. The 2001 presidential election is
significant in that this was first democratic election to be held in the country since the military
coup d’état. 2001 was the year when the electoral franchise was expanded to allow the
participation of the pre-coup parties, which had been previously banned by the military from
taking part in the first organized presidential election.

94

Figure 2 The results of the 2006 presidential election in The Gambia

Figure 2 shows the regional distribution of votes among the three main candidates, who
competed in the 2006 presidential election. While Ousainou and Halifa were from the Mandinka
and Wolof ethnic group respectively, Jammeh was from a Jola ethnic minority. The results
showed an overwhelming regional support for Yahya in ways that transcend ethnic and linguistic
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barriers in the country. This also proves strongly that Gambian voters are less concerned about
the ethnicities of the candidates. If ethnicity had been an issue for Gambian voters, I argue, it
would have been impossible for Yahya to win an election in the country, given that the Jola
ethnic group is demographically in the minority.

Therefore, to understand the voting behavior of the masses of Gambian electorates,
evaluating their voting patterns in the past presidential elections is crucial to determining the
charge of ethnic biases in voting preferences. However, the evidence from the 2006 presidential
polls has also shown that ethnicity was not a factor in the voting of Gambian electorates. The
evidence shows a landslide victory for Jammeh cutting across all major regions and breaking all
ethnic barriers in the country.
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Figure 3 The results of the 2011 presidential election in The Gambia

Figure 3 shows the regional distribution of votes for the 2011 presidential election in The
Gambia. This election, as history would have it, became the last presidential election that
Jammeh would win over the opposition. One surprising sign is that Jammeh’s proportion of
votes in the major regions of the country appears to be much wider than in earlier elections,
which showed a strong political dominance in popularity of his party over the opposition. Also,
given regional variances in ethnic distribution of the Gambian demographic population, ethnicity
does not appear to have caused a major hindrance to Jammeh, expanding his base of political
support. As the results in Fig. 3 show, Jammeh defeated Darboe and Bah in their ethnic-
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dominated regions like Janjanbureh, Basse, Kuntaur, and Mansakonko administrative regions
that are heavily populated by Mandinka and Fula ethnicities.
Based on the evidence presented by the Gambian political development and by my
investigation of past electoral behavior, it is obvious that, while ethnicity has shaped voting

choices elsewhere in African countries, the voting preferences of the Gambian electorates show
contrast. Gambian voters are less concerned about the ethnicities of the candidates than they are
for the issues they cared about; they will vote for a candidate who delivers political goods that
will benefit the entire society and not just a selective few based on ethnic or tribal affiliations.
Having explored the voting behavior of Gambians in the past presidential elections and having
established that the peoples' votes were not influenced by cues of ethnicity, the central question

this dissertation addresses becomes: Why did Jammeh lose the 2016 presidential election in The
Gambia?
In The Gambian election, the opposition coalition, after many years of trial and failure,
managed to affect a regime change in the 2016 presidential election. The change raised several
important questions that defy conventional wisdom: Why would a dictator organize an election
only to lose it? What issues did Gambian voters consider when they voted in this election? Six

months after this historic vote in my country, I conducted a nationwide survey to examine the
opinions of Gambians who took part in the polls. I wanted to determine whether the election was
based on issues more so than on ethnicity. The results and the implication of this study are
extensively discussed in this paper.
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Chapter 6
Methodology and Results of the 2016 Presidential Elections in the Gambia
In this project, I used field survey data and conducted direct interviews of Gambian
voters who took part in the 2016 presidential election six months after the end of this historic
vote. This dissertation investigates three main factors: Jammeh’s handling of the national
economy, the alleged human rights abuses by his administration, and whether the Gambian
electorates had based their voting preferences based on ethnicities of the candidates. These three
main variables are crucial to understanding the surprising electoral outcome in the country
wherein a coalition of opposition parties successfully defeated a dictator in an election that he
organized.

This study has two main goals: to explore the voting behavior of Gambian electorates
who took part in this election and to investigate the issues they had voted upon that led to a
regime change in the country. Did ethnicity play a role in Jammeh’s loss in the 2016 presidential
election, and, if so, to what extent did it favor the opposition coalition candidate, Adama
Barrow? Also, if the election was based on issues, how much of a factor was the status of the
Gambian economy, as well as mounting allegation of human rights' abuses during Jammeh’s

leadership in the country influenced the behavior of voters in this presidential election?
For this project, I conducted a nationwide survey of the Gambian electorates in six major
administrative regions in the country. I enlisted the support of five students from the University
of The Gambia and gave them two days training exercise in accordance with standards research
procedure on how to administer field survey without harming subjects. This training included
translating survey questionnaires into local language for participants who could not read and
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understand English language, how to seek their consents, and to ensure that voters responses
remain anonymous throughout this exercise. In this exercise, I randomly selected five polling
stations, and I administered questionnaires to a randomly selected total of 944 people who had
voted in the 2016 presidential election. This survey could not cover every single polling station,
but by random sampling, I am confident that these data are comprehensive and that the results
from this survey are extensive enough to draw a generalized conclusion.
The main hypothesis in this inquiry was to assess whether the condition of the Gambian
economy, alleged human rights' abuses under the Jammeh administration, or ethnocentric voting
contributed to a regime change in The Gambia.
H1: The condition of the economy in the country contributed to Yahya Jammeh's losing
2016 the election in The Gambia.
Why did I choose the economy as a unit of analysis? I focused on the economy and
evaluated the effects it has on the voters' feeling of the candidate due to the importance the
economy had in this election. Therefore, using the theory of spatial voting, I argue that political
parties would strategically organize and focus on issues, which they have an advantage to
galvanize public opinion in support of their policy positions. Gambian opposition-coalition
parties had one primary goal: defeat Jammeh.
Hence, in order to achieve this goal, the opposition leaders had to focus on exposing the
weakened status of the economy and to make a case for how Jammeh’s failed economic policies
had created a worsening economic crisis in the country, which resulted in a high rate of
unemployment, especially for youths. The group also promised to transform the country’s
economy and create more employment opportunities for Gambians, many of whom were
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migrating in mass to Europe through a risky and dangerous journey, locally known as “The Back
Way.”
H2: Yahya Jammeh’s Human Rights' record contributed to his loss of the presidential
election in The Gambia
On the issue of protecting fundamental human rights of Gambians, Jammeh’s
government was widely accused by human rights' organization such as Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch to have engaged in a state-sponsored abuse of the rights and freedoms
of Gambians. Jammeh had ruled the country with an iron fist, including jailing and killing
journalists for writing articles critical to his government. He had ordered arrest and detention of
political opponents; his elite paramilitary is accused of carrying out indiscriminate torture and
enforced disappearance of innocent Gambians. He ruled the country through fear and
intimidation of the masses.
Jammeh ruled the country for 22 years and periodically agreed to organize elections. One
important distinction was the scale of human rights' abuses of opposition-party executives in the
2016 presidential polls compared to all other elections in the country. The death of Solo Sandeng
while in government custody and the arrest and detention of the United Democratic Party and its
supporters a few months into the presidential polls galvanized a sense of support and unity
among opposition parties in the country. This unification resulted in the formation of the
coalition of opposing political alliances to jointly compete in the election against Jammeh. The
opposition parties were, for the first time, able to set aside their political differences to jointly
compete in the election as a united front using Jammeh human rights' violations in their
campaign platform in canvassing votes.
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H3: Ethnocentric voting contributed to Yahya Jammeh's loss of the presidential election
in The Gambia.
Finally, I will examine the concept of ethnicity and how that has factored into the voting
choices of Gambian electorates. Votes based on ethnic cues have been studied for a long time by
many scholars; they have previously studied the voting behavior of African electorates and
concluded that ethnicity plays a significant factor in voting choices. While it is true that
electorates in many African countries tend to respond to cues of ethnic identities, the voting
behavior of the Gambian electorates have never been examined. This research addresses this gap.
The results and analyses are discussed below.

Figure 4 Percent of the total votes for the three candidates
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Figure 4 shows the percentage of votes for the three candidates in the presidential
election. Among the people in the survey, 49% indicated that they had voted for Adama Barrow,
the leader of the opposition-coalition parties; 39% of respondents said they had voted for Yahya
Jammeh, the incumbent. Only 15% voted for Mama Kandeh, who stood as an independent
candidate in the race. These results are not the actual representation of the exact electoral
outcome as presented by the Independent Electoral Council but are limited to the opinions of the
people who took part in this research project. My finding shows that the election resulted in a
simple-majority win for the opposition leader over the incumbent. This is strikingly like the
outcome of the polls in the general election as presented by the Independent Electoral Council
(IEC,2016). Jammeh lost the election to Adama Barrow, and this research has in no ambiguous
terms dismissed all speculations advanced by some of APRC supporters, who have argued that
the votes were manipulated and rigged against Jammeh by biased officials of the electoral
commission in favor of the opposition. Thus, the credibility of my research relies strongly on the
similarity to official election results as presented by the IEC, which showed a lead in the polls by
43.3% of votes for Barrow, who secured a 3.7 margin of victory over Jammeh, the incumbent,
who had obtained 39.6% of the votes. Kandeh received 17.1% of the total votes.
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Figure 5 Most important issue in the election

Gambians were asked to show the most important issue they considered when they voted
in the presidential election (Figure 5). Given the significance of the economy, human rights'
abuses and Jammeh's policy of unilaterally changing The Gambia into an Islamic State prior to
the election, I consider it necessary to present these issues to gauge the opinions of Gambian
voters. Among all other issues presented in the survey, 61% of the people stated that they based
their votes on the economy of the country, whereas only 22% of the people stated that human
rights concerns were the primary issue for them. On the policy of transforming Gambia into an
Islamic state, only 2% of the participants expressed support, while 5% of the people showed that
none of these issues was a factor in their votes. Although the economy emerges as the issue most
often mentioned by voters in the survey, as the No. 1 issue that they had considered when they
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voted, it is not clear which of the candidates they had voted for or against in relation to the
question of the economy in the country.

Figure 6 The second most important issue in the election

Participants were asked to indicate the second most important issue (after the economy)
that they considered when they voted in the last presidential election (Figure 6). On the issue of
human rights, 61% percent of the people stated that they based their votes on human rights'
considerations, while only 25% of the people voted in favor of the economy. Also, 2% of the
participants based their votes on the candidate’s ethnicity, whereas only 4% voted in favor of
Gambia's becoming an Islamic State. Essentially, the pattern of issues is changing from the
economy to human rights and to ethnicity as questions have been presented on a scale of
importance. Human rights appear to dominate the second framing of questions, but it is also not
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clear how the voters evaluated their support for a candidate in this election based on this issue.
To address this problem, I utilized a crosstab to show the distribution of the electorates' support
of a candidate based on the issues identified in the survey.
H1: The condition of the economy in the country contributed to Yahya
Jammeh's loss of the election in The Gambia.

Figure A 1 Most important issue in the election

Figure A summarizes the survey results based on how respondents voted when they also
indicated that the economy was the issue of greatest importance. For those who indicated that the
economy was the most important issue, 29% voted for Barrow. The statistical inference to be
drawn from this result is that the people who voted for Barrow were convinced that the Gambian
economy would be better for them under the Barrow administration than under the incumbent
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Jammeh administration. In contrast, Jammeh received 27% of the respondents’ votes who had
indicated that the economy was the first issue they had considered in the election. Only 11% of
the voters supported Kandeh on the basis of that the economy was identified as the most
important issue.

The results indicate that consideration of the economy has emerged as an important factor
in influencing the electorate choices for all the three candidates in the 2016 presidential election.
However, it is also fair to conclude that the results suggest a more polarizing outcome, mainly
between the supporters of Jammeh and Barrow on this issue. The results indicate that, while the
condition of the economy may not have favored the people who voted for Barrow, Jammeh's
supporters appear to have been satisfied with the status of the economy under his administration.

Why are Gambian voters polarized on the issue of the economy and how has this polarization
factored into their voting preferences of candidates in the 2016 presidential election? The
Jammeh administration undertook some measures of economic policy in the country that might
have benefited certain sections of Gambian voters.
Jammeh, himself, operated a network of business enterprises called the Kanilai Family
Farm, where basic commodities; food, clothing, and agricultural products; were sold to

Gambians in a much lower price range compared to market prices. These goods were
occasionally distributed to the people free of charge. Rice, the main food in the country, was
widely used by the government to strengthen its political base. Critics have argued that this
small-scale social policy of donating essential food commodities to the populace deflected from
the state's inability to create a sustainable economic policy that would benefit Gambians in the
long term. Under Jammeh, the country continued to experience increased unemployment. One
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sector particularly impacted was the youth who were emigrating in large numbers to Europe in
search of ‘greener pastures.’ Jammeh’s administration may have failed to establish a robust
economic policy to improve their livelihoods especially. So, while his government's
redistributive policies, e.g. providing short-term food aid to the local populations, were popular
among some Gambians, who according to the survey favored Jammeh’s handling of the
economy, did not benefit all.
Given the importance voters attached to the economy, Jammeh lost the election, in part,
because of his handling of the economy that favored some groups while depriving others,
possibly driving voters to support to the opposition camp. This is also consistent with Hypothesis
1, which states that the condition of the economy in the Gambia contributed to Jammeh's loss.
H2: Yahya Jammeh’s human rights record contributed to his loss of the
presidential election in The Gambia.

108

Figure B 1 Second most important issue in the election

The results of the second hypothesis (Figure B) shows human rights as the second most
important issue Gambian voters considered in the presidential election and the candidate for
whom those respondents cast their votes. For voters who indicated that human rights was the
second most important consideration in the election, 35% of the participants in the survey voted
for Barrow, 19% for Jammeh and 9% for Kandeh.
The result demonstrates that a fairly large number of people who voted for Barrow were
increasingly concerned about human rights abuses under the Jammeh administration, more so
than for those who supported Jammeh on the same issue. The conclusion I draw from these
results is that Barrow's supporters were by far more dissatisfied with the Jammeh
administration's handling of human rights during the 22 years of his rule, while for Jammeh
109

supporters, the alleged human rights abuses under his administration did not negatively influence
their votes. Regardless of the disagreement held by the Gambian electorates on this issue, most
of the respondents who voted for the opposition have indicated human rights' abuses as the
second most important issue determining their votes.

The issue of human rights posed a shift in voters' support, overwhelmingly in favor of the
Barrow, the opposition candidate. The results indicated that the number of people who were
concerned about human rights violations under Jammeh outnumbered those who supported him
based on the same issue in the election. This result indicates a clear indictment by the voters on
Jammeh’s poor handling of human rights in the country. Based on this result, it is fair to
conclude that Jammeh lost the election, mainly because of the human rights' abuses carried out

on the population by his government during his 22-year reign in The Gambia. This finding also
supports the second hypothesis: Jammeh lost the election because of his poor handling of human
rights in The Gambia.
H3: Ethnocentric voting contributed to Yahya Jammeh’ loss of the
presidential election in the Gambia.
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Figure 7 Percent of votes for candidates

Figure 7 illustrates the survey respondents’ votes based on their own ethnicity for the
three candidates who ran in the presidential elections. Jammeh is from the Jola ethnic group,
Barrow from the Mandinka, and Kandeh of the Fula ethnic group. Since the presidential
contenders were from different ethnic backgrounds across the country, did ethnic considerations
influence Gambian voters in their support for candidates in this election? To answer this
question, the distribution of votes is sorted among the three contenders and evaluated according
to the survey respondent’s ethnic identification.
The results indicate an increasing support for Barrow by those who had identified
themselves as belonging to the Mandinka ethnic group. Jammeh also received outstanding
support from people who had identified themselves as belonging to the Jola ethnic group. The
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results show that the Mandinka and Jola overwhelmingly voted for candidates who represented
their ethnic backgrounds. Ethnocentric voting alone, however, did not generalize voting behavior
of the entire Gambian population. In fact, more Fulas voted for Jammeh than for Kandeh, who
hails from the Fula ethnic group. Also, Jammeh received more votes from the Mandinka ethnic
group in the election than from any other ethnic group beside the Jolas, despite the fact that
Barrow, who is Mandinka, was in the race. Finally, Kandeh received more votes from the people
who identified themselves as Mandinka than those from his own ethnic group.
Therefore, it is evident that the Gambian electorate was drawn to issues and their
perceptions of human rights and the economy were stronger factors that determined their voting
preferences more so than ethnocentricity. Although the electorate was polarized on the issue of

the economy in the country under Jammeh, their views on human rights clearly conveyed their
disapproval of the Jammeh administration and resulted in his loss in the 2016 Gambian
presidential election.
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Table 4 Comparing Gambian Electorates' Votes Between Barrow and Jammeh.
A Report of Coefficent Estimates of the Logistical Regressional Analysis
Variables

Coefficients

SE

Trust for Gambian
Security

.13

.063***

Democracy in The
Gambia

.18

.06***

The election was fair

1.9

.23***

Mandinka Ethnic
Group

1.5

.2***

Jola Ethnic Group

-1.1

.41***

Pseudo- R2

0.3661

Number of
813
Observation
*** indicates p value < 0.05
In the above regression analysis, I compared Gambian voter's support for Barrow and
Jammeh, the two leading contestants in the 2016 presidential elections. I also examined votes of
those identifying with either the Mandinka or Jola ethnic groups relative to their candidate
preferences and determined that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship
between being Mandinka and voting for Barrow. Likewise, there is a negative and statistically
significant relationship between being from the Jola ethnic group and voting for Barrow. These
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results show that the predicted probability of voting for Barrow is 15 percentage points higher
for voters who identified as Mandinka than for other voters. Similarly, the predicted probability
of voting for Barrow is -1.1% percentage points lower for voters who identity as Jola than other
voters. There is a remarkable difference in preferences of votes between Jammeh and Barrow.
While Mandinkas have shown favorability in voting for Barrow, Jolas demonstrated a strong
preference for Jammeh.
Given Jammeh’s claim that the election was rigged against him by the opposition
coalition, I asked Gambian voters opinion on the outcome of the 2016 presidential polls. There is
a positive correlation between people who perceived the election was fair and their support for
Barrow. The predicted probability of voting for Barrow is 1.9 percentage points higher for those
who believe the election was fair. Additionally, on a seven point scale, I asked Gambian voters
to indicate if they held the opinion that the country would be a democracy having successfully
ousted Jammeh through the ballot box, abruptly ending his 22 years rule of tyranny and
oppression in the country. As I argued elsewhere, organizing a successful election is not a
guarantee that a country will be a democracy. Regime change has renewed Gambian voters’
optimism that the country would become a democracy, and this belief holds strongly among
voters who supported Barrow in the election. For every one-unit increase in the opinion that the
Gambia will be a democracy the predicted probability of voting for Barrow increases by 18%
percentage points.
Finally, using a five point scale, I examined voters' trust for The Gambian security
services during the political impasse in siding with the people and upholding the democratic
votes. There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between voters' trust for The
114

Gambian security and their support for Barrow. With a one-unit increase in the number of voters
who indicated trust in The Gambian security, the predicted probability of voting for Barrow
increases by 13%, holding all other variables at their constant values.

Table 5 Multinomial Regression Analysis for the 2016 Presidential Election in The Gambia.

A Report of Coefficent Estimates of the Logistical Regressional Analysis
Variables

Gambian
Economy

Regression Analysis Using
Barrow as the Baseline
Coefficients
.37

Regression Analysis Using Kandeh
as the Baseline

SE

Coefficients
.02

.32

SE
.37

Human Rights

-.70

.35***

-1.4

.44***

Mandinka
Ethnic Group
Fula Ethnic
Group

-1.33

.20***

-.38

.28***

.34

.28

1.71

.33***

2.84

.37***

1.1

.56***

Jola Ethnic
Group
Pseudo- R2
Number of
Observation

0.2122

944

*** indicates p value < 0.05

In this section, I used a multinomial, logistical regression analysis to examine the three
main issues Gambians have voted on in respect to the three candidates participating in the 2016
presidential election. The results are consistent with my hypothesis as I argued that the election
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was issue-based and that the economy and human rights abuses were the main issues Gambian
people have voted on in the election. On the question of the economy, Gambian voters were not
only polarized, but there is no statistical relationship between vote choices on the economy.
Hence, the regime change in the country cannot be attributed to a vote choice based on the
economy. On the issue of human rights, however, there is a negative and statistically significant
relationship between voters who were converned about human rights abuses and their choices of
votes. The predicted probability of voting for Barrow on the question of human rights is -.70%
points higher than those who voted for Jammeh. In the same vien, voters who were concerned
with human rights abuses in the 2016 presidential election were -1.4% less likely to vote for
Kandeh or Jammeh in comparision with Barrow. Concern with human rights reduced the
probability of voting for Jammeh or Kandeh. This finding supports the compelling argument that
the 2016 presidential election in the Gambia was an indictment of Jammeh's poor handling of
human rights in the country. Gambian voters who were concerned with human rights abuses in
the country during his leadership have overwhelmingly voted against him in support of the
opposition candidate, Barrow.
Given the importance of ethnic cleavages and its potential in affecting voting outcomes in
African elections, I examined the votes based on the three main ethnic groups, the Mandinka,
Fula, and Jola ethnic groups, evaluating how they voted for the presidential contestants who each
hail from these three ethnic identities. The results show that a person who identified as a
Mandinka is -1.33% percent less likely to vote for Jammeh and more likely to vote for Barrow
(who is Mandinka). Similarly, for those who identified as Jola, the predicted probability of
voting for Jammeh (who is Jola) increases by 2.84% relative to Barrow. Finally, there is a
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positive and statistically significant relationship between being a member of a Fula ethnic group
and voting for Kandeh (who is Fula) than Barrow. For an individual who identifies as Fula, there
is a 1.71% increase in the predicted probability of voting for Kandeh over Barrow. Also, there is
a positive and statistically significant relationship between being a Jola and voting for Jammeh
over Kandeh and Barrow. For those who identified with the Jola ethnic group were 1.06% less
likely to vote Kandeh and Barrow, than they are for Jammeh.
In sum, while Gambians who participated in the 2016 presidential election were split on
the question of who would be best at handling the country’s economy, their responses on human
rights show an overwhelming dissatisfaction with Jammeh’s government given the human rights
abuses in the country, showing that this is one of the main reason why Jammeh lost the election.
Although there was evidence of ethnic-based voting with Mandinkas supporting Barrow, Jolas
voting in favor of Jammeh, and Fulas showing preferences for Kandeh, the results show that
ethnicity was less of a factor than the issues for the Gambian electorates’ choice led to the
regime change. There were also instances of cross-ethnic voting as shown with the Jolas
preferring Kandeh to Barrow. Statistically, the results show that the election was primarily issuebased more so than ethnic considerations and the choices of Gambian voters on these issues that
significantly impacted the outcome of the presidential race.
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Figure 8 Agreement that Gambia will be a democracy

Figure 8 denotes a measure of the scale of agreement among Gambians on the question
about whether the country will be a democracy following the abrupt end of the 22 years of
Jammeh dictorial rule in the country. Democracy is a process that involves a complex form of
governance. A country’s ability to hold peaceful and transparent elections signifies the fulfilment
of one essential democratic principle, that of guaranteeing the voters the freedom to decide who
will govern them. However, caution requires that the determination of a country’s democracy
isn’t based on a single election that successfully ousted a dictator. In the case of The Gambia, the
tyrant may be disposed, but the institutional mechanism in which Jammeh had relied upon to
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abuse the rights of Gambians, such as the army, the police, and the infamous state secret agents
(NIA), remain present and operational in the country.
Given this reality, the survey participants were asked whether The Gambia would
become a democracy given the departure of Jammeh. The results here indicate 48% of Gambians
strongly hold the opinion that the country will be a democracy, while only 11% had an opposing
view that Gambia will not be a democracy following the end of Jammeh regime. Overall, the
majority of the survey participants were optimistic that the country will be headed towards a
democracy. Others, however, were cautious to arrive at this conclusion, perhaps for obvious
reasons given the lack of instutional reforms that reflect democratic ideals. The Gambia’s
experiment towards democacy is a process that will not only stand the test of time, but would
also serve as a motivation for other countries to emulate, especially those currently experiencing
dictaorial rule. In the midst of fear and intimation, Gambian voters have defied all odds to
electorally effect a regime change. The political events in The Gambia have sent a clear signal to
voters everwhere that when the people are given the freedom to choose in a free and fair
electoral process, the victory of the opposition over an incumbent government is possible.
Election is a competition and the credibility of the polls will rely on the premise that both
incumbent and opposition parties have equal chances of winning or losing.
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Figure 9 Problems with Gambian politics under Jammeh

The primary issues faced by Gambians under the Jammeh regime, are re-examined in
respect to their influence on the voting decisions of the Gambian electorates. Clearly, Jammeh’s
firm grip of power and intolerance of dissenting views created so many underlining problems
and voters, fearing reprisal, could not openly discuss them given the climate of state sanctioned
terror. This question was posed differently but close enough to the issues Gambian voters had
considered in their choice of candidate in the election: what were the biggest problems in
Gambian politics under the Jammeh’s administration? Consistent with the second hypothesis,
58% of the people indicated that human rights abuses were the biggest problem during the 22
years of Jammeh’s leadership, whereas 20% of Gambians stated that unemployment was the
main problem. While the opinions of Gambian voters split on the question of the economy, an
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overwhelming number of respondents indicated that they were concerned over the human rights
abuses that were carried out under the Jammeh administration. Also examined was the variable
of ethnic conflict, exploring whether there were underlying inter-ethnic grievances in the
country. This exploration was based on the account that Jammeh, in one his campaigns, had
made disparaging remarks about the Mandinka ethnic group whom he accused of organizing a
series of coup d’états that aimed to overthrow his government. Also, Jammeh had declared The
Gambia as an Islamic state, prompting fears that the country’s Christian minorities would have
their rights violated and increasing the prospect of religious conflicts in the country. The results
of the survey indicated an estimated 5% of the people believed ethnic conflict to be a problem
during the Jammeh regime, whereas 8% of voters had considered religious conflict as a bigger
problem for that time period.
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Figure 10 What should be the priority of the government?

Figure 10 summarizes participant response to the question of what the priority of
government intervention should be under the Barrow administration. Like any new government
that comes into power, there are many sectors that must be addressed to improve the lives of the
people. However, with limited resources, the government must prioritize areas to focus its policy
formulation and intervention. Government policy will be effectively implemented when the
opinions of the people dictates public policy. Based on this fact, Gambian voters were asked
their priority preferences for the newly established Barrow-led government to focus. An estimate
from the participants in the survey shows that 32% of Gambians wanted the Barrow-led
government to focus its resources on reducing the unemployment ratio in the country, with 28%
of the people indicating that the government’s priority should be on justice and reconciliation
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and to address those whose fundamental rights were violated by Jammeh’s regime. Also, since
most of the Gambians sustain their livelihoods through farming, a noticeable 15% of Gambians
want the new government to consider investing in agriculture. While an estimated 11% of
respondents had preferred the government to invest its resources on providing quality and
affordable education in the country, 11% indicated that they want the government to provide
more resources to improve the health care system in the country.

Figure 11 Support for political parties in The Gambia

Figure 11 illustrates the support for political parties in the Gambia, recognizing that the
opposition parties consolidated in a coalition that successfully defeated Jammeh’s party. It is
important to determine how much support each political party has among Gambian electorates,
when broken down into single units. Exercising caution to the fact that party support is fluid and
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not static and because of the rapid changes that could occur due to voters’ realignment and crosscarpeting in partisan position, the results presented here represent responses from six months
after this historic vote in Gambia. The results show that 35% of Gambian voters said they
supported Jammeh’s party, APRC, while 25% percent of the people said they supported the UDP
party. Also, a fairly large number of Gambian electorates, 23% of the people in the survey,
identified themselves as independent, or not being a supporter of any political party in the
Gambia. This result is significant and also concerning for the future of Gambian elections in two
ways: The APRC lost the election to the opposition coalition parties, but despite being defeated
in the polls, six months post-election, the party still appears to be leading in the number of
people who consider themselves members of the APRC.
The inferences garnered from this finding are that despite Jammeh’s party lost in the
election, the APRC continues to be popular among Gambians. This evidence supports how
closely contested the election was, as shown in Figure 4, and consistent to the analyses in Figure
13, where Gambians opined that the formation of the coalition was one of the main reasons why
the opposition was able to defeat Jammeh in the polls. Therefore, if this trend holds moving
towards the next election, this research predicts that, without a coalition approach, the APRC
party will not only win the election, but also will continue to dominate the political landscape of
the Gambia for a foreseeable future. Equally, the formation of the opposition parties was
primarily to defeat Jammeh in the polls and the goals were achieved. The current political
climate has witnessed the emergence of many newly formed parties that are preparing to contest
for the 2021 presidential elections. Surprisingly, Barrow, the current president who led the
coalition to victory as nominated by the UDP ticket, has since broken ranks with the UDP party
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founder and its members to form a new party, the National People’s Party( NPP). The other
parties who came together and formed the coalition have also splintered and are all operating
independently from one another.

Figure 12 Will Barrow keep his promise to Gambians?

Figure 12 summarizes responses to the question of whether Barrow will honor his
promise to step down after three years in government. Barrow was selected as the flag bearer of
the opposition coalition to lead them in the elections against Jammeh. Part of the conditions laid
down by these parties were that if Barrow wins, he would serve a three-year term and then step
down to allow another election to be organized in which he would not participate. Interestingly,
this agreement contradicts the Gambian constitution, which provides a five-year mandate for the
president to serve in office before another election would be organized. The reason for this short125

term voluntary mandate, according to coalition participants, was to level the ground for all
parties to compete in the next election. Based on this promise, the Gambians surveyed were
invited to gauge their opinions on the likelihood that Barrow would honor the agreement made
with other parties to step down at the end of three years. At the time of this study, 35% of the
people indicated that Barrow would keep his promise and step down at the end of his three years
in honor of the coalition agreement, while only18% of the respondents disagreed with this
statement.

Figure 13 The main political event in The Gambia

Participants were asked to indicate what the main political event in the Gambia was that
contributed to Jammeh’s loss of the election (Figure13). There were several events that happened
that could explain why Jammeh lost the election, such as the regime cracking down on the UDP
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supporters who went to the street to protest for electoral reform. As discussed earlier, this group
was led to the street by Solo Sandeng to protest the unfair electoral laws put in place by the
Jammeh government to control the opposition and to make it difficult for them to win an
election. The government moved swiftly by detaining and torturing the UDP supporters, leading
to Solo Sandeng’s death in the custody of the Jammeh regime. This event was followed by
another protest by the UDP opposition party led by Oussainou Darboe. Along with the leaders
and members of the party’s executives, they demanded the release of Solo’s remains and other
protesters who were remained under the state custody. The government responded by arresting
and jailing the UPD party executives, some of whom were believed to have been tortured in
detention. This event led to the subsequent formation of the coalition of the opposition parties to
compete in the election against Jammeh.
Also, there were other developments in the Gambia related to migration, where a mass
exodus of Gambian youths embarked on dangerous journeys attempting to reach Europe by
crossing through the Mediterranean Sea. This journey, locally referred to as the “Back Way”
while highly risky, is indicative that young people believe that better economic opportunities
exist for them outside of The Gambia, in Europe, Kora and Darboe (2017). Among these social
and political developments in Gambia, 45% of Gambians stated that the formation of the
opposition coalition against Jammeh’s party in the election was the main political development
that led to Jammeh’s defeat in the election, while 32% of the people stated that jailing of the
UDP opposition supporters was the main reason why Jammeh loss in the 2016 polls. Nineteen
percent of the people surveyed indicated that the death of Solo while in the regime custody was
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the main political event that led to the downfall of the Jammeh’s regime. Only 5% thought that
the mass exodus of youths contributed to Jammeh’s downfall.

Figure 14 The successes of the Jammeh regime in The Gambia

Surveyed voters were asked to indicate what some of the Jammeh administration
achievements were in the Gambia during the 22 years of his leadership (Figure14). It is
important to point out that, even though Jammeh's legacy in the Gambia was polarizing among
voters, many people supported some of his policies. As the results above clearly illustrate, 50%
of the people indicated that infrastructural development was Jammeh’s main achievement, while
25% mentioned education as one of the Jammeh administration’s successes. Why did the voters
give Jammeh such a high rating on infrastructural development? Jammeh spearheaded massive
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infrastructural projects in the country, building roads that connected major towns and regions.
Jammeh constructed major referral hospitals and through his partnerships with the government of
Cuba, supplied medical doctors in Gambian hospitals to facilitate the nationwide health care
delivery. Before Jammeh came into power, under the 30 years of Jawara’s leadership in The
Gambia, across the entire country, there were only three high schools and no university. Within a
short period of time, Jammeh’s administration had built many high schools across every region
of the country and made government scholarships available to students whose parents could not
afford to send their children to school. His government also provided free basic and secondary
education for girls to help discourage early marriage in the country. Jammeh established the first
university in the country and provided government funding for over half of the students who
were studying at the University of The Gambia. He built bridges across the country earning him
the title ‘Babili Mansa’, a Mandinka term meaning bridge builder. Given these developmental
gains in the country, it is not surprising that Gambian voters highly rate Jammeh’s performances
in the infrastructural development of The Gambia.
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Figure 15 Trust for Gambian security among the people

The outcome of the 2016 presidential elections could have plunged the country into a
civil war. Jammeh, who had initially accepted defeat, later changed his mind and threatened to
nullify the results until another election was organized. He claimed that the opposition rigged the
election against him. Jammeh’s refusal to abdicate power to the newly elected government led to
a military intervention by the regional forces of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) to uphold the electoral outcomes and restore democracy in the Gambia. Given
this contentious political impasse in the country, some Gambians argued that the Gambian
military would force Jammeh to step down and honor the vote by December 19, when his term
constitutionally expired. Based on this assessment, the voters’ trust in the Gambian security
forces was evaluated through this survey question (Figure 15), asking them whether they
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believed the Gambian army would defend the electoral verdict of the people during the impasse
and force Jammeh to leave. The voters opinions of the Gambian security forces were polarizing
with 24% of the people in the survey stating that they never trusted the security forces to protect
the vote, whereas, 25% of the people indicated trusting the Gambian security forces to do their
job.

Figure 16 The expectations of Gambians for the new government

Figure 16 summarizes the expectations Gambians had for the Barrow’s government.
Voters were asked to compare what they expect from this government compared to Jammeh’s
regime. Sixty-five percent of the voters stated that things would be much better under Barrow’s
administration and another 10% indicated that it would be somewhat better. Fifteen percent
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combined, believed that the government would be either somewhat worse or much worse based
on survey responses. While again it is important to remember that that this survey was taken six
months after this historic vote, and that the opinions of voters could change at any moment, it is
clear that the Gambian voters expressed strong favorable opinions of the Barrow government,
with the expectation that things will be better under him than they were during the 22 years of
Jammeh’s leadership.

Figure 17 Receive political news through social media

Figure 17 illustrates Gambian respondents’ indication of whether they received their
political news through social media. Kora and Darboe (2017) have argued that unlike any
previous election, the emergence of social media (e.g. WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook) has
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contributed to Jammeh’s loss of the election. This belief if premised on the fact that with the
advent of social media, the Jammeh’s government lost its ability to censor and control
information in the country. Gambian voters, for the first time, were not only able to access
independent political news of events happening in the country, but the internet facilitated voters’
access to political news outside the country, which the government could no longer hide.
Given this reality, the voters were asked to indicate from which medium they received
their political news. Examining the effect social media had on voter access to political
information, 44% of the people indicated that they had received political news from social
media, while 45% of the people said that they did not receive their political news from social
media but through local radio networks. Gambian voters were polarized on the effect of social
media in effecting a regime change in the country. Although, some indicated that political
information they received through social media had influenced their voting preferences, other did
not believe that social media had played a role in affecting their voting decisions.
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Figure 18 Fairness of the electoral commission

Gambian voter respondents were asked to state whether the Independent Electoral
Council (IEC), the agency responsible for organizing elections in The Gambia, was fair in the
conduct of the 2016 December presidential elections (Figure 18). This question was asked
mainly because Jammeh had complained that the IEC had connived with foreign powers to rig
the elections against him. He demanded a recount and threatened to dissolve the IEC. Voters
responding to this question showed that 38% of the people said they did trust that the elections
results reported by the IEC were accurate and that the commission was not biased against
Jammeh, whereas 63% of the people indicated they did not trusted the IEC and that results
reported weren’t accurate to the electoral outcome, essentially supporting Jammeh’s claims that
the vote was rigged against him.
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Figure 19 Candidates votes by region in the Gambia

Figure 19 summarizes the votes for each candidate by the six major regions of The
Gambia. Examination of regional voting is an essential facet of this study, recognizing that the
distribution of votes for the three candidates provides additional insights to Gambians’ voter
behavior. First, across the six regions, a single, particular ethnic group inhabits none. While the
Mandinka ethnic group is spread widely throughout the country, there is a significant presence of
the Mandinka ethnic groups in the Lower River Region, and some parts of the North Bank
Region. The Fula ethnic group is also sparsely spread out around the country, and more heavily
concentrated in the Central River Region and the Upper River Region. The Wolofs are found in
the North Bank, Greater Banjul Area and some parts of the Central River Region, while the
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Sarahule ethnic group is predominantly inhabiting the Upper River Region. The Jolas are the
main ethnic group in the West Coast Region of The Gambia.
Examining regional responses of the voters has shown that an overwhelming number of
the people in the North Bank Region (NBR) have voted for Barrow over Jammeh and Kandeh.

Jammeh, despite holding the advantage of incumbency during the election, has the lowest
number of votes in the NBR compared to any other region in the country. Interestingly more
people voted for Jammeh than for Barrow and Kandeh, in the West Coast Region (WCR), where
Jammeh’s hometown is located. In the WCR, the proportion of votes for the were significantly
lower compared to any other regions. While Barrow defeated Jammeh and Kandeh in all other of
the five administrative regions, it is not clear whether Barrow’s victory was, in some way,

influenced by the support from his Mandinka ethnic group. Given that no region is entirely
occupied by one single ethnic group, and recognizing that there are some areas with higher
presence of certain ethnic groups, the survey evidence of voters strongly supports the argument
that ethnic voting was not the main reason why Jammeh lost the 2016 presidential election.
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Figure 20 Ages of voters in the 2016 presidential election

Figure 20 displays the age demographic of Gambian voters in the last presidential
election. The highest median of voter age ranges from people who are between 18 to 40 years
respectively. This result clearly shows that young people, age 40 and less, participated more in
this election those older than 40, paralleling a demographic reality in the country with young
people constituting 40% of the population. The Gambia, like many developing countries, have
stunning low life expectancy ratios compared to more developed countries. This reality results in
young people being a major political force in influencing electoral outcomes in the polls,
provided that a party manages to energize them to vote. This survey provides clear evidence that
the Barrow victory was strongly influenced by the mass participation of the youth whose votes
resulted in a regime change. The irony here is that the youth comprise the groups facing serious
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problems of unemployment in the country and are the same groups emigrating in mass, risking
their lives, to go to Europe in search of greener pastures.

Conclusion
Studying the voting behavior of a group of people is a difficult exercise because the

issues that influence voting choices vary and, at the time, could not be fully captured with a
single analysis. In Africa, many scholars who have studied the voting behavior of the electorates
have concluded that ethnicity is a factor in the way in which the people vote in elections. In this
dissertation, I have advanced various factors as to why ethnicity is significant in African politics.
Key among these reasons are: The concept of functionality, the idea that people tend to respond
to ethnic cues in politics because they expect some kind of reward, the legacies of colonialism in

African countries, and the effects of the colonial policy of divide -and-rule in which European
powers intentionally empowered some ethnic groups while depriving others from political
power, and, finally, the differences in political culture among African nations that have
homogenous and heterogeneous populations and how they both respond differently to ethnolinguistic politics.
Through understanding why ethnicity is salient in African politics, I argue that analysts

must explore historical effects, the politicization of the existing cleavage structure, and
demographic characteristics of African nations, and must investigate how all these factors
contribute in various ways to structuring the identity politics of most African countries. While I
have no doubt that ethnic cleavages powerfully influence the voting behavior of electorates in
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some African countries, this is not true for all other African nations. Research that aims at
generalizing that African citizens vote based on ethnicity is likely misleading.
Hence, the evidence of this findings on the Gambian presidential elections strongly
supports the argument that the election was issues-based: One of the most important issues that

influenced the results in favor of the opposition was human rights abuses under the Jammeh
administration. Even after controlling for ethnicity, human rights is a significant predictor of
voting behavior and results has indicated that those who were concerned about human rights
were more likely to support Barrow, than Jammeh. Ethnicity, although important for some, did
not influence the overwhelming majority of Gambians who participated in this election. On the
question of the economy, Gambian voters were split and as indicated by the survey results views

of the economy did not help distinguish Barrow voters from those who voted for Jammeh. The
electorates' support for human rights surpassed their considerations of ethnicity as well as the
Islamization policy of Gambia under the APRC government, and that Jammeh lost the election
primary based on human rights abuses. However, with Jammeh finally off the political spectrum
in The Gambia, significant challenges remain in consolidating recent electoral gains to establish
solid foundations for a thriving democracy to ensure good governance. My survey results
indicated that most Gambians were optimistic about the prospects of their country under the new
administration. This attitude is consistent with the emergence of a movement in The Gambia in
support of the electoral outcome with the slogan, “Gambia has decided.”
It is one thing to decide. Fulfilling the promises upon which Gambians have decided is
another. Therefore, politicians must deliver or run the risk of going back to the old way of doing
business, a move that will contradict the wishes and aspirations of the people, who, despite a
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climate of fear and intimidation, successfully effected a regime change that ended the rule by
tyranny in The Gambia. The results of the Gambian election had a surprising outcome: they
violated two theoretical assumptions often advanced by many scholars, who saw ethnocentrisms
as measures to examine voting behavior in developing democracies. Paul Collier (2009) argues
that a dictator will agree to organize an election only when he is confident that he will win.
Collier also noted that, in African elections, votes are often based on loyalty to ethnic identities
rather than issues. Although these dynamics often play out in some African societies, clearly
Collier’s arguments do not hold for The Gambia where a dictator had organized an election and
lost.
Likewise, if votes were based on ethnicity more so than on issues, it is tempting to argue

that in a free and fair election, Jammeh would not have been able to sustain the electoral victory
for the 22 years that his regime lasted based on the theory that he came from one of the minority
ethnic groups in the country. Clearly, the ethnic factor was less of a cause for a regime change in
The Gambia than voters’ concerns about the economy and human rights abuses under the
Jammeh administration.
Finally, having presented my evidence in the study of the voting behavior of Gambians,

this dissertation has branched away from the existing consensus of ethnic voting many
Africanists scholars wield to study elections in Africa. I am confident that voters in Africa, like
those in advanced countries, despite the challenges of limited information and educational
attainment, have the capacity to evaluate their voting decision based on the issues they care
about, which ought not necessarily fall along a country's existing structures of ethnic cleavages.
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It is true that ethnic cleavages exist in Africa as a distinctive multi-cultural make-up of
the society; however, when politicized, a dangerous weapon is created that increases ethnic
conflicts and divisions in many African countries. In The Gambia, we had a dictator who had
ruled the country with an iron fist by oppressing all forms of dissent to his regime. If ethnicity
strongly dictates the votes in the country, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for
Jammeh, being from a minority Jola ethnic group, to win any elections in The Gambia, let alone
rule the country for over two decades. On the contrary, it could have also been that Gambian
electorates might have shied away from politicking along ethnic lines because of Jammeh's
heavy-handedness and for fear of political reprisal by his dictatorial regime.
While this possibility is far from the scope of this dissertation, my conclusion remains

that issues of human rights and economy, albeit quietly, stood out among Gambian voters more
than considerations of the ethnicities of presidential aspirants who took part in the election.
Whether this trend will continue into the future of Gambian politics in the post-Jammeh era will
require the test of time. So far, the evidence of political development in Libya, and other
countries where a dictator was ousted either through elections or popular rising of the masses,
has shown increased ethnic tensions and chaos, creating a fertile ground for radical extremism
and violence against innocent civilians.

141

Chapter 7
Examining Issue Voting in the 2018 Local Government Elections in The Gambia
Following the two years after the presidential elections, Gambians went to the polls again
for the local government elections and this time around it was a contest for mayors of the two
major cities. Banjul City Council (BCC) and Kanifing Municipal Council (KMC) are the cities
constitutionally allowed to organize mayoral elections in the country. Consistent to the inquiry of
the voting behavior of Gambian electorates at the national level, this study also examined the
voting decisions of Gambians at the local government levels to determine whether voters have
evaluated the choices of their candidate based on the ethnicities of the contestants or more so by
the issues the candidates had promised to address if elected.

In this regard, a survey was conducted six months after the local government elections
and the findings compared with the results of the presidential election to examine similarities as
well as differences between local and national elections. Having taken into consideration that the
city of Banjul and Kanifing municipality are faced with some common challenges, it is also true
that the problems facing these cities are in some ways distinct and require different approaches.
Based on this fact, the survey questions were carefully designed to capture these unique

similarities as well as differences, drawing heavily drawing from the investigator’s study on the
mayoral contestants as they presented the problems facing these cities and how they promised to
address them.
Most importantly, these particular local government elections were historic in terms of
the number of contestants who competed in the mayoral polls. This was primarily base on the
fact that Jammeh, who held a firm grip on the political system in the country, had been removed,
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injecting a new breed of political enthusiasm in the country. Many people who were previously
afraid to contest for local government during the Jammeh era, came out in numbers to compete
in these elections. In essence, the downfall of Jammeh brought a renewed interest in Gambian
politics in ways not previously observed. Also, this crowded political field was much more
representative of the country’s ethnic diversities, even more so than the presidential election,
making it much more interesting for political analysis.
In investigating the voting preferences of Gambian voters in the local government
elections, several questions were raised to guide the study: What were the issues the electorates
had considered in the 2018 mayoral election? Who are the participants in this elections, and what
are the issues have they voted on in this election? Did the ethnicities of the candidates influence

the choices of the voters or were they more concerned with issues and voted based on those
issues in support of their candidates?

Methodology
In the city of Banjul, nine people contested for the position of mayor. A numerical
variable was allocated to each of the candidates and coded as follows: Rohey Lowe 1,Abdoulie
Bah 2, Alagie Jah 3, Abdoulie Saine 4, Musa Njie 5, Paul Bass 6, Lizzi Eunson 7, Ebou Faye 8,

and Adama Ba 9, respectively. Nine candidates also participated in the mayoral election in the
Kanifing municipal council. For the purpose of analysis, numerical values were allocated to each
candidate and coded as follows: Talib Bensuda 1, Bakary Badjie 2, Sherif Gomes 3, Rambo Jatta
4, Papa Njie 5, Adama Bah 6, Dawda Njie 7, Modou Jenkins 8, B Seghore 9.
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The survey was distributed to a randomly selected number of people (N=206) who
participated in the mayoral elections. This number of voters was selected based on the small size
of city of Banjul compared to the Kanifing municipal council. Five locals were trained to collect
this survey data, including how to present the questions and the required follow-through for
proper research protocol. This included seeking consent by the participants, informing them that
their participation was voluntary, and that in the event that one felt uncomfortable answering a
question he/she could freely withdraw from the research without any problem. Also, training
underscored the understanding that many voters were illiterate in the English language, requiring
interpretation of the survey into the two most frequently spoken local languages in the country,
Wolof and Mandinka to ensure participants fully understood the context of consent, voluntary
participation, and the right to withdraw at any time prior to answering survey questions.
In this election, the candidates have raised several issues that are facing the two cities,
which they promised to address if elected. The survey identified some of these problems and
presented them to the voters in order to gauge their opinions on which issues influenced their
votes in support of a particular candidate in the race. The city of Banjul and Kanifing share many
common challenges. In this analysis the issues were coded as follows: ethnicity 1, education 2,
revenue generation and collection 3, jobs for the youths 4, drainage system 5, garbage collection
6, sea erosion 7, road infrastructure 8, recreational facilities 9 and for those who indicated none
of the above, 10.
While the challenges facing the city of Banjul and Kanifing municipality seem endless,
the primary reason the above issues were included in the examination of voter choices is to first
explore the extent to which ethnicity is perceived to have influenced the voting decisions of
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some electorates. This advances the notion that if the voting choices are somewhat influenced by
their cues of ethnicities, one would assume that the impact of ethnic voting would be much
stronger in local government elections than the national election. This is premised on the
understanding that the candidates in the local government election are not only more closely
associated with the voters but also are more personally confronted with issues that affect
people’s lives on a daily basis. The local leaders have a more direct relationship with the
communities they represent and are occasionally well known to the people they serve. Would
Gambian voters reflect on their ethnic cues when deciding their choice of a candidate in the local
government election?
The two cities also are melting pots in terms of the diversity of ethnic representation in

the country. The saying that ‘all roads lead to the city’ presents a real life experience in most
African metropolitan areas, where opportunities for economic advancement is centered more in
the cities than in rural areas, resulting in mass emigration of people from rural to urban centers in
search of greener pastures. This problem also shapes the demographic characteristics of the
cities, reflecting multi-ethnic diversities, in which all ethnic groups from across The Gambia
appear to be highly concentrated. The ethnic diversity presents an opportunity for a robust
analysis of the voting behaviors of a diverse section of Gambian voters and to determine whether
cues of ethnic identities, or others issues unrelated to ethnic identities influences the choices of
voters in the local government elections. This question will be examined later in this analysis.
The second issue examined is the educational opportunity available in the municipalities
to address the needs of the citizens. In the Gambia, the education sector is mainly controlled by
the central government. The local governments Banjul and Kanifing, however, have built schools
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to complement the efforts of the central government, and to address the educational needs of
their residents. Also, the most common schools operated by these municipalities in The Gambia
are the skills centers, where vocational training is provided to those who have not completed
school training them to acquire skills in the informal employment sector, as a way to address the
rise in unemployment.
The third issue, the revenue generation and collection within the municipalities, is based
on the need for Banjul and Kanifing to generate revenue through the collection of taxes from
markets, neighborhood shops and compound taxes given they are not funded by the central
government. Both cities do not have an electronic tax collection system that will facilitate their
revenue generation and rely on municipal police to go from one business to another to enforce

tax compliance for the city. This process is not only labor intensive but is riddled with corruption
that has created significant loss of revenue for both local municipalities. How to effectively
address this problem was a policy agenda the mayoral aspirants laid out in their convention
speeches and will be further analyzed through evaluation of the voters survey responses.
Fourth, unemployment has been one of the biggest problems confronting the two cities.
Despite the fact that local governments have limited resources they could use to create more jobs

compared to the central government, all mayoral contestants noted that the increased
unemployment of youths in both cities was a serious problem. The candidates for the mayors
have weighed in on this issue with the promise that they will devote resources to create
employment opportunities for young people. Also, this election coincided with the mass exodus
of Gambians youths who were taking risky journeys to travel to Europe through Libya in search
of better economic opportunities then could be at home. The journey, commonly known as the
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back way, has resulted in estimates of over 35,000 Gambians arriving in Europe through
irregular means between 2014 and 2018, according to the International Organization for
Migration (2018).
Environmental health challenges are also problematic for these cities. One examined in

this study was the drainage system, a major problem for both the city of Banjul and Kanifing
municipality. The rural-urban migration has increased the population growth in urban areas and
created substantial demand and congestion on the drainage systems of the two cities. This,
coupled with the poor infrastructural planning, has blocked the free flow of water, sending
sewage into the streets and creating a health hazard to local inhabitants. Similarly, growing
population and urbanization has also caused challenges for the collection and safe disposal of

garbage. Local municipalities lack resources to buy waste disposal equipment to effectively
collect and dispose of garbage that is generated daily in the cities. Solid waste continues to pile
up in the streets as residents have no alternative safe way of disposing of their wastes, further
endangering the health of the populace.
Another environmental problem facing both municipalities is sea erosion. While the
advancing sea levels have affected some part of the Kanifing municipality, especially in the

coastal towns of Bakau, Tanji and Sanyang, the city of Banjul is located on an island that is
believed to be under sea level elevation. Banjul has lost significant land base due to advancing
water from the sea and in the 2005 the government of The Gambia contracted a company from
Holland to address the problem. Similar efforts were made by the hotel owner associations in the
country to plant coconut palm trees along the banks of the sea as a way to combat sea erosion of
the shoreline. The road networks connecting the two municipalities are in bad shape, especially
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during the rainy season and both cities lack recreational facilities for their residents to enjoy. All
of these issues were presented to voters responding to the survey and their responses analyzed to
determine which of these issues were important to in their choice of mayoral candidate. In this
study, two main hypothesis are presented to investigate whether the local election was issue
based or ethnicity based.
H1: In the 2018 mayoral elections in the Gambia, the electorates have evaluated their
votes for candidates based on issues rather than on the ethnicity of candidates.
Consistent with the notion of ethnic voting, this hypothesis explores the voting decisions
of Gambians to determine the basis upon which they made their electoral choices for a preferred
candidate. Also, given the fact that at the local level voters are confronted with more immediate
issues which directly affect their daily lives, one would assume that their needs associated with
those issues would outweigh any ethnic identity considerations. This assumption is because on
the sense that having a dysfunctional local government level impacts voters’ lives more
significantly than it at the national level. This is not a diminishment of the importance of the
national government’s ability to address the collective needs of the citizens, but given limited
resources and in some cases, the central government may discriminate and channel its resources
to places and regions of the country that are electorally viable while neglecting demands from
others. The challenges faced by local governments compared with the central government, is that
they cannot discriminate and intentionally exclude others from benefitting from public goods.
Local government is held to different standards because it is not only closer to the people, but
also must deliver basic services to them at the grassroots level. Based on the important role local
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government plays in addressing the needs of the people, this hypothesis will explore which
issues are of greatest concern to the voters for the local government to address.
H2: In the 2018 mayoral elections in the Gambia, the electorates evaluated their votes
based on the ethnicities of the candidates more than on the issues the candidates
promised to address.

This hypothesis will explore whether the Gambian electorates were responding to cues of
ethnicities when they voted in the local government mayoral races. Unlike any other election in
the history of local government, this poll has attracted many candidates who came from various
ethnic backgrounds in the country to compete for the offices of mayor. Given the diversity of the
contestants’ ethnicities, what were the most important issues the voters considered in these
elections? We asked three ranked choice questions to guide this hypotheses. The reason for

doing so is that there is a sensitive identity issue, and the investigator believed that survey
participants were likely to dodge this issue when answering questions. Ethnicity in Africa, like
race in the United States, is a divisive issue that many people tend to shy away. Just as a white
voter in the US is less likely to openly indicate that he/she is supporting a candidate because the
person is white for fear of being considered racist, in Africa, a voter may be reluctant to say
he/she is supporting a candidate because of the shared ethnic identities. By asking the questions

in three different areas, we expected to better capture the true issues that the voters cared about
when they participated in the voting processes. We are confident that having presented a wide
range of issues to voters and allowing them to decide on these issues, that their stated preferences
were an honest reflection of their true choices in the polls.
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Mayoral election in the Banjul City Council (BCC)

Figure 21 The results of the local government election in Banjul

Figure 21 shows the distribution of votes among the candidates who participated in the
election of the city. Rohey Lowe received 26% of the votes, while Abdoulie Bah, the incumbent
seeking re-election had 17% of the votes. Adama Bah and Lizzi Eunson obtained 16% and 17%
of the votes respectively. Ebou Faye had 11% of the votes, while Abdoulie Saine managed to

emerge with 9% of the votes. Alagie Jah, Musa Njie, and Paul Bass all received less than 5% of
the total votes in the election. Banjul, despite being the capital city of The Gambia and the seat of
the central government power in the country, has always had a history of voting out the
incumbent in the mayoral race.

150

Banjul voters are a well-informed electorate who, despite the 22 years of Jammeh’s
regime tactics of instilling fear and intimidation in voters throughout the country, has remained
firm in their choices to independently elect mayors who are not nominated by the ruling party.
The example shown here of the incumbent party losing to the opposition in the mayoral election
in Banjul had been a repeated occurrence throughout the Jammeh era, where Jammeh’s party
chosen candidate was defeated in the polls by an independent candidate. Following, Jammeh's
departure in the 2016 presidential election, Banjul voters made history again by electing its firstever female mayor.

Figure 22 First issues for voters in Banjul

As stated earlier, many challenging issues face the city of Banjul. Like any other city in
The Gambia, Banjul has many problems that cannot be captured in totality. For this study, nine
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key issues were examined and presented to the survey respondents who participated in the
mayoral election (Figure 22). In pursuance to the hypothesis of issue voting, participants in the
survey were asked to identify one of the most important issues they had considered when they
voted in the mayoral elections for the Banjul City Council. Given the range of issue alternatives
identified by candidates in their manifestos as problems facing the city of Banjul, the survey
invited voters to identify which of these issues was more important to them.
One of the primary issues Banjul voters considered in the election was employment
opportunities for youth, and a resounding 40% of the participants in the survey indicated that
jobs for younger Gambians was the most important issue they considered in choosing their
mayoral candidate. Another primary issue that emerged for Banjul voters was the road

infrastructure network in the city, with 18% of the survey participants indicating that they were
concerned with the poor road network in the city and that their vote supported a candidate based
on this issue. Fifteen percent of the Banjul voters supported candidates who had promised to
improve the quality of education in schools of the city. Support for garbage collection, fixing the
city drainage system, improving the city’s revenue generation capacity, and combatting sea
erosion, each fell below 10% as issues influencing voters’ preference for a mayoral candidate.
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Figure 23 Second most important issue for voters in Banjul

Voters were asked to evaluate the issues they considered as the second most important
when they participated in the election (Figure 23). The reason for inviting these choices to vary
as first, second, and third, enabled a better evaluation of the consistency of the choices the voters
were making in the election but especially, a way to explore whether their preferences were
influenced by cues of ethnic identities rather than concrete policy issues. In Banjul, 29% of the
people who participated in the survey indicated that their second most important issue was
improvement of the roads networks in the city of Banjul, including fixing broken streets, roads,
and pedestrian walking areas and enhancing gutters to facilitate the free flow of sewage waste
out of the city.
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As discussed earlier that the city of Banjul is under sea level and despite numerous efforts
taken by the government to construct roads networks within and outside of the city, the roads in
Banjul usually have a very short life span before cracks develop. Most the roads that were built
have washed away during the torrential rainy season as the soil becomes too wet to support the
pavement. Support for youth’s employment remained high among participants as a second
choice as well, with 27% of the voters indicating that they supported the creation of employment
opportunity for the high number of jobless young people in the city of Banjul. There is a
noticeable increase in support among the voters on garbage collection in Banjul with 19% of the
participants in the survey indicating that garbage collection was the second most important
consideration for them, whereas only 15% of the voters had expressed their concerns on fixing
the drainage system of the city.
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Figure 24 Third most important issues for Banjul voters

The final question invited voters to identify what the third most important issue was that
they had considered when they voted in the Banjul mayoral election. Surprisingly, the two issues
that garnered the highest responses for voters are uniquely linked. The need to rebuild the
crumbling road network in the city was identified by 28% of the people, indicating they had
voted in support of improving roads in Banjul. As with the roads being in bad shape, the same is
true for the drainage system, which is mostly linked to the road network around the city of
Banjul. An estimated 25% of the participants in the survey stated that the poor drainage system
in the city was their third most important consideration when they voted in the election. The
voters in Banjul consider the dilapidated drainage system as one of the primary causes of floods
in the city during the rainy season. On the issue of garbage collection, 18% of the people
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considered it the third most important issue, while 15% of the survey participants considered
improving the quality of education in schools around the city as their third most important issue.
Youth employment, while dominant as an issue voters have considered for their most- and
second-most important issues, had 10% among the voters as a third most important issue.

Figure 25 Support for political parties among voters in Banjul

In this section, the support for political parties among the voters in Banjul is investigated.
Despite there being a coalition of parties that defeated Jammeh in the 2016 presidential polls, by
the time of the 2018 survey, the coalition was no longer in place as political parties that
participated in its formation splintered into their respective parties. Although since the departure
of the Jammeh regime in the Gambia there has been a resurgence of new political parties, this
research is limited to parties that were in place during Jammeh’s regime and that have a
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noticeable presence in the country. The parties include the APRC, UDP, GDC, PDIOS, GMC,
NRP, GPDP, PPP, and a whole section of the Gambian voters who this research identifies as
“independent” and have sworn no affiliation to any of the parties.
For Banjul, 25% of the people surveyed had indicated that they support the APRC,

whereas 20% of the people in the survey said they supported UDP. An estimated 38% of voters
in Banjul indicated that they were independent and have no affiliation with any of these parties,
and about 9% of the people said they support PDIOS. Support for the rest of the parties among
the people of Banjul falls below 5%. Also, Barrow, who is the current president at the time of
this survey, was still a member of the UDP party, but has recently broken ranks with his old
party to form his own party, the National People’s Party( NPP), and is preparing to run for office

in the upcoming presidential elections. Although this survey could not capture the popularity of
Barrow’s new party, surveyed voters were asked to indicate the candidates they expect to vote
for in the next election and the results from that may enable inferences.
An important observation on support for political parties among the people of Banjul
shows surprising popularity with the APRC party and even with Jammeh out of the country and
in exile in Equatorial Guinea, it is evident that his party remains popular among the people of

Banjul. The UDP came in second in terms of support among the people of the city and this was
likely possible because of the incumbency the party was enjoying at the time with Barrow in the
office. Now that Barrow has formed his own party, this research suggests that there would be a
split in support between the NPP and UDP in Banjul, resulting in favoring the APRC in any
future election.
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Figure 26 The choice of presidential candidate in next election

In Figure 26 the survey participants indicated the candidates they will vote for in the next
presidential election. A range of potential presidential candidates were provided in the survey to
gauge the voters’ opinions and included: Jammeh, Barrow, Kandeh, Darboe, Bathily, Bah,
Sallah, and Fatty, and also an option for voters to indicate “none of these candidates”. For
Jammeh, 23% of the voters who took part in the survey said they will vote for him; similarly,
23% said they will vote for Barrow. Jammeh and Barrow are statistically tied in terms of support
among the surveyed voters in Banjul, while support for Kandeh is at 18% among the people of
Banjul. An estimated 14% of the participants said they will vote for Darboe, while 13% of the
people said they support Sallah. Ten percent of the electorates in Banjul indicated that they have
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no preferences for any of these candidates and wouldn’t be voting for them in the next
presidential election.

Figure 27 Priority areas for Barrow's government

Figure 27 summarizes survey respondents’ identification of the issue areas that the
Barrow government should consider for priority intervention. Several issues were presented to
the survey participants, ranging from employment, quality education, improving health care
services in hospitals, agriculture, to combatting corruption in government. Reducing corruption
in government and improving transparency in government institutions is the issue that 58% of
voter respondents in Banjul identified should be the Barrow’s government priority, particularly
given concerns that there is too much corruption under Barrow’s current leadership in the
country. For those who supported government intervention on reducing unemployment, 21%
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stated that they think Barrow’s government should focus more on creating jobs, while 17% of the
people indicated that they prefer the government to prioritize the agricultural sector. Banjul
voters, in more clear terms, appear to understand that no meaningful interventions will succeed
in a government that is riddled with corruption. They have indicated that the Barrow’s
government must be transparent and reduce corruption before they can address the issues of
unemployment, agriculture, and improve health services in the country.
Mayoral election of the Kanifing Municipal Council (KMC)

Figure 28 The results of the local government election in Kanifing

In the Kanifing municipal elections, nine candidates competed for the office of mayor.
Out of this group of aspirants, Talib Bensouda, the candidate representing the UDP won the
election with 50% of the votes, while Rambo Jatta of the APRC, came in second with19% of the
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votes. The results also show that Papa Njie and Adama Bah were statistically tied, each receiving
9% of the votes, whereas Backary Badjie, Dawda Njie, Modou Jenkins, Sherif Gomes, and B.
Senghore obtained less than 5% of the votes. Mayor Bensouda's rise to power was fueled by the
strong backing of the UDP party which, at the time of election, enjoyed a brief advantage of
incumbency in President Barrow’s administration where key government positions were held by
members of the executives of the UDP, including the vice presidency. However, by the time of
this survey, there was a gradual divorce between Barrow and the party executives of the UDP
through what is believed to have been an apparent power struggle. Barrow has since left the
UDP, and recently formed his own party, the NPP. Barrow is now preparing to contest in the
next presidential elections. The local government elections may have favored the current mayor
of the Kanifing Municipality to remain in office. It is unclear, however, whether Bensouda will
be able to retain his seat in any future elections given the recent split within his party and the
potential weakening of its dominance in the region that may empower the support base of other
parties to win the next election.
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Figure 29 The first issues for voters in Kanifing

Consistent to my investigation of the primary issues which the voters have chosen in
support of the candidates in this election, the Figure 29 shows that 62% of the survey participants
said that the number one issue they had considered when they voted in this election was the
employment for young people. This result mirrors that of Banjul, showing that the majority of
people who participated in the polls were increasingly concerned about the rising unemployment
rate for youth in the two cities. The voters’ support for the creation of jobs for the masses of
young people trumped all other issues considered when they voted. While 18% of voters
responding indicated they voted in support of an efficient revenue generation and collection in
the municipality, voter's support for all other issues was below 5%.
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Figure 30 The second issues for voters in Kanifing

The second primary issue the voters of the Kanifing Municipal Council indicated was the
collection of garbage with 24% of survey participants indicating that they voted for their
candidate based on their position on the collections of waste generated by residents of the area
Waste collection and safe disposal have been a serious challenge for Kanifing municipality given
that over the years, the city has not only increased in population density but has also expanded
geographically and many areas that were not previously inhabited are now occupied. The city
has not only had limited resources to purchase waste disposal trucks but has had difficulty
securing a safe site for landfilling and recycling wastes generated by the city.
The current dumpsite is located in the middle of a town called Bakoteh, where residents
have always complained of the toxic smoke that is generated by the wastes and how it impacts
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their health and well-being. This issue was attributed to the poor planning of the city, as the
future growth in population and related developmental challenges for this urbanized area were
not considered when the dumpsite was located. Poor city planning is not limited to The Gambia,
but it is a problem for many African cities. Youth employment also ranked highly among voters
of the KMC, with 18% of them indicating that unemployment was the second issue they had
considered when they voted.
The voters were split on their positions on revenue generation and fixing broken road
infrastructure within the municipality as both issues were identified at 16%, a statistical tie, albeit
slightly higher support of the former over the latter among the respondents. Equally, voters were
polarized in their support of improving the drainage system in the city and building recreational

facilities in the city as both issues were identified by 9% of respondents as the second issue they
considered when they voted in the elections. Support for candidate’s ethnicity, the quality of
education, and combatting coastal erosions were lower than 5% among the KMC voters.
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Figure 31 The third issues for voters in Kanifing

When voters were asked to indicate the third issue they had considered in their support of
the candidates in the mayoral election of the KMC, 23% indicated that they would prefer
building the city’s crumbling road infrastructures, while 20% supported establishing recreational
facilities in the city. As a third choice, 19% of respondents supported effective and efficient
garbage collections and disposal mechanisms to be put in place within the city, whereas 13% of
the voters supported improving the city drainage system to facilitate the flow of water, especially
during the rainy seasons. Employment, as the third most important issue, was identified by 10%
of participants, while support for revenue generation and collections in the city was identified by
8%. Also, the voter's support for quality education as the third most important issue was 5%,
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while those who had indicated their votes were based on ethnic consideration and combatting sea
erosion were lowest among the KMC voters.

Figure 32 Support for political parties in Kanifing

Figure 32 shows the results of survey respondents in the KMC indication of the party
they support in The Gambia. The UDP was identified by 38% of the survey respondents as the
party they supported, while 21% of the voters said that they support PDOIS. Also, 18% of the
people indicated that they support the GDC, whereas support for the APRC, the party of former
President Jammeh received 9% of support in the KMC. Over 15% of the voters who participated
in the survey are independent, while support for the remaining political parties is below 3% of
people who participated in this survey. The findings on support for political parties in the KMC
differ from that of Banjul, where the UDP and APRC were closely tied in percentage of support
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Banjul also had a higher percentage of voters who identified as independent and not supporting
any particular political party than in the KMC.
Another important observation that could explain the surge in the numbers of support for
the UDP among the people of Kanifing was the fact that, at the time of the survey, the party was

enjoying the advantage of incumbency. As I noted earlier, Barrow ran for presidency on the UDP
ticket. The recent power struggle within the party, however, has resulted in a split that is likely to
decrease the strong political support base previously enjoyed by the UDP before the breakup.
Barrow has formed a new political party and it is not clear how the support base of his political
party would hold into the future.

Figure 33 Barrow's government priority in Kanifing
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As the excitement of the Barrow government has begun to dwindle among many
Gambians who have defied all odds of a dangerous political environment by voting
out Jammeh’s tyrannical dictatorship, participating voters were asked to indicate what priority
interventions should be the focus of the Barrow’s government. This was another way of learning
the opinions of voters who made this change possible, and the evidence here, like in Banjul,
shows that 41% of the people had the opinion that the Barrow’s regime is way too corrupt and
the priority of his administration should be to reduce corruptions and improve transparency in
government. Similarly, 22% of the voters had indicated that the Barrow’s government priority
should be the reduction of unemployment in the country, while 12% of the voters in the KMC
preferred that the government focus on improving the agricultural sectors of the economy. On
the question of improving the health care services in the country, 11% of voters were in support,
while 9% of the people supported government invention to improve the quality of education.
Clearly, corruption and unemployment are two strongly correlated issues and voters’
opinions on this issue appear to be consistent. A corrupt government cannot deliver any
meaningful results that will reduce unemployment, as resources that are misused or stolen are
often the ones public officials were supposed to use to help create jobs for the masses. Hence, the
importance of voters’ attachment to issues of transparency in governance is to ensure that public
officials are first and foremost held accountable before they can deliver programs that will create
employment for the people.
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Figure 34 Support for candidates in future presidential election in Kanifing

Figure 34 illustrates the survey respondents’ indication of the candidate they expect to
vote for in the next presidential election, with the assumption that all the above candidates are on
the ballots. Among the voters in the Kanifing municipality, 28% of the people in the survey said
they will vote for Oussainou Darboe in the upcoming presidential elections, while 27% of them
indicated support for Halifa Sallah. Darboe and Sallah appear to have gained support among the

people of the KMC above that of the current, incumbent president. Also, 19% of the people said
that they would vote for Kandeh, whereas 18% of voters indicated that they will vote for Barrow,
the current president. Support for the former president, Jammeh, is very low, with only 8% of
respondents indicating that they will vote for him in the next election. The support for the rest of
the candidates across the surveyed voters in the KMC is below 3%. It is recognized that these
numbers are subjected to change.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this study advanced three major questions to guide research in
investigating the issues that were important to voters of the Kanifing Municipality and Banjul
City Council, when they participated in the 2018 mayoral elections in their respective areas. For
voters in the KMC, the issue that concerned them most was the increased unemployment among
the youths. As the results appear to show, the people's support for a candidate was primarily
influenced by strong considerations of the youth’s employment in the municipality. The second
most important issue aside of unemployment was the collection of wastes generated by residents
and their safe disposal as increases in population and expansion of the urban settlement have
made it difficult for the city council to effectively undertake this exercise given limited available
resources resulting in uncollected garbage everywhere in the streets. Finally, fixing the
dilapidated road network within the municipality emerged as the third most important issue for
many of the voters in the KMC region.
Similarly, the voters who participants in the mayoral elections in Banjul, have highlighted
three main primary concerns. First, voters were worried about the high rates of employment in
the city for young people, second, the need to fix the road network in the city, and thirdly, the
poor drainage system of the city, causing frequent flooding during the rainy season. The study
shows that these issues were more important to the people of Banjul than the ethnic backgrounds
of candidates who participated in the election. A similar conclusion is also made on the study of
voters in the KMC, as the survey results discussed above show that the people care more about
the issues than the ethnic identities of the contestants in the elections. Hence, it is fair to
conclude in support of the hypothesis that voters in both elections cast their votes based on issues
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and that ethnic identities did not influence the voting decisions of the either people of Banjul or
KMC in the mayoral elections.
There is a striking similarity of the 2018 local government election study with the results
of the 2016 study of the presidential elections in The Gambia, in which Jammeh lost to the

opposition coalition parties. In both sets of elections, Gambian voters have demonstrated that
they were more concerned with issues than with the ethnicities of the candidates in elections. Just
as concluded that Jammeh lost the election based on his poor handling of human rights, more
than ethnocentric voting, the study of local government elections also indicates that decisions of
Gambian voters were primarily based on social issues identified above.
In their determination of the second and third most important issues, differences emerged

between the voters in Banjul and those in the KMC. While voters in the KMC have stated that
their second and third preferences were waste collection and building road networks within the
city, the voters in the mayoral election in Banjul have repeatedly noted the importance they
attached to fixing the road infrastructure of the city as their second and third most considered
issue when they voted in the local government election.
The number one issue that emerged as the most important considerations for the voters of
Banjul and KMC, was the employment of the youths. Employment is a politically charged
subject given the fact that many people's lives are dependent on it to improve their economic
status, but the local government in the Gambia has limited resources to effectively undertake
robust job creation activities compared to the central government. With corruption being
identified as the biggest hurdle for the lack of government intervention to reduce unemployment
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in the country, the burden of government inaction has posed serious safety challenges to local
governments in the Gambia, particularly in the urban area, where government policy failure to
address youth employment results in increased rates of crimes such as theft and related banditry
activities. The rise in unemployment is relatively linked to a mass exodus of Gambian youths to
Europe who are using dangerous route through Libya crossing the sea to enter Europe, most of
whom are believed to be economic migrants seeking a better economic future. In The Gambia,
this journey is commonly known as the “Backway” and while some have managed to make it,
many others lost their lives in the process.
The 2016 presidential election in The Gambia was issue-based, and ethnicity even
though was important for some voters, was not the major factor that had influenced the voting

behavior of the people who participated in it. For those who supported Jammeh, 27% of them
had indicated that he did well on the economy for them, whereas 29% of people who supported
Barrow said that they expected that he will do well on the economy. Kandeh received 11% of
support on this same issue. While the economy has emerged as an important factor in this
election, the response Gambian voters have had on the issue of the economy is polarizing
between those who supported Jammeh and Barrow. Hence, Jammeh’s defeat cannot be attributed
to economy or ethnicity as a factor more so than human rights. On human rights, there is a big
difference between those who voted for Barrow and Jammeh and by extension Kandeh. There is
a strong predictor of votes in favorability to Barrow on considerations of human rights than
Jammeh. One of the most important issues that influenced the results in favor of the opposition
candidate was human rights abuses. Even after controlling for ethnicity, human right is a
significant predictor of voting behavior. On the question of ethnicity, even though most people
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would not admit it, there is evidence of ethnic voting between people who identified as
Mandinka, Fula, and Jola respectively. Mandinkas are more like to vote for Barrow, Jola for
Jammeh, and Fulas for Kandeh. These findings are also consistent with the studies of elections in
many African countries Porsner(2004), Collier, (2009).

Examining the voting behavior of a group of people is a complex undertaking as issues
that influences the voting preferences of the people are many and unlimited. However, in the
African continent, many studies of elections and voting behavior by many scholars appear to
indicate that African voters tend to care more about ethnic considerations than they are on other
issues. This study does not dismiss that fact as evidence presented here in the Gambia
presidential elections has indicated ethnic-based voting among the Mandinka, Jola, and Fula

ethnic groups consistent with previous studies. However, one unique contribution these
dissertations advance with regards to The Gambia, and African politics, in general, is that
ethnicity is not the only factor that influences voting perspectives of the people in the continent.
Gambian voters, by extension Africans in general also care about issues, such as the economy,
human rights, and the need for the government to address other social services like roads,
garbage collection, education, and health care, etc.

If voters use ethnicities are cues to supporting a candidate, it is because ethnicity is
functional in the political processes and provide certain kinds of benefits to the people. The
results of this study have not only triggered a new way of thinking in studying elections in Africa
but have also exposed one fundamental flaw of using one single issue, ethnicity as a monolithic
factor shaping the voting choices of African people. The idea that somehow African voters
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behave differently from those in the west, and that they care more about supporting their ethnic
candidates in an election regardless of the issues presented to them is likely to be misleading.
Henceforth, this study contributes to an ongoing academic debate geared towards
understanding the issues that influenced the voting preferences of African voters and to

determine which of these social cleavages are influential in a political system, and which ones
are not. Thus, the question as to whether the Gambia’s case offers a unique example of the
voting perspectives that is different from that of many African countries would be an interesting
study in the future. For now, this dissertation is limited in scope and could not fully address
this question. As stated above, in the Gambia a dictator had organized an election, which he loss
to the opposition. Jammeh's regime was oppressive and whether being a dictatorship he was able

to suppress ethnic politics in the country or was The Gambia's homogeneous makup makes it less
prone to ethnic politics ? These questions can only be answered in a matter of time. For now, one
fact remains, the dictator is gone, the rule of fear and intimidation he uses towards his critics is
also gone with him. While democracy is a process, and a country cannot be classified as
democratic based on holding one single election, and Gambia is yet to pass that threshold. From
all indications, The Gambia is presumed to be a democracy at least for now, and the next
presidential election that is scheduled to take place towards the end 2021 will be first test of the
countrys democratic gains. What will happen from now and then will undoubtedly dictate the
direction of the country.
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